


FM 30-5

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE



HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JULY 1963

FIELD MANUAL

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

CHANGE

No. 1

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C., 19 June 1964

FM 30-5, 11 July 1963, is changed as follows:

CHAPTER 9

ORDER OF BATTLE
(ADDED)

Section I. INTRODUCTION

185. General

a. Order of battle is defined as the identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. It consists of evaluated information regarding the following elements:

- (1) Composition.
- (2) Disposition.
- (3) Strength.
- (4) Training.
- (5) Tactics.
- (6) Logistics.
- (7) Combat effectiveness.
- (8) Miscellaneous data.

b. Order of battle intelligence is an integral part of combat and strategic intelligence. In determining enemy capabilities and probable courses of action, commanders must consider order of battle intelligence together with other intelligence pertaining to the enemy, terrain, and weather.

c. In general, order of battle personnel are responsible for all information concerning foreign military forces. In order to accomplish

his mission, the order of battle analyst has to consider and develop intelligence concerning the order of battle elements as they pertain to foreign military forces. Order of battle techniques employed in support of counterinsurgency operations parallel those used during conventional warfare.

186. Relationship to Other Intelligence

Military intelligence is developed in many fields outside the scope of order of battle, but all intelligence is ultimately related to it. For example, ordnance technical intelligence produces intelligence on the capabilities and characteristics of a weapon, but order of battle intelligence determines the effect of the weapon's capabilities and characteristics on enemy tactics, combat effectiveness, and organization. Enemy military intelligence organizations are of primary interest to counterintelligence, but as part of a military organization, they are also of interest to order of battle because they concern enemy composition, strength, and personalities. The relationship between order of battle intelligence and other military intelligence cannot be overemphasized.

*This change supersedes FM 30-19, 17 June 1959.

Section II. ELEMENTS OF ORDER OF BATTLE INTELLIGENCE

187. Composition

Composition is the identification and organization of units. It applies to specific units or commands as opposed to type units.

a. Unit identification is often called the key to order of battle intelligence because it leads to the answers to many questions concerning the enemy. Unit identification in order of battle intelligence consists of the complete designation of a specific unit. It identifies the unit, indicates what type unit it is, and gives its relative size or strength. Through identification, the order of battle analyst is able to develop, almost immediately, a basic picture of the enemy. Combined with organization, the identification of a specific unit alerts the analyst to the possible presence of other unidentified units of the same organization.

b. Organization is the structure of a unit and the relationship of the various echelons within the structure. A knowledge of the organization of a military force is necessary to develop accurate intelligence concerning strength, tactics, training, logistics, and combat efficiency. The capabilities of an enemy cannot be assessed accurately without a knowledge of organization. The organization of all types of armies is constantly changing. Thus, organization is an element of order of battle to which continuing attention is devoted.

c. The basic, self-sufficient, tactical unit must be considered when developing intelligence concerning composition. A tactical unit is defined as the highest tactical echelon(s) having a fixed TOE. In the U. S. Army, this term would apply to the division; while in some countries the field army is the basic, self-sufficient, tactical unit. The importance of this concept lies in the term *self-sufficient*. Organic units, although capable of independent action, cannot sustain themselves over a prolonged period of time. They are dependent upon higher headquarters or upon that unit which by design is self-sufficient. For this reason, subordinate units are seldom employed independently or separately from the basic, self-sufficient, tactical unit. The following example will show clearly the importance of this concept. An order of

battle analyst receives confirmed reports of a new Aggressor motorized rifle *regiment* in his sector. Knowing that the motorized rifle *division* is the basic, self-sufficient, tactical unit and therefore that its three motorized rifle regiments are seldom employed independently, he tentatively accepts the presence, not of one new motorized rifle regiment, but of an entirely new motorized rifle division. When one of these regiments is located, it may be reasonably assumed that the remaining elements of that division are also somewhere close by.

188. Disposition

Disposition, in order of battle terminology, consists of the location of enemy units and the manner in which these units are tactically (or administratively, in time of peace) deployed. In addition, disposition includes the recent, current, and proposed (or probable) movements of enemy units.

a. Location refers to a geographical location or position occupied by any unit or units. It is important primarily because it answers the commander's question, "Where is the enemy?" Without this information, the commander and his staff are incapable of performing effective operational planning and are unable to make acceptable estimates of the situation or arrive at sound decisions for the employment of friendly troops. Knowledge of the strength and the location of an enemy force assists the commander in determining the capabilities of this force and its effect upon the accomplishment of his mission. In time of peace, intelligence collection guidance is seriously hampered when knowledge of location of foreign military forces is lacking.

b. Tactical deployment is the relative position of units with respect to one another or to the terrain. Tactical formations are designed for executing the various tactical maneuvers. If this deployment can be predetermined, it may lead to an accurate appraisal of probable enemy courses of action. The knowledge of how enemy units are echeloned may indicate (if the enemy assumes the offensive) which units will be used in the initial attack and which units will be employed in supporting and reserve roles. Tactical deployment with respect to terrain is also

important. A study of dispositions, coupled with an analysis of the area of operations, leads to logical conclusions concerning enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.

c. Movement of enemy units is another subelement of disposition. Movement is the physical relocation of a unit from one geographical point to another. Movement is significant because it automatically changes the tactical deployment of the opposing forces and, quite properly, is referred to as enemy redeployment activities. Movement or redeployment is also important for other reasons. When an enemy unit has moved, is moving, or will possibly move in the near future, it becomes capable of a number of actions which affect the order of battle situation. Such a unit can be moving to attack to reinforce or replace another unit, or to perform other missions unknown to friendly forces. In view of these possibilities, a unit movement becomes highly important and must be tracked as closely as possible.

189. Strength

The term "strength" covers the description of a unit or force in terms of men, weapons, and equipment. Information concerning strength gives the commander a strong indication of enemy capabilities and assists him in determining the capabilities and probable courses of action of the enemy force. A lack of strength or a preponderance of strength has the effect of lowering or raising the estimate of the capabilities of an enemy force. Likewise, a marked concentration or buildup of units in an area gives the commander certain indications of enemy objectives and probable courses of action. In time of peace, changes in the strength of a potential enemy are important factors indicating his intention to wage war. The manpower potential of a nation affects the current armed strength, conscription quotas, and mobilization capacity. Strength computation techniques are described in appendix XIII.

190. Tactics

Tactics, in order of battle intelligence, includes tactical doctrine as well as tactics employed by specific units. Tactical doctrine refers to the enemy's accepted principles of

organization for, and conduct of, operations. Tactics, on the other hand, describes the manner in which the enemy conducts an operation in accordance with tactical doctrine. From a knowledge of tactical doctrine, the order of battle analyst knows how the enemy may employ his forces under various conditions or in certain types of situations or special operations. Various types of enemy units can logically be expected to perform according to certain patterns within the framework of tactical doctrine. There are established principles and patterns for the employment of infantry, armor, and artillery in both offense and defense. Any predetermination of the probable patterns of employment and enemy action or reaction is extremely important in the planning phase of an operation as well as its execution.

191. Training

Training is closely related to combat effectiveness in both peace and war. Each type or phase of training analyzed (individual or unit) contributes to the overall picture of potential or actual enemy capabilities. Units usually are engaged in field exercises and in maneuvers during the latter part of the training cycle. Thus, the combat efficiency and capabilities of units at the peak of proficiency can be appraised. The thoroughness, degree, and quality of specialist, NCO, and officer training determine to a large extent the overall efficiency of the armed force.

192. Logistics

Logistics also is closely related to combat effectiveness. The adoption of a course of action is influenced by the ability of the logistical system to support that action. Knowledge of the enemy's logistics facilitates a more accurate evaluation of enemy capabilities as well as strength, combat efficiency, and disposition. Types of logistical information of interest to the order of battle analyst include—

- a. All classes and types of supply.
- b. Requirements.
- c. Procurement.
- d. Distribution.
- e. Transportation.
- f. Installations.
- g. Terminals.

- h. Evacuation and salvage.
- i. Repair and maintenance.

193. Combat Effectiveness

Combat effectiveness is a term used to describe the abilities and fighting quality of an enemy unit or entire national army. Combat effectiveness affects the capabilities of a unit or army. How well a unit will perform in combat is predicted by analyzing:

- a. Personnel strength.
- b. Amount and condition of weapons and equipment.
- c. Status of training.
- d. Efficiency of the officer and noncommissioned officer corps.
- e. The length of time a unit has been committed in combat.
- f. Traditions and past performance.
- g. Personality traits of the unit commander.
- h. Geographical area in which committed.
- i. Morale, discipline, and political reliability (or belief in the cause for which they fight).
- j. Status of technical and logistical support of the unit.
- k. Adequacy of military schooling at all levels.
- l. National characteristics of the people.

194. Miscellaneous Data

Miscellaneous data include various types of supporting information needed by an analyst to contribute to the development of the other order of battle elements. Miscellaneous data include basic intelligence that can be described as "know your enemy."

a. Personality files contain information on certain characteristics and attributes which describe individual members of an enemy military force. A knowledge of personalities is important as an aid in identifying units. In many foreign armies, the average soldier may not know the identity of his unit, but usually

he knows the name of his commander. Personality data is valuable because the tactics and combat efficiency of particular units are often closely related to key individuals.

b. Unit history is defined as the record of past performance or activities of a specific unit. It includes information/intelligence on component elements; on present and past parent units; outstanding personalities who have commanded the unit; and other details which describe, limit, or clarify the capabilities of the unit concerned. The development of unit history is important because it aids in determining the capabilities and limitations of a unit. Military units, like individuals, develop certain outstanding characteristics which distinguish them from other units. Just as they consider the various qualifications and traits of enemy military personalities, order of battle personnel must also consider an enemy unit as a "personality" in analyzing its capabilities and limitations.

c. Information on uniforms and insignia is an important part of know-your-enemy intelligence. This information assists in establishing unit identification and organization and in determining morale and esprit de corps.

d. Some foreign armies use systems of code numbers (and names) to conceal true designations (or affiliation) of units, field post numbers, and vehicles. These code number systems, when properly analyzed, are valuable sources of information related to composition and disposition.

e. The order of battle analyst must be able to recognize and appreciate the capabilities and limitations of foreign weapons and equipment. Although technical intelligence agencies are primarily concerned with the determination of weapons and equipment characteristics and capabilities, the analyst uses this intelligence to analyze the effects of these items on the organization, disposition, tactics, and combat effectiveness of the military force.

Section III. PLANNING THE COLLECTION EFFORT

195. Responsibility

Order of battle personnel assist the G2 in planning the collection effort. At times, they

may be required to draft collection memorandums for the guidance of collection agencies. Planning is a continuous process. As intelligence is developed, the need for new informa-

tion arises, and every effort is made to maintain a continuous flow of order of battle information by timely requests to the collection agencies.

196. Collection

Order of battle personnel do not have a collection capability; therefore, most of the infor-

mation is received from agencies and sources outlined in paragraphs 38 through 62. The G2 section sends information it receives to the order of battle section for detailed processing. From the standpoint of report and source evaluation, order of battle personnel must know which agencies are available and their capabilities to supply accurate information.

Section IV. PROCESSING ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE

197. Introduction

Order of battle personnel are responsible to the intelligence officer for the processing of order of battle information. The intelligence and information received and processed by an order of battle section normally becomes voluminous in a short period of time. In organizing this information, order of battle personnel maintain extensive and systematic filing and compilation systems. Specific items of intelligence and information must be located on short notice and incorporated into comprehensive reports or analyses. This requirement necessitates a high degree of efficiency in the organization and processing of data received.

198. Order of Battle References

Typical order of battle references currently published are—

a. Order of Battle Handbooks. An order of battle handbook (often known as "Handbook of Military Forces") contains background data including descriptions of a foreign nation's political structure, typical organization of that nation's military establishment, the tactical doctrine applicable to various types of military units, and other more technical data, such as the logistical system used and the characteristics of weapons and equipment.

b. Order of Battle Books. An order of battle book is a compilation of current intelligence which shows the composition and disposition of the military establishment of a foreign nation. It is normally published by headquarters of higher commands or at the departmental level. Unlike the order of battle handbook, it contains established intelligence data on major *identified* units and their subordinate elements. It may also contain personality data, a list of logistical

installations, unit history data, and other order of battle data. Changes or updated versions are normally disseminated on a regular basis by the publishing headquarters.

c. Installation Handbooks. Ideally, these books contain complete information concerning every military installation in every city in the country or area of interest. They are useful, particularly during peacetime, for establishing disposition of forces.

d. Miscellaneous References. Other publications and periodicals prepared at departmental and area command levels are of value to the order of battle specialist. These may deal specifically with order of battle or with any and all phases of combat and strategic intelligence. Civilian organizations under contract to the Department of Defense make special studies on various subjects concerning foreign and enemy military forces. These studies are usually detailed and technical in nature, but provide a wealth of special information not otherwise available.

199. Recording Order of Battle Data

a. The recording aids outlined in chapter 3, section II, may be adapted to order of battle use (for example, the index tabs on the worksheet corresponding with the order of battle factors). Order of battle records and files are consulted continually for the purpose of producing new intelligence. Files are established for cataloging incoming information for easy reference, and more importantly, they are used as a basis for comparison and contrast in the production of new intelligence. Because of this, order of battle files must be simple, yet complete. One or more of the typical aids discussed below may be used; the type used depends




Figure 18. Example of a unit workbook.

upon the echelon maintaining the files and the situation.

- (1) Unit workbook.
- (2) Order of battle workbook.
- (3) Order of battle situation map.
- (4) Order of battle card file (STANAG 2078).
- (5) Personality file.
- (6) Military installation file.
- (7) Organizational file.
- (8) Strength file.
- (9) Topical file.

b. Other file systems or forms are developed locally to cope with special situations; however, the primary mission is the production of intelligence. The establishment of elaborate file systems is not permitted to impede this mission.

c. The employment of automatic data processing systems (ADPS) within the field army is inevitable. Implementation of ADPS will result in overall improvement in the speed and accuracy of data processing previously conducted by manual methods. Greater speed and effectiveness in the collation, processing, and dissemination of information and accomplish-

PARENT UNIT 111 Mtz Rifle Division

SUBORDINATE UNITS	CITY	COORDINATES	INSTL	PERSONALITIES	ID OR	REMARKS
					CODE NR	
Div Hq	Stein	PV818147	1 & 3	CG G/D Murdock Edward R		PW No 26, captured 2 Feb 63
219 Mtz Rifle Regt	Delitsch	PU781934	4	CO - Col Oldham Ernest B	16181	Document captured 19 Mar 63
220 Mtz Rifle Regt	Eilenburg	PU852961	2		16182	Deserted 21 Mar 63
3d Bn	Gladbach	PV891024	1			Gladbach residents report bn subordinate to Hq in Eilenburg. 3 Feb 63
61 Mdm Tank Regt	Linburg	PV863106	3	CO - Col Bhartrhari, Kerala N		Agent report 26 May 63
352 Trans Bn	Lehrt	PV825158	1		16195	OB book

Figure 19. Example of a unit worksheet of a unit workbook.

ment of certain analytical functions will be possible because of the versatility and capabilities of data processing systems. To operate effectively in this type of environment, order of battle analysts at all echelons of command must anticipate the adoption of appropriate formats, procedures, and techniques to benefit from automatic data processing.

200. Unit Workbook

The format of the unit workbook depends entirely on the structure of the foreign army being monitored. Typically, the unit workbook consists of a collection of unit worksheets arranged by type of unit or in numerical sequence (fig. 18). Analysts with order of battle books at their disposal may use them as unit workbooks by inserting additional pages as new information is received (fig. 19). Gen-

erally, the parent unit listed on the unit worksheet is of division size or larger. Personalities are listed on the worksheet as a ready reference to the personalities of the unit. Unit, postal, and vehicle numbers are noted on the worksheet and are used in determining order of battle changes or as confirmation of current data. Details which may reveal any facet of the unit's order of battle are noted in the remarks column. Such items as reports of branch insignia, number and type of weapons, and statements of local residents are entered in this column in abbreviated form. The date and the source of information are entered for each entry. The installation column of the worksheet shows the numerical designation assigned a particular enemy installation when plotted on a sketch, map sheet, or town plan attached to the workbook.




Figure 20. Example of an order of battle workbook.


201. Order of Battle Workbook

a. The order of battle workbook aids in the sorting, evaluation, and interpretation of information and in the preparation of intelligence reports. Its purpose and use are identical to those of the G2 worksheet.

b. There is no prescribed form for the order of battle workbook. At corps level and higher, the order of battle workbook is tabbed to con-

form with paragraphs of the order of battle annex of the periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP). Figure 20 shows the method of tabbing the workbook.

c. Information is entered under the appropriate heading or headings as either a complete report or a digest of the original report. All entries contain a journal date and number in addition to identification of the source. Com-



STRENGTH				UNLOCATED UNITS	LEGEND
<u>COMMITTED FORCES</u>				Recon Co, 23 Regt Recon Co, 24 Regt Unident Recon Bn, 22 Div 160mm Mort Bn, 22 Div	I Irregular
	<u>NR</u>	<u>PERS</u>	<u>WPNS</u>		
Mtz Rifle Bn	5	2675	30xHMG		
Mdm Tk Bn	2	420	64xMdm Tk		
Recon Co	2	120	6xMdm Tk		
			6xAmph Tk		
<u>FIRE SUPPORT</u>					
Mort Bn	1		18x160 Mort		
Gun Bn	1		18x100 Gun		
How Bn	1		18x122 How		
RL Bn	1		18x140 Rkt		
AAA Regt	1		24x57 Gun		
			18x57 SP Gun		
<u>REINFORCEMENTS</u>					
Mtz Rifle Bn	1	535			
Mdm Tk Bn	1	210	32xMdm Tk		
Mdm Tk Regt	1	1200	101xMdm Tk		
			3xAmph Tk		
			10x122/152 AG		
Mtz Rifle Regt	1	2555	35xMdm Tk		
			3xAmph Tk		
Recon Bn	1	230	10xMdm Tk		
			10xAmph Tk		
Irregular Co	1	95			

Figure 21. Order of battle situation map.

ments, when appropriate, are added after each entry to show the significance of the report when compared with the overall tactical situation.

202. Order of Battle Situation Map

This is a graphic portrayal of current enemy order of battle, either confirmed or unconfirmed. It shows identification and dispositions of the enemy units and any other information which will assist in developing the enemy order of battle (fig. 21).

a. As a general rule, enemy units down to and including two echelons below the analyst's own level of command are plotted by using the appropriate symbols in FM 21-30. For example, at division, enemy regiments and battalions are plotted; at corps, enemy divisions and regiments. Higher units are plotted to the extent practicable. The foregoing information is only a guide. For example, analysts at theater level who are responsible for publication of order of battle books may plot separate battalions. Peculiarities of enemy organization, the tactical situation, and time and personnel available determine more precisely what will be plotted and what will be omitted on order of battle maps. The time and date of the information are entered below each symbol or plotting.

b. A caption box on the order of battle situation map is an annotation containing information which helps to explain the order of battle situation. Although any number of caption boxes may be used, normally three types are necessary—strength, unlocated units, and legend caption boxes.

- (1) The entries in a strength caption box usually consist of a digest of strength computations in numbers of personnel, type(s) of units, and weapons and equipment categorized as committed forces, their fire support units, and reinforcements (fig. 21).
- (2) It is important that the order of battle analyst be aware of that which is not known about the enemy. He is assisted in this by the use of the unlocated units caption box which calls

attention to existing units which remain unlocated. It is a reminder that maximum effort must be directed toward establishing the disposition of units listed therein and that they remain a threat to accomplishment of the friendly mission.

- (3) A legend caption box is included on the order of battle situation map when it becomes necessary to improvise symbols for enemy units. Within this caption box, the exact meaning of each improvised symbol is explained.

203. Order of Battle Card (Stanag 2078)

Order of battle card files are used to maintain accurate and complete data on any unit (fig. 22). Order of battle cards will be maintained at all echelons down to and including division or such lower levels as may be necessary. (To meet the requirement for more detailed recording and filing of order of battle intelligence, particularly at higher levels, a supplementary filing system may be maintained. This system generally will be based on the component parts of the order of battle card.) Normally, one card will be maintained on each enemy division or any other unit in a position to affect current operations. The order of battle card contains the following minimum information, numbered as follows:

1. TITLE (number and designation of unit/formation)-NATIONALITY
2. CODE NAME (official name assigned by the enemy for convenience)
3. NICK NAME (unofficial popular name)
4. PARENT FORMATION
5. SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS/UNITS
6. FIELD POST NUMBER
7. INSIGNIA
 - (a) Personnel
 - (b) Equipment
8. COMMANDER
9. UNIT HISTORY
10. MISCELLANEOUS
11. LOCATION

ORDER OF BATTLE CARD (STANAG 2078)					
1. TITLE-NATIONALITY:		2. CODE NAME:		3. NICK NAME:	
4. PARENT FORMATION:		6. FIELD POST NO.		8. COMMANDER:	
5. SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS/UNITS: (List only major subordinate elements)		FPN	COMMANDER		7. INSIGNIA: a. Personnel: (Attach patch) b. Equipment: (Sketch)
9. UNIT HISTORY:			10. MISCELLANEOUS:		
			a. Logistics:		
			b. Training:		
			c. Tactics:		
			d. Other:		
NOTE: This card is a summary of OB information pertaining to the division. Other card files containing information pertaining to the subordinate elements are necessary.					

Front

Figure 22. Format for Order of battle card (STANAG 2078).

Back
Figure 22—Continued.

12. TABLE OF PERSONNEL AND MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT (to include initial and effective strengths and casualties (STANAG 2076))

13. COMBAT EFFICIENCY

Note. Data contained in items 11, 12, and 13 are subject to frequent change and are listed on the back of the card.

204. Personality File

Personality data on designated categories of individuals are recorded in a personality file. The purpose of this file is to provide reference material used in the development of other order of battle intelligence. Information on key military figures can be of significant value in the establishment of unit identifications, tactics, and combat effectiveness. The file is kept in alphabetical order. The card (or sheet) contains information concerning the individual's name, rank, current assignment, date and place of birth, civilian education, political affiliation, nicknames, physical peculiarities. Reference also is made to the individual's schooling, qualifications, awards, decorations, chronology of assignments, campaigns, engagements, demonstrated performance in leadership assignments, and important activities participated in, as well as character traits such as morals, reputation, appearance, and mannerisms. Source and date of information are recorded with each entry.

205. Military Installation File

These files are normally maintained during peacetime by higher echelons to facilitate publication of installation handbooks. Separate collection sheets are prepared for each installation (fig. 23). The collation sheet contains all information that has been collected on a particular installation to include the number and types of buildings and their capacities, personnel uniforms and insignia, and major items of unit equipment. Maps, town plans, or sketches showing the location of each installation within the city supplement this file.

206. Organizational File

This file is an efficient and convenient method of showing types of units within an armed force. Organizational files depict the complete breakdown of all units, from the highest type headquarters to the lowest unit, including personnel and major weapons strengths. Since this is rarely possible on a single sheet of paper, a chart showing the general organization of the major unit and individual charts for each of its subordinate units are prepared. Principal weapons and equipment charts may be prepared to supplement organizational charts (fig. 24).

207. Strength Worksheet

This worksheet (fig. 25) is used to maintain a running numerical tabulation of the enemy's personnel and equipment strengths. This information is recorded on committed units, fire support units, and reinforcements.

208. Topical File

This file is maintained when detailed information is desired on new items of enemy equipment, changes or clarification of tactical doctrine, or on any additional data which will clarify enemy order of battle. Cards or sheets are filed alphabetically by subject.

209. Evaluation and Interpretation

The same methods of evaluation and interpretation discussed in chapter 3 are used. An analysis of the order of battle elements is required in the interpretation of order of battle information. The interrelationship of these elements is such that it is difficult to place a greater importance on one than another. Similar difficulty is encountered in analyzing one element without reference or dependence upon another. Therefore, a combination of all data pertaining to all elements is required to accomplish complete interpretation.

TOWN HEIMERZHEIM

COORD 33ULB 5220

INSTL	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	USE	CAPACITY	STRENGTH	UNIT	TIME LAST	EVAL	REMARKS
							INFO		
1	523208 (201-4th St)	5 story, red brick bldg, Flagpole extends from 5th story window	Unident Hq	400	Unk	Unk	0758	B-2	Many high ranking officers and official sedans observed.
2	522211 (Hwy 2 be- tween K & L Sts)	4x 2-story, wood barracks surrounded by 8' board fence	Trps	500	350?	Engr?	0758	C-2	Sentry observed wearing engineer insignia.
3	531215	6x 4-story, red brick bar- racks with 2-story bldg	Trps	1,000	850	Unident- ified Army	0458	B-2	Sentry observed wearing art- insignia. Known to local residents as "Kaiser Eks"
4	533218 (N of Instl 3)	8x 1-story garage-type bldg	gun park	---	---	---	0458	B-2	Probably belongs to unit in Instl 3. 9x100mm guns observed
5	514231	2x 3-story, stucco bldg	Trps	Bn	Bn	1st Bn 19th Mtz R Regt	1257	A-1	
6	535211	Local tng area, obstacle course in NW corner	---	---	---	---	0458	B-2	Believe used by trps from both Instl 2 and 3
7	554205	Several underground bunkers inclosed by 8' barbed wire fence. Guard towers located on each corner.	Ammo dump	10 Tons (est)	---	---	1257	F-6	

Figure 23. Example of an installation handbook explanatory sheet.

MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION, MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT

UNIT	Personnel ¹		Small arms		Mortars	AAA	Antitank artillery			Vehicles			Electronic	
	Officers	Enlisted men	Light machinegun	Heavy machinegun	82-mm mortar	14.5-mm antiaircraft machinegun (dual)	57-mm antitank gun	82-mm sqd antitank launcher	82-mm rcl rifle	AC	Trucks	Motorcycles	MANKO	Radios
Mtz rifle co (3)	18	339	45	6				27		12	3	3		15
Mortar battery	4	43			6					1	2	1		3
Arty battery	6	44				2	3		3	1	2	1		3
Hq and svc co	17	64								24	5	1	1	13
TOTALS	45	490	45	6	6	2	3	27	3	38	12	6	1	34

¹Individual weapons: officers--pistol: enlisted men--5 percent pistol, 35 percent submachinegun, 60 percent rifle.

Figure 24. Example of a principal weapons and equipment chart.

[illegible]

Section V. DISSEMINATION OF ORDER OF BATTLE INTELLIGENCE

210. General

The methods of dissemination are discussed in detail in chapter 4. The order of battle section is usually responsible for most of the enemy situation of the intelligence estimate (sec. II, app. XII). Paragraphs 4 through 9, section II, appendix XII are primarily its concern. Although paragraphs 10 and 11 usually involve the order of battle analyst, other intelligence personnel may also contribute to these paragraphs.

211. Order of Battle Annex

An order of battle annex is a document containing order of battle information/intelligence which normally is disseminated with the PER INTREP. Since it is a means of disseminating newly developed intelligence, only the intelligence produced during the reported period is presented. Appendix XIV provides additional guidance and an example annex.

APPENDIX XIII

ENEMY STRENGTH COMPUTATION (ADDED)

1. General

a. Enemy strength is seldom constant in combat. It undergoes continuous fluctuation through casualties and subsequent replacements. This inherent fluctuation establishes the basic premise that strength figures computed on any military force not under our control can only be approximations.

b. Enemy strength is categorized as committed forces, reinforcements, air, nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare. These categories are normally presented in terms of numerical strength and strength by type unit.

2. Definitions

a. Numerical strength is the expression of a unit or force in terms of numbers of personnel, weapons, and equipment.

b. Initial strength of an enemy unit or force comprises the number of personnel, weapons, and equipment authorized by established and approved tables of organization and equipment (TOE).

c. Effective strength of an enemy unit or force consists of that part, including logistical components, of its initial strength which is currently capable of combat employment.

d. Strength by type unit is the expression of units or forces in terms of numbers of units by type, such as infantry, armor, artillery, and air.

3. Numerical Strength Computation (Stanag 2076)

a. Prior to and at the onset of hostilities, the initial compilation of effective strength is normally compiled from intelligence estimates made at theater level, based upon initial strength and such other factors as:

(1) The degree to which the enemy unit

force is up to initial strength at the time.

(2) Whether war was premeditated.

(3) Whether any warning of war was, or would be, received.

(4) Whether large military forces were maintained by the enemy prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

(5) Whether the enemy was, or would be, committed in other theaters of operation.

(6) Lines of communication—whether interior or exterior; whether by land, sea, or air.

b. Further effective strength estimates are based upon:

(1) Consideration of the previous estimates (if any) of effective strength.

(2) Recent intelligence.

(3) The effects of nonnumerical factors such as logistical capability, time and space.

(4) Losses of personnel (killed, wounded noneffectives, PW) and equipment destroyed or captured. These figures are based on physical count. In nuclear war however, when physical count is impossible, losses are computed from statistical tables.

(5) Reinforcements and replacements (in the absence of other intelligence and where the enemy has secure routes of communications it is assumed that personnel reinforcement can be accomplished within 72 hours and equipment can be resupplied within 6 days).

c. Resultant calculations are expressed as percentages of TOE strength; however, numerical expression may be necessary to present a better understanding of the combat capability

of a force and provide the commander with a basis for comparison.

d. The computation of enemy strength requires the utmost caution and alertness for intelligence that may reveal the enemy's actual strength. This is especially true at the onset of hostilities when *accurate* intelligence pertaining to enemy strength is lacking or inadequate, and the initial strength figure is only an approximation.

4. Numerical Strength Computation Formulas

a. Effective strength—TOE strength minus losses, plus replacements.

b. Percentage of TOE
$$\text{strength} = \frac{\text{Effective strength}}{\text{TOE strength}} \times 100.$$

c. In time of peace, strength can generally be computed by annual induction quota times term of conscript service, plus cadre.

5. Computation of Strength by Type of Unit

a. Strength by type of unit includes the total number of enemy units listed by category and type. Normally, order of battle analysts account for enemy units down to and including two echelons below their own level of command. For example, an analyst at division level would express enemy strength in battalion size units.

b. Expressing strength in terms of number of units by type within an enemy force is stressed because it is a simple, reliable, and a readily understood method of computing enemy strength. At the same time, the order of battle specialist cannot ignore individual unit strength computations. This is particularly important in arriving at a true picture of the enemy's strength compared to friendly forces. The enemy may have eight battalions of infantry in a given area, and only five friendly battalions may be located in the same area. However, because of differences in organization, the total friendly strength may exceed that of the enemy force.

c. Techniques for computing strength by type of unit are thoroughly discussed in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7, appendix XII. Organic or supporting artillery and reconnaissance units are considered and counted as committed forces unless known otherwise. For example, organic divisional artillery is considered committed unless it is located outside the friendly commander's area of influence and not capable of firing support missions. Frequently, artillery units are listed as fire support units when categorizing enemy strength. Numerical tabulation of the committed forces and reinforcements, as well as their individual strengths in personnel and equipment, is maintained on a strength worksheet (fig. 25).

APPENDIX XIV

FORMAT AND EXAMPLE OF ORDER OF BATTLE ANNEX TO PERINTREP (ADDED)

1. Format of Order of Battle Annex

Note. 1. Omit items not applicable and renumber remaining paragraphs.

2. All entries are followed by a comment.

3. Evaluation of source and information, including type source, accompanies each entry.

Classification

ORDER OF BATTLE

Annex____, (OB) to PERINTREP No.____, ____ Corps, _____

1. COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION (See Appendix 1, Overlay). An overlay is usually attached to present the graphic display of enemy units. The initial subparagraphs always consist of identification and disposition; the remaining subparagraphs contain information pertaining to organization. Information concerning identification and disposition is listed by mentioning the highest echelons first, followed by subordinate units from left to right, or top to bottom as displayed on the overlay. Related items may be combined and presented in a single entry.
2. STRENGTH. This paragraph contains information pertaining to enemy personnel, weapons, and equipment losses during the period. Replacement rates and strength figures of individual units may be listed.
3. TACTICS. Only new tactics and deviations from prescribed tactical doctrine are reported.
4. TRAINING. New development and recent changes in training programs or methods of special training undertaken by the enemy since the initiation of hostilities are reported.
5. LOGISTICS. Enter data concerning those items which will affect current enemy operations such as supply status, supply system, and locations of supply facilities.
6. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS. This paragraph includes data on the combat effectiveness of enemy units; either of the entire force or of a major tactical unit. Items indicating morale, spirit, quality of troops and commanders are listed. The ability of the enemy unit to accomplish its expected mission is expressed.

Classification

Classification

7. MISCELLANEOUS DATA. Personalities, unit history, field post numbers, code numbers and names, order of battle changes, and any other item of order of battle intelligence that cannot be properly inserted in preceding paragraphs are listed.

Acknowledge.

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Lt Gen

Appendixes: 1—En Disp Overlay
2—Aggressor Army Org Chart
3—Aggressor Training Pam

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Classification

2. Example of Order of Battle Annex

Classification

Annex B (OB) to PERINTREP 29, 3 Corps, 201800 August 19----

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION (See Appendix 1, Overlay).

a. All PW captured during period are from Aggressor 2d Combined Arms Army. Unit identification include: (C-1)

<u>16 Mtz Rifle Div</u>	<u>30 Mtz Rifle Div</u>	<u>32 Mtz Rifle Div</u>
283 Mtz R. Regt	141 Mtz R. Regt	132d Mdm Tk Regt
294 Mtz R. Regt	142 Mtz R. Regt	
	130 Mdm Tk Regt	
	130 Recon Bn	

COMMENT: 32 Mtz Rifle Div accepted as being organic to 2d CAA. 52 Tk Div previously accepted, completing organization of 2d CAA.

b. Two large missile type weapons mounted on large amphibious armored carriers and several smaller vehicles identified in position vic MP 420513. (B Air 2)

COMMENT: Probably elements of Free Rocket Regt, 2d CAA, previously unlocated.

c. Captured Aggressor field order reveals plans to attach 40 Tk Div to 2d CAA effective 22 August. (B-1)

COMMENT: PW previously reported 40th Tk Div moving to reinforce 2d CAA. Aggressor main effort probably planned for this area.

Classification

2. STRENGTH.

En losses reported during period:

	PW	KIA	ARTY	ARMOR	AIR	VEH
16 Mtz Rifle Div	37	302	2	4	1	21
30 Mtz Rifle Div	16	52	8	1	-	16
32 Mtz Rifle Div	8	12	-	-	-	4
Total 3 US Corps Sector	61	366	10	5	1	41

COMMENT: Personnel losses, which have shown a marked increase during the period, have been sustained mostly by Aggressor combat patrols. Aircraft loss was H1, Observation Helicopter equipped with AERO radar. Overall strength of 2d CAA is generally not affected.

3. TACTICS.

a. PW from 16 Mtz Rifle Div and 30 Mtz Rifle Div state they have been instructed in the event their units are cut off to continue fighting as guerilla units or in small groups, live off the land, and destroy as much US property as possible before gradually infiltrating back to friendly lines. (F-6)

COMMENT: Intensive guerrilla activity in our rear areas could be expected should elements of these units be cut off.

b. Enemy documents captured 07 Aug included a training pamphlet for battalion, company and platoon commanders, written by G/D GRIBOYE-DOV entitled "Tanks Out Front," (Appendix 3). It advocates tactics permitting US patrols and advancing forces to pass through Aggressor lines. A coordinated tank-infantry attack is then made on open flanks and rear elements, with tanks continuing momentum of attack to destroy remaining US forces. (B-2)

COMMENT: Considering Aggressor doctrine that tanks are the decisive arm, the above tactic is assumed a possibility, particularly in view of reports of probable employment of 40 Tk Div (para. 1).

4. TRAINING.

a. Reference paragraph 3b.

b. Indications of Aggressor concern for COMSEC is noted in document captured from 2d CAA dated 10 Aug, directing all subordinate units to immediately initiate intensive training in radio security and communications procedures. (B-2)

COMMENT: ASA confirms Aggressor lack of radio discipline and states that security violations increase during reinforcement and relief operations. Numerous Aggressor security violations have been noted since 17 Aug, further substantiating reinforcement or relief of 2d CAA units.

5. LOGISTICS:

a. PW state Aggressor supply personnel have recently contacted local

Classification

merchants, farmers, and fishermen for supplies of most Class I items. (C-6)

COMMENT: Aggressor either has critical shortage of Class I items or has a bottleneck in supply system requiring local procurement of Class I items.

b. Air and ground reconnaissance patrols have reported Aggressor stockpiling large quantities of supplies and equipment in rear areas of front line divisions. (B-2)

COMMENT: Not normal supply procedures. Significance as yet undetermined. Would indicate Aggressor may be planning major offensive soon.

6. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.

a. PW from 16 Mtz Rifle Div and 30 Mtz Rifle Div state morale is high but senior officers are disgruntled because their units always receive difficult missions while the 32 Mtz Rifle Div and 56 Tk Div have, until recently, been assigned less hazardous missions. (F-6)

COMMENT: Analysis of unit history and recent operations of Aggressor 2d CAA indicates it has usually been highly successful in combat. This, and the fact that 2d CAA has always had fine commanders, would account for high morale in units. This is first indication of dissatisfaction among officer personnel. Report seems cogent, however, since 32 Mtz Rifle Div has not been engaged in combat with US forces in this campaign.

b. PW reports 30 Mtz Rifle Div to be redesignated 30 "Fusilier" Mtz Rifle Div for superior combat record. (F-6)

COMMENT: 3 US Corps rates combat effectiveness of 30 Mtz Rifle Div from excellent to outstanding in comparison to other Aggressor divisions in same sector. 30 Mtz Rifle Div casualties have been comparatively small; no deserters have been apprehended and its operations have been executed with determination.

7. MISCELLANEOUS DATA.

a. Personalities identified by PW: (C-1)

CG, 40th Tk Div	G/D GRIBOYEDOV, Semyon P. (Ref 3b)
CO, 282 Mtz Rifle Regt	Col CARDUCCI, Gherardo S.
CO, 283 Mtz Rifle Regt	Col UNDSET, Bjornstjerne (Acting CO)
CO, 130 Mdm Tk Regt	Col STEENWYK, Martin J.
CO, 132 Mdm Tk Regt	Col MATTEZ, Mario

COMMENT: Confirms previously obtained information.

b. Unit History: Officer PW stated his unit (32 Mtz Rifle Div) trained extensively during 1959 and 1960 in special tactics for assault of river lines. (F-6)

COMMENT: Special training received by 32 Mtz Rifle Div should increase its overall effectiveness when employed in river-crossing operations. No evidence of other units so trained.

Classification

Classification

c. Field Post Numbers: Captured document reveals Aggressor field post numbers being used as identification symbols on documents and messages. First two and last three digits are transposed. Field post number of 46 Mtz Rifle Div will appear as 75031 instead of 31750. (B-1)

COMMENT: Aggressor has employed this system previously as a security measure. Expect this system of transposing digits will occur in different patterns during future operations.

Acknowledge.

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Lt Gen

Appendixes: 1—En Disp Overlay
2—Aggressor Army Org Chart
3—Aggressor Training Pamphlet

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TPMG (1)
TSG (1)
CofEngrs (1)
CofCh (1)
OPO (2)
USASA (2)
USACDC Agcy (5)
USCONARC (10)

USAMC (15)
USACDC (10)
ARADCOM (1)
ARADCOM Rgn (1)
OS Maj Comd (10)
OS Base Comd (5)
LOGCOMD (2)
MDW (2)
ZI Armies (10)
OS Armies (25)
Corps (15)
USA Corps (2)
Div (10)
Bde (3)
Regt/Gp (3)
Inf Bg (3)
Bn (2)

Br Svc Sch (5) except

TAGSUSA (250)

PMGS (275)

USAQMS (180)

USASA Sch (125)

USAAVNS (450)

USASWS (200)

USATSCH (400)

USAWC (5)

USMA (5)

PMS Sr Div Units (2)

PMS Jr Div Units (2)

PMS Mil Sch Div Units (2)

MAAG (2)

Mil Msn (2)

Joint Sch (5)

USATC Armor (5)

USATC AD (5)

USATC Engr (5)

USATC Inf (5)

USATC FA (5)

USASTC (5)

Units org under fol TOE:

17-22 (3)

NG: State AG (3); Units—Same as Active Army except allowance is one copy to each unit.

USAR: Units—Same as Active Army.

For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320-50.

FIELD MANUAL

No. 30-5

HEADQUARTERS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C., 11 July 1963

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

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CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

Section I. INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose and Scope

a. This manual furnishes guidance concerning combat intelligence at division through theater army and comparable communications zone commands.

b. The means and methods of collecting information of the enemy and the area of operations; the production, dissemination, and use of intelligence; order of battle; counterintelligence; and intelligence training and planning are described. Intelligence staff organization, functions, and responsibilities are covered in FM 101-5. Definitions are contained in AR 320-5, and JCS Pub. 1.

c. The material contained herein is applicable to both nuclear and nonnuclear warfare.

Aspects of the material vary in importance with the different forms of war, the scale of use of nuclear weapons, the locale, and the type of military operations being conducted.

2. Submission of Changes

Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded direct to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Combat Developments Agency, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

Section II. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

3. General

Military intelligence is knowledge of a possible or actual enemy or area of operations. It is essential to the preparation and execution of military policies, plans, and programs. It provides a basis for the timing and length of operations to be expected; combat strength required; task organization; combat service support requirements; phasing of support and its buildup; and actions and reactions of allies, neutrals, neighbors, and friendly elements. The term "military intelligence" encompasses both strategic and combat intelligence.

4. Combat Intelligence

Combat intelligence is evaluated information and conclusions about the enemy, including capabilities and vulnerabilities, the weather, and geographic features of the terrain. The commander requires combat intelligence to estimate the probable effects of these factors on his courses of action. He employs combat in-

telligence to determine the best use of his available resources to accomplish his mission and maintain the security of his command. In non-combat commands, combat intelligence provides a basis for security measures, for decisions on the best use of the area of operations in accomplishing the mission, and for determining or anticipating future support requirements.

5. Strategic Intelligence

a. Strategic intelligence is oriented on national objectives. It assists in determining feasible national objectives and furnishes a basis for planning methods of accomplishing these objectives. Factors which influence the military capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of nations are considered components of strategic intelligence.

b. In the production of strategic intelligence, a large volume of detailed basic intelligence on nations is accumulated. This material is produced incidental to the primary purpose of

strategic intelligence. A great part of this basic intelligence is used in the training and operations of military units.

6. Interrelationship of Strategic and Combat Intelligence

a. The distinction between strategic intelligence and combat intelligence is essentially in scope and point of view. Both are concerned with knowledge of foreign nations and with areas of actual or possible military operations. Both are produced by application of the same fundamental intelligence collection and processing techniques.

b. Although strategic and combat intelligence are treated as separate categories of military intelligence, there are several functional categories of intelligence from which both strategic and combat intelligence are derived. Some of these are listed below. (See AR 320-5 and JCS Pub 1 for definitions, and AR 320-5, under "intelligence," for a more comprehensive list.)

- (1) *Order of battle intelligence*. (ch. 9)
- (2) *Technical intelligence*. (FM 30-16)
- (3) *Communications intelligence* (COMINT). (FM 24-150)
- (4) *Electronic intelligence* (ELINT). (FM 24-150)
- (5) *Target intelligence*. (JCS Pub 1)
- (6) *Terrain intelligence*. (FM 30-10)
- (7) *Weather intelligence*.

c. Many subjects of strategic intelligence interest are also of combat intelligence interest.

- (1) Information gathered and intelligence produced for strategic purposes are frequently useful in the conduct of

tactical operations. In this category are maps and charts; descriptions and studies of beaches, ports, rivers, towns, and other terrain features; studies of transportation and communications systems; data on trafficability, cross-country movement, climate, and hydrography; political, sociological, and economic studies; and order of battle studies on foreign armies, navies, and air forces. Field commanders may have to depend almost entirely upon strategic intelligence for their initial knowledge of the enemy and the area of operations.

- (2) Information collected by combat units often assists in the production of strategic intelligence. Interrogation of prisoners of war may provide strategic information on political and economic conditions within the enemy homeland. Technical characteristics of a newly encountered enemy weapon or item of equipment, in addition to being valuable combat intelligence, may be used in strategic intelligence to aid in determining the production of industrial or manufacturing centers.

7. Counterintelligence

Every military intelligence activity has a counterintelligence or security control aspect, thereby making the two operations inseparable. The objective of counterintelligence is to destroy the effectiveness of enemy intelligence activities and to safeguard information against espionage, personnel against subversion, and installations or materiel against sabotage.

Section III. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

8. General

Intelligence operations concentrate on those aspects of the operational environment pertaining to the enemy and the area of operations which influence the commander's choice of a course of action. The enemy situation and the area of operations are analyzed to determine the key elements that affect military operations. Key elements include such conditions as extremes of weather and terrain; enemy use of

a particular form of combat power; implementation of an enemy capability previously held in restraint; or use of resources and characteristics of the area which can make the accomplishment of the mission of friendly forces possible or easier.

9. Geographical Area of Intelligence Operations

a. Generally, commanders at the various echelons need information from different geo-

graphic areas. Also, generally, the area of a higher commander includes that of his subordinate commanders.

b. Combat intelligence plans, orders, and requests, are concerned with definite areas, particularly the *area of influence* of the command. This area is that portion of the assigned zone or area of operations in which the commander, by his own means, is capable of directly influencing operations by the employment of his available combat power (AR 320-5).

c. Intelligence operations also are concerned with the *area of interest* of the command. The

area of interest is that portion of the area of operations from which information and intelligence are required to permit planning for the extension of the area of influence or for the displacement of potential targets into the area of influence. It includes the area of influence; areas adjacent thereto; areas occupied by enemy forces which, if employed in the area of influence, could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission; and extends into enemy territory to the objectives of current and planned operations. Figure 1 depicts the relationship of the two areas.




Figure 1. Relationship of area of influence and area of interest.

10. Basic Principles of Intelligence Operations

Although the product of intelligence operations in the Army varies with the requirements posed by the operational environment (pars. 12-19), certain basic principles guide the conduct of intelligence operations regardless of requirements or available intelligence means or environmental conditions at a particular time or place. These are as follows:

a. Intelligence operations and tactical operations are interdependent.

(1) Intelligence operations within the Army are an integral part of the operations of all units. The degree of success achieved by any unit in accomplishing its mission will be directly affected by the intelligence which it develops and uses. Tactics and strategy are at the same time the cause and effect, respectively, of intelligence operations.

(2) Staff agencies with responsibility and authority for preparing and issuing operational orders and those with responsibility for intelligence operations must work as one team. Only in this manner can orders and plans reflect available intelligence and take full advantage of available knowledge of the situation and of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. Responsibility for coordination rests jointly upon intelligence and other staff agencies.

b. Intelligence must be useful. Intelligence must increase knowledge and understanding of the particular problem under consideration in order that logical decisions may be reached.

c. The best intelligence is valueless unless it reaches the user in time to serve as a basis for appropriate action. Adherence to this principle may involve some sacrifice of completeness and accuracy in the intelligence product. Whenever this occurs, the user of the intelligence must be informed of the loss of completeness or accuracy.

d. Intelligence operations must permit flexibility in procedures. Standard procedures generally make intelligence operations more effective. However, intelligence operations are

based upon reason and judgment; procedures must be flexible to meet unexpected requirements. Procedures which cannot be changed to meet the requirements of a given situation generally lead to failure.

e. Intelligence operations require imagination and foresight. Policies and procedures that limit the imagination or initiative of subordinate agencies are avoided. Intelligence personnel and agencies use resourcefulness so that all available information can be developed and exploited to produce intelligence for the user. Blind acceptance of the continuance of the current situation may be fatal.

f. The nature of intelligence requires constant security measures.

(1) Unauthorized personnel must be denied information about operations of intelligence agencies, sources of information, and the intelligence product.

(2) While the effects of compromise of complete intelligence studies and estimates are obvious, the cumulative effects of compromise of fragmentary information also are dangerous.

(3) A clear distinction between security and secrecy is imperative to effective intelligence processing and use. Intelligence processing agencies must exchange information and intelligence freely and completely to permit production of the best possible and most timely product. Security measures must not hinder dissemination of information or intelligence to those who need it.

11. Intelligence Cycle

a. The activities connected with intelligence operations follow a four-step cycle oriented on the commander's mission. The four steps are—

(1) Planning the collection effort and preparing orders.

(2) Collecting the information.

(3) Processing the collected information.

(4) Disseminating and using the resulting intelligence.

b. The intelligence cycle is continuous. At the same time that new information is being collected in response to direction, other information is being processed and intelligence is being used.

mation is being processed and intelligence is being used.

Section IV. INFLUENCE OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

12. General

a. A discussion of the elements of the operational environment is contained in FM 100-5.

b. All elements of the operational environment do not necessarily have an influence on all operations. However, all operations are influenced by the commander's mission, the nature of the conflict, scale of use of nuclear and other weapons, the nature of friendly and enemy forces, the locale, and the civil population in the area of operations.

13. The Mission

The mission of the command is the single factor of the operational environment that dominates intelligence operations. Intelligence operations are conducted to produce the intelligence necessary to accomplish the mission. Facts are analyzed and interpreted for their significance in relation to accomplishing the mission. Thus, a thorough knowledge and understanding of the assigned mission is essential to proper direction of intelligence efforts. Intelligence operations do not cease in the absence of an assigned mission. Logical missions are assumed and intelligence operations are conducted in anticipation of the receipt of a mission.

14. Nature of Conflict

The same general intelligence requirements for information of the enemy and the areas of operations exist under all forms of conflict. Different types of conflict, however, will normally require that emphasis be placed upon particular aspects of the production of intelligence as indicated below.

a. Cold War.

- (1) Intelligence requirements in cold war operations are influenced by the non-combat nature of military activities. Emphasis is given to the political, economic, technological, sociological, and

psychological aspects of the area of operations. Simultaneously, a requirement exists for information of the covert and overt activities and capabilities of dissident elements. This information is needed to determine the nature of, and initiate counteraction against, the cold war activities of these elements; to provide warning of an extension of the conflict to other forms of war; and to provide a capability for the immediate attack of targets in the event of open conflict.

- (2) Counterintelligence requirements are particularly significant. Covert activities are the norm and a continuous effort must be made to counterespionage, sabotage, political, social, and economic subversion, guerrilla activity, and/or the combination of these activities which constitute insurgency. The counterintelligence effort extends from the individual through the highest headquarters in the area.
- (3) Intelligence collection procedures and techniques vary with the nature of the cold war environment. The term "cold war" encompasses environments from simple political maneuvering between some countries to extremely hot insurgency situations in other countries. Each of these varied conditions demands a change in emphasis upon procedures and techniques. The need to honor political boundaries often reduces the effectiveness of airborne technical devices and requires a modified use of these means and a greater emphasis upon clandestine collection techniques. The nature of the early stages of insurgency limits the effectiveness of technical devices and combat intelligence techniques and also requires greater emphasis on clande-

stine collection techniques. For each situation, collection techniques must be selected in terms of their capability and suitability within the nature of the cold war situation.

b. Limited War. In limited war, intelligence requirements are primarily of a combat intelligence nature. Although the immediate emphasis in intelligence operations is determined by the requirement to support the existing operational situation, the consequences of a sudden extension of the conflict, particularly to a general war, dictates that intelligence operations be conditioned to this possibility. Intelligence operations must produce information and intelligence which will provide warning of an impending extension of the conflict. The overall system, i.e., organization, equipment, and operations, must be maintained in such a condition as to permit ready transition to the greater requirements resulting from the new operational environment.

c. General War. During the opening phases of general war, the emphasis in intelligence operations is on maintaining the security of the command; providing early warning of the start of major enemy tactical operations; protecting intelligence collection means; and providing such evaluated information concerning the nature of the enemy, the weather, and terrain as may be available and required. When tactical operations begin, intelligence operations are oriented toward securing the intelligence necessary to achieve superiority of fires, maintain the integrity of the command, and accomplish the missions assigned.

15. Use of Nuclear Weapons or Chemical Munitions

The use of nuclear weapons or chemical munitions affects the nature of military operations which in turn orients intelligence requirements. For example, the scale of use of nuclear weapons affects the relationship between fire and maneuver. This relationship influences intelligence operations concerned with target acquisition. Similarly, the scale of use of nuclear weapons affects the degree of dispersion required for adequate security of units and installations. Degree of dispersion influences intelligence operations concerned

with combat surveillance and the physical area of operations.

a. Intermediate Scale of Use of Nuclear Weapons.

- (1) An intermediate scale of use of nuclear weapons dictates that combat forces adopt measures which permit speed, dispersion, and a high degree of air and ground mobility on the battlefield. Intelligence requirements emphasize the importance of knowledge of the terrain, particularly the air and ground routes that influence courses of action. Target acquisition for nuclear delivery means is a major activity. Political, social, and economic information of the area of operation is relatively less important to the conduct of the military operation than terrain and target acquisition data. The enemy, the weather, and the terrain are the predominant intelligence factors that permit the commander to judge vulnerabilities, compare courses of action, and arrive at decisions.
- (2) Counterintelligence activities focus on measures to positively protect nuclear delivery means (and associated installations) and to reduce the effectiveness of enemy target-acquisition.
- (3) Techniques and procedures must make maximum use of advanced technological equipment to provide the responsive intelligence operation necessary in nuclear warfare.

b. Unrestricted Scale of Use of Nuclear Weapons.

- (1) In the higher scales of use of nuclear weapons, firepower generally becomes the dominant element of combat power. In such situations, intelligence operations are more concerned with target acquisition and counterintelligence than with the influence of the area of operations on ground and air mobility.
- (2) Emphasis in target acquisition is on locating enemy nuclear delivery means and other nuclear targets.

- (3) Emphasis in counterintelligence operations is on preserving the integrity of the command and on protecting nuclear delivery systems by denying the enemy the ability to acquire targets.

c. Use of Chemical and Biological Munitions. The employment of chemical and biological munitions introduces new factors into intelligence operations. The effectiveness of such munitions, the difficulty of immediately detecting their employment, and the surprise with which they can be delivered combine to present a formidable intelligence problem. The nature of these munitions has created a requirement for special means of detecting biological contamination and for a better means of detecting chemical agents (par. 177).

16. Enemy Forces

Forces opposing the friendly force structure may vary from well-trained, numerically superior, forces—mechanized and supported by ground and aerial delivery means, and possessing a variety of firepower/CBR capabilities—to loosely organized indigenous forces operating with little or no support. These forces can be expected to fully exploit opportunities for guerrilla activities, subversion, insurgency, and sabotage, and to be capable of sustained operations under unfavorable conditions. The diversity of possible enemy capabilities establishes a correspondingly wide range in the commander's requirements for combat intelligence, for security and counterintelligence, and in the system which provides for both.

17. The Area of Operations

An important intelligence task is providing information of the area of operations. The magnitude of this task increases as the locale of military operations changes from a modern, well-developed, and well-documented area of the world to more remote areas of which little or no documentation is available. In such areas, a greater proportion of the collection effort must be expended on the collection of information of the area of operations—particularly the terrain—and on more frequent preparation of an analysis of the area of operations.

18. The Civil Populace

The attitude, actions, and capabilities of the civil populace significantly affect intelligence operations. A friendly populace that actively assists the military force is an important asset in the collection of information and in counterintelligence activities. A hostile populace makes the collection of information more difficult, increases the scope and magnitude of counterintelligence operations, and intensifies the requirements for information of the civil aspects of the area of operations.

19. Friendly Force Structure

Intelligence operations are oriented primarily on aspects of the operational environment external to the command. However, the conduct of intelligence operations is affected by the means available to the friendly force and the organization of the friendly force structure.

a. Means Available.

- (1) The availability and capability of intelligence units and information collection devices are important influences in intelligence operations. For example, a limitation in numbers of aerial vehicles or in aerial vehicle capabilities may result in a reduction in the aerial surveillance capability. This in turn may require a greater dependence upon ground reconnaissance collection means.
- (2) All military units are means for collecting information. The amount of effort devoted to this aspect of intelligence operations varies with the primary mission of the unit. Combat and combat support units normally devote a significant effort toward the collection of information. Other types of units collect information only to the extent that their normal mission activities provide information of intelligence value.
- (3) The availability of support from other Services affects Army intelligence operations. Aerial surveillance/reconnaissance and weather information collection are particularly affected in this respect.

(4) Other governmental agencies may be represented in the area of operations. The agencies most frequently represented are the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. In cold war operations, local State Department agencies are especially valuable in developing current intelligence of the area.

(5) Agencies which collect or process information are discussed in paragraphs 50 through 60.

b. Organization of the Force.

(1) At times, the friendly force structure may dictate that a headquarters conduct intelligence operations which would normally be performed by a higher headquarters. In a small theater of operations, a field army headquarters may be required to perform the intelligence operations normally conducted by a theater army headquarters, or a reinforced division may be required to perform the intelligence operations of a field army.

(2) In combined operations (involving armed forces of other nations), cer-

tain intelligence operations may be a combined effort by all the nations composing the force.

(3) In unified operations and joint actions, the basic intelligence function is unchanged. Intelligence functions, responsibilities, and procedures in unified operations and joint actions are conducted in accordance with Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication No. 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."

c. Composition of Forces. The composition of a force determines some of its intelligence requirements. A predominately armored force has somewhat different requirements for detailed terrain information than an infantry force. Weather information requirements of an airborne or airmobile force are different from those of ground forces. An enemy capability or vulnerability which is an important consideration to one force may not be equally important to the others. These different intelligence requirements influence intelligence operations, particularly the determination of intelligence priorities and methods of collecting information.

CHAPTER 2

COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

Section I. GENERAL

20. Introduction

a. The collection of information is a difficult step in the intelligence cycle. The enemy's interests demand that he make every practicable effort to defeat attempts to gain information about his activities. Accordingly, strengths, dispositions, and movements are concealed; censorship and communications security measures are enforced; false information is disseminated and tactical measures designed to deceive are adopted.

b. In order to penetrate the enemy's counter-measures, every conceivable source of pertinent information must be continuously exploited.

21. Planning and Executing the Collection Effort

a. The first step in planning and executing the collection effort is to determine the intelligence required for decisions and plans. The second step is to determine the priority of need of the different intelligence items. The third step is to balance requirements with collection

capabilities to provide a basis for allocating the available collection means. Collection agencies are then selected and appropriate orders are prepared and dispatched. Their execution is supervised to insure that the required information is obtained in time to be of use.

b. To efficiently plan and supervise the execution of a collection effort, the intelligence officer must have a thorough knowledge of the available sources of information, the collecting agencies, and the type of information that each of the latter can provide. He must understand the operations of the command in order to provide the particular intelligence required for success. He must have a thorough knowledge of the tactics, organization, and characteristics of the enemy. He must be especially competent in the fields of surveillance, reconnaissance, and counterreconnaissance, and target acquisition operations (ch. 5). He should also have a basic understanding of the weather elements and their influence upon personnel, materiel, and terrain.

Section II. REQUIREMENTS

22. General

Information and intelligence requirements are generated by the commander and his staff. They develop during the preparation of plans and estimates for future operations, in the conduct of current operations, in the planning for maintenance of the security of the command, and during the processing of the information.

23. Information Requirements

a. *General.* Complete information of the enemy and the area of operations rarely can be obtained. *Adequate* information must be

obtained, however, to permit determining the influence of the characteristics of the area on both friendly and enemy courses of action; the existence, identification (nature), and locations of targets; and the enemy's capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable course of action. Information of the characteristics of the area of operations, the disposition of enemy units and objects in the area of operations, and of associated activities is obtained from studies or by direct observation. Other information such as average rainfall, temperature, and humidity is obtained by analyses of data accumulated over a period of time.

	PERSONNEL (moving or stationary)			VEHICLES (ground stationary or moving)			WEAPONS (moving, stationary, firing)			MOVING AIR VEHICLES (aircraft, missiles, projectiles)		
	DIVISION	CORPS	FIELD ARMY	DIVISION	CORPS	FIELD ARMY	DIVISION	CORPS	FIELD ARMY	DIVISION	CORPS	FIELD ARMY
COVERAGE	Entire area of influence			Entire area of influence			Entire area of influence			Entire area of influence		
DETAIL	Platoon sized groups	Company sized groups	Battalion sized groups	Columns or groups ex- ceeding 15 to 25 vehicles	Columns or groups ex- ceeding 50 to 75 vehicles	Columns or groups ex- ceeding 100 vehi- cles	Missiles and cannon	Missiles and long range cannon	Missiles	Location, type, velocity, direction of travel, altitude		
FREQUENCY	2 to 4 hours	4 hours	Daily	1 hour	4 hours	Daily	Continuous	Continuous	Continuous	Continuous		
SPEED	30 min	2 hours	4 hours	30 min	1 hour	4 hours	Immediate	Immediate	1 hour	Immediate		
ACCURACY GENERAL LOCATION	150 meters	1,000 meters	2,000 meters	150 meters	1,000 meters	2,000 meters	500 meters	500 meters	500 meters	NA		
ACCURACY SPOT LOCATION	50 meters	100 meters	200-400 meters	50 meters	100 meters	200 to 400 meters	50 meters	100 meters	200 to 400 meters	Varies with characteristics of available AD weapons		

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Figure 2. Typical information needs in the respective areas of influence of division, corps, and field army headquarters.

	STRUCTURES			TERRAIN			ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATIONS		
	DIVISION	CORPS	FIELD ARMY	DIVISION	CORPS	FIELD ARMY	DIVISION	CORPS	FIELD ARMY
COVERAGE	Entire area of influence			Entire area of influence			Entire area of influence		
DETAIL	Groups of structures	Groups of structures	Complexes	Equiv to 1:50,000 map	Equiv to 1:100,000 map	Equiv to 1:250,000 map	Location, frequency, type, time and purpose		
FREQUENCY	12 hours	Daily	Every 2 days	Initial coverage—as soon as possible. New coverage—seasonal or each 6 months.			Continuous		
SPEED	2 hours	2 hours	6 hours	NA	NA	NA	Immediate		
ACCURACY GENERAL LOCATION	500 meters	500 meters	2,000 meters	250 meters	500 meters	2,000 meters	150 meters	500 meters	500 meters
ACCURACY SPOT LOCATION	50 meters	100 meters	200 to 400 meters	Equiv to 1:50,000 map	Equiv to 1:100,000 map	Equiv to 1:250,000 map	50 meters	100 meters	200 meters

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	NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS			CONTAMINATED AREAS			FOR EFFICIENT EMPLOYMENT OF SUPPORT WEAPONS		
	DIVISION	CORPS	FIELD ARMY	DIVISION	CORPS	FIELD ARMY	DIVISION	CORPS	FIELD ARMY
COVERAGE	Entire area of influence			Entire area of influence			Entire area of influence		
DETAIL	Location, HOB, yield, fallout, rainout			Location, type, intensity			Target ident and three-dimensional location		
FREQUENCY	Continuous			Cont after CBR opns initiated			Continuous		
SPEED	Immediate			Immediate			Immediate		
ACCURACY GENERAL LOCATION	NA	NA	NA	NA			150 meters	200 meters	700 meters
ACCURACY SPOT LOCATION	100 meters	300 meters	600 meters	200 meters	2,000 meters	2,000 meters	Varies with characteristics of available weapons		

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Figure 2—Continued.

b. Information Needs at Division.

- (1) Typical information needs of a division headquarters in the division area of influence are shown in figure 2.
- (2) Information of other characteristics of the area such as politics, economics, sociology, and psychology also are

needed to the extent that they directly affect both friendly and enemy courses of action.

c. Information Needs at Corps.

- (1) Typical information needs of a corps headquarters in the corps area of influence are shown in figure 2.

- (2) Corps also needs information of non-physical characteristics of the area. The needs at corps are more numerous and cover a wider area of interest than at division, as the corps is concerned with the longer range planning of projected operations as well as the conduct of current operations (FM 100-15).

d. Information Needs at Field Army.

- (1) Typical information needs of a field army headquarters in the field army area of influence are shown in figure 2.
- (2) Field army needs for information of the nonphysical characteristics of the area of operations are more numerous and cover a wider area of interest than the corps. The army's territorial and administrative responsibilities create requirements for information of items such as road and rail nets, local resources, labor forces, and similar economic, political, and sociological information. A significant requirement exists for information leading to the detection of espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Civil affairs responsibilities are considerably increased in scope and magnitude and create requirements for detailed information of the nonphysical characteristics of the area such as economics, politics, sociology, and psychology. All of the above requirements are characterized by the need for current information and for projection in time and space well in advance of the current operation (FM 100-15).

e. Information Needs at Army Group. The army group is primarily a tactical unit whose functions are to implement broad strategic plans and instructions and to provide long-range operational direction to its major subordinate commands (FM 100-15). Accordingly, the need for information is correspondingly more strategic in nature and is projected further into time and space than that of the field army. It has no significant need for information such as discussed in *d* (2) above. Its need for combat intelligence and strategic intelli-

gence is satisfied by reevaluation and reinterpretation of available combat intelligence considering strategic plans and operational responsibilities; and by information furnished by theater Army, Navy, and Air Force, by other army groups or equivalent headquarters, and by its subordinate commands.

f. Information Needs of Theater Army. Theater army headquarters is concerned with general instructions and policy guidance, and may be concerned with campaign planning. The particular information required is that which will provide the intelligence necessary for formulating guidance to headquarters in the communications zone, army groups, and comparable forces.

g. Information Needs of Logistical Commands. The information needs of logistical commands vary with the mission and territorial responsibilities of each command. For the most part, these needs are concerned with command security and the characteristics of the area of operations. Specific needs are reflected in one or more of the following areas:

- (1) Espionage, sabotage, or subversive activities of enemy elements or disaffected or dissident groups or individuals in the area of responsibility of the command.
- (2) Capabilities and vulnerabilities of guerrillas and dissident or subversive forces (actual or potential) within the area of responsibility of the command.
- (3) Enemy capabilities which pose a significant threat to the accomplishment of the mission, particularly nuclear attacks by any means, air attacks, use of chemical and biological agents, and use of airborne forces.
- (4) Characteristics of the area of operations affecting the accomplishment of the mission, including physical and nonphysical characteristics of both current and projected areas of operations.
- (5) Installations, communications, and other facilities under enemy control which are of potential future use to logistical command units.

19h. Information Needs of Theater Army Civil Affairs Command. The theater army civil affairs command needs information of the area of operations concerning the government, economy, and inhabitants to include their attitude, activities, and such other matters as affect the conduct of civil affairs activities. See FM 41-10 for information needs for civil affairs operations.

20i. Information Needs of Theater Army Air Defense Command. The theater army air defense command needs information that provides intelligence of the following:

- (1) Capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of enemy attack means to include missiles.
- (2) Warning of enemy air attack in time to take air defense measures.
- (3) Capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of enemy electronic means

and practices associated with the conduct of air warfare.

(4) Characteristics of the area of operations affecting location of air defense installations.

(5) Enemy capabilities to interfere with friendly air defense activities.

24. Weather Information Requirements

a. All commanders need information of weather and the intelligence derived from that information. Figure 3 lists the usual requirements for weather information within the theater army in terms of the various forecasts, studies, and summaries.

b. There are two types of weather information requirements. Those established by the Army and passed to the USAF Air Weather Service for action (weather forecasts, studies, and summaries), and those established by the

Weather information	Command area			
	Company	Brigade, regiment, separate battalion, squadron	Corps division	Army
				Communications zone
1. Climatic Information:				
a. Climatic summaries		X	X	X
b. Climatic studies		As rqr	As rqr	As rqr
2. Weather forecasts:				
a. General				
(1) 3-5 day		X	X	X
(2) 48 hour		X	X	X
(3) 24 hour	X	X	X	X
(4) 12 hour	X	X	X	X
b. Special				
(1) 24 hour area flight		X	X	X
(2) Aviation route and terminal		X	As rqr	As rqr
(3) Nuclear weapons		X	X	X
(4) Radiological defense		X	X	X
(5) Severe weather	X	X	X	X
(6) For engineer officer		X	X	X
(7) For chemical officer		X	X	X
c. Long range trend		X	X	X
3. Weather Observations:				
a. Current weather	As rqr	As rqr	As rqr	As rqr
b. Airstrip observations		X	X	X
c. Ballistic observations		X	X	X
4. Weather Summaries	As rqr	As rqr	As rqr	As rqr

Note. See paragraphs 102 through 105 for discussion of weather forecasts and climatic summaries and studies.

Figure 3. Requirements for weather information within the theater army.

USAF Air Weather Service and passed to the Army for action (local weather, temperature, and wind). The establishment, coordination, and consolidation of Army requirements and the supervision of activities necessary to fulfill the Air Weather Service's requirements are intelligence responsibilities.

25. Intelligence Targeting Requirements

- a. In both nuclear and nonnuclear warfare,

an ability to acquire targets throughout the area of operations is a fundamental need.

- b. The effective employment of firepower requires timely detection, identification, and accurate three-dimensional location of targets.

- c. The effective employment of maneuver forces requires more detailed target intelligence than is required for weapons employment, but the *accuracy* of location may not be as critical as it is for the employment of weapons.

Section III. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND THEIR PRIORITIES

26. General

- a. The collection capabilities of a command are rarely sufficient to satisfy all intelligence requirements simultaneously. Therefore, collection resources of a command are directed toward definite intelligence objectives in the priority of their need.

- b. Priorities reflect the criticality of the need for the particular information. No formula exists which can automatically determine priorities. Such determination is a matter of judgment. An intelligence priority in one situation or for one command may not be a priority in another situation or for another command.

- c. Intelligence requirements are categorized as *essential elements of information (EEI)*, and as *other intelligence requirements*.

27. Essential Elements of Information

(AR 320-5)

- a. Essential elements of information (EEI's) are the highest priority intelligence requirements.

- b. An EEI is an item of intelligence or information of the characteristics of the area of operations and the enemy which the commander feels he needs before he can reasonably arrive at a sound decision. These decisions are of the type which involve the mission of the command and the choice of a course of action to accomplish the mission. Any enemy capability that threatens the successful accomplishment of the mission will be an EEI. Any enemy capability or characteristic of the area which is a governing factor in the choice of a course of action will be an EEI. Enemy capabilities or area characteristics which may affect

but will not prevent accomplishment of the mission, regardless of which course of action is chosen, will qualify as other intelligence requirements.

- c. The relationship between an EEI and a command decision at a particular time dictates that the establishment, modification, or cancellation of an EEI must have the commander's approval.

- d. Although EEI's have a special relationship to the commander, they may originate in the staff in the form of recommendations. These recommendations are coordinated and presented for command approval by the intelligence officer.

- e. An item of information or intelligence specified in the unit SOP for collection or dissemination may become an EEI. For example, an SOP may require all units to report immediately items such as "known or suspected targets suitable for nuclear attack or indications of their existence or development." Whether or not such an item is in the unit SOP, it becomes an EEI if it is needed by the commander at a particular time in making a decision with an acceptable degree of confidence.

- f. The nature and number of EEI will vary with the type of operation, the phase of the operation, and the extent and accuracy of the available information and intelligence. For example, in the planning phase of an airborne operation, there might be two EEI's, "What drop or landing zones exist in our objective area? Special attention to xxx." and "What are the enemy air defense dispositions? Special attention to xxx." During the execution phase of

the same operation, the EEI's might be reduced to one, the nature of which would be directed toward the enemy nuclear capability.

g. When the available information and intelligence are complete enough to satisfy the commander in making a decision with confidence, the commander has no outstanding priorities in his intelligence needs. However, at no time is the available information or intelligence so complete that additional requirements do not exist.

28. Other Intelligence Requirements

a. After the allocation of means to collect information required to satisfy the EEI's, the remaining means are used for the collection of information of the other enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and characteristics of the area that also could materially affect the successful accomplishment of the mission. In addition, such information of the enemy and the area of operations must be collected as will aid in the interpretation of the results of the collection effort.

b. Other intelligence requirements derive from command requirements which do not qualify as EEI, and from staff requirements. The formulation and/or announcement of other intelligence requirements and the allocation of collection means to meet these requirements is a staff responsibility of the intelligence officer.

29. Stating Intelligence Requirements

a. When announced to the command, EEI and other intelligence requirements are stated clearly and concisely and preferably as questions. Usually they are concerned with—

- (1) Enemy capabilities, including time, place, strength, or other details.
- (2) Enemy vulnerabilities, including nature, extent, permanence, or other details.
- (3) Enemy order of battle factors.
- (4) Terrain, including natural and artificial obstacles.
- (5) Weather.
- (6) Information desired by higher, lower, or adjacent headquarters.

b. A stated requirement includes enough data to provide guidance for subsequent development

into orders and requests for specific information. This is accomplished by including appropriate questions on time, strength, and area; and by directing special attention to specific units, areas, and activities.

30. Dissemination of Requirements

a. EEI and other intelligence requirements are disseminated to subordinate, higher, and adjacent commands to guide them in preparing collection plans and evaluating information by acquainting them with the commander's priority intelligence needs.

b. The intelligence requirements announced by each headquarters are analyzed by each receiving headquarters to determine whether the receiving unit is physically capable of obtaining information pertinent to the requirements and whether the collection of that information is compatible with its mission. If not, the receiving headquarters does not repeat the requirements to its subordinate elements. Intelligence needs of higher headquarters are modified by a lower unit as required. For example, a corps EEI may ask, "Where are possible crossings of the COTTONWOOD River in the corps zone? Special attention between CRATERVILLE and TRAIL CITY." Subordinate divisions repeat the corps EEI, modifying it to refer to the division zone and directing special attention to only specific parts of the river line within the division boundaries.

c. Intelligence requirements are disseminated by fragmentary orders or by listing in paragraph 2 of the intelligence annex to an operation order, and may be included in the coordination instructions of paragraph 3 of the operation order (FM 101-5).

31. Cancellation or Modification

EEI and other intelligence requirements are canceled or modified by fragmentary orders or by publishing a new list in an operation order (par. 27c). Those which are concerned with the enemy's adoption of a course of action prior to a specified time are automatically canceled when that time arrives.

32. Intelligence Requirements Pertaining to Enemy Capabilities

a. General.

- (1) Enemy capabilities are usually the

first consideration in determining intelligence requirements and their priorities because of the commander's concern with intelligence which confirms, alters, or refutes the existing estimate of enemy capabilities and probable courses of action. All enemy capabilities are not necessarily the subject of intelligence requirements. Enemy capabilities which are apparently impossible of implementation, or are not likely to be implemented, are not considered in formulating EEI or other intelligence requirements. For example, when a delaying action is being conducted against advancing superior enemy forces, priorities concerning enemy defense, delay, and withdrawal are not stated.

- (2) Each enemy capability listed in the current intelligence estimate is usually the subject of either an EEI or some other intelligence requirement. If knowledge of the implementation of the particular enemy capability or course of action is not available, and this knowledge is needed by the commander at the time in order to make a decision with reasonable confidence, then that enemy capability is an EEI rather than another intelligence requirement.
- (3) EEI and other intelligence requirements pertaining to enemy capabilities are not answered completely until the enemy has committed himself to a course of action. Partial answers are produced continually and result in progressive changes to the intelligence estimate. For example, efforts to determine in what strength the enemy may reinforce troops in contact often produce changes in the strength estimate of available enemy reinforcements, and of the enemy's capability to reinforce. Similarly, evidence that the enemy has reinforced certain units changes the estimate of the number of committed forces.

b. Attack Capability. An intelligence requirement concerning an enemy attack directs

specific attention to definite areas and usually to specified times. The areas to which attention is directed are usually avenues of approach determined by analysis of the area of operations and enemy dispositions. If the enemy can attack using several avenues of approach, only one requirement is stated with the different avenues of approach indicated as areas to which special attention is directed. Specified times are most frequently stated when the command's course of action is to attack. Time may be given precisely or may be stated as "before our attack," depending upon whether the time of the attack has been determined.

c. Defense Capability. Requirements concerning enemy defense specifically state the line or area concerned.

d. Withdrawal Capability. Requirements concerning enemy withdrawal usually indicate the line or area beyond which the enemy's withdrawal is of particular interest, and may direct attention to a line or area to which the enemy might withdraw and the withdrawal route.

e. Delay Capability. Requirements concerning enemy delaying actions also specify the lines or areas along which delaying positions may be organized.

f. Reinforcement Capability. Requirements concerning reinforcement ordinarily do not distinguish between reinforcement of an attack and a defense. They simply ask whether available reserves may be employed, and when and where. Other requirements ask specifically whether the enemy will attack or defend. Requirements concerning reinforcement direct specific attention to known reserves.

g. Nuclear Capabilities. When the enemy has a tactical nuclear capability, the stated requirement may be, "Will the enemy employ nuclear weapons against us? If so, when, where, how many, of what yield, and by what delivery means? Special attention to very heavy artillery units in the vicinity of GROTE and possible missile launchers in the vicinity of AVON."

h. Air Capabilities. Requirements as to enemy air capabilities are rarely listed at division, corps, and comparable echelons in the communications zone. Normally, intelligence on enemy air capabilities is disseminated by the

field army and communications zone headquarters because units subordinate to these headquarters do not have the means to obtain the desired information. In airborne and amphibious operations, where enemy air activity is a significant factor, a corps or division commander may appropriately designate an air EEI, especially during the planning phases of the operation:

i. *Miscellaneous Capabilities.* Stated requirements concerning other enemy capabilities might be—

- (1) "Will the enemy employ guerrilla forces in conjunction with his attack? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the heavily wooded area north of MAS-LEM."
- (2) "Will the enemy infiltrate our lines? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the swampy area east of HAYS."
- (3) "Will the enemy employ airborne forces in our sector? If so, when, where, and in what strength? What will be the direction and altitude of approach? What drop or landing zones will be used? Special attention to the area south of YORK."
- (4) "Will the enemy employ amphibious forces on our south flank? If so, when, where, and in what strength? How many landing vehicles of what type will be employed? Special attention to beaches at SAVANNAH and GEORGETOWN."
- (5) "Will the enemy use chemical or biological agents against us? If so, what agents, when, where, and by what delivery means? Special attention to artillery, mortar, and rocket units."

33. Intelligence Requirements Pertaining to Enemy Vulnerabilities

a. Requirements may be designated for developing knowledge of enemy vulnerability to attack, and of other conditions or circumstances

which make the enemy liable to damage, deception, or defeat. Requirements of this category develop intelligence as to nature, extent, permanence, or other details of the conditions or circumstances which produce the vulnerability.

b. The details desired may be listed in the stated requirement or may be omitted if they are numerous and routine. For example, for analysis of nuclear targets, information is desired as to size, shape, composition, concentration, vulnerability, recuperability, and permanence. Since these requirements are both numerous and normal, details pertaining to them are properly omitted. The statement may simply ask what nuclear targets exist in our zone and direct attention to a specific area or activities. When enemy vulnerabilities result from faulty dispositions, logistical inadequacies, or administrative deficiencies, the degree of permanence of the condition may have to be established before tactical plans to exploit the vulnerability can be prepared. Hence, intelligence requirements may ask "if" and "when."

34. Other Intelligence Requirements

a. *Order of Battle.* Information of order of battle factors is often appropriate as a priority intelligence requirement in long-range planning, or when the enemy situation is extremely vague due to a lack of specific intelligence on enemy dispositions or strength.

b. *Terrain.*

- (1) Information of terrain conditions is frequently a priority intelligence requirement in offensive operations. Information usually is sought about obstacles, which may influence either friendly or enemy courses of action. Other terrain data, such as cross-country trafficability and the condition of road and rail lines, frequently are subjects of intelligence priorities.
- (2) In the defense, priorities for information concerning terrain under enemy control may be required to determine enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities.

Section IV. DETERMINATION OF INDICATIONS

35. General

a. Although EEI and other intelligence requirements announce the intelligence missions of the command, collecting agencies normally are assigned specific tasks in the collection of information of enemy activity or of characteristics of the area of operations.

b. Particular enemy activities or characteristics of the area of operations indicate various courses of action open to the enemy. The determination must be made as to which of these enemy activities or area characteristics should comprise a part of the mission of intelligence collection agencies. This determination is based upon the theory that probable enemy courses of action can be deduced from knowledge that certain enemy activities such as movement of units, building of bridges, or stockpiling of supplies do or do not exist. Such knowledge forms the basis for deducing the relative probability of various enemy courses of action. This theory is extended to include enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, units, and installations.

c. Therefore, a necessary step in planning the collection effort is to determine those enemy activities or characteristics of the area of operations which will indicate the answer to the intelligence requirement. This procedure is called "determination of indications" and is a function of the intelligence staff officer.

36. Indications

a. An indication is any positive or negative evidence of enemy activity, or any characteristics of the area of operations, which points toward enemy vulnerabilities or the adoption or rejection by the enemy of a particular capability, or which may influence the commander's selection of a course of action.

b. Indications include conditions and circumstances which result from previous actions or from enemy failure to take action. For example, current enemy dispositions may indicate the adoption of a particular enemy capability or the existence of an enemy vulnerability. Similarly, the enemy logistical situation may favor the adoption of a particular enemy capability or may influence our selection of a course of

action by indicating an enemy vulnerability. The destruction of large enemy forces by nuclear attack may result in a vulnerability which favors our resumption of the offensive. Destruction of river-crossing means in one area by friendly forces may lead to the enemy's crossing elsewhere. The presence of obstacles in a specific area may influence the adoption or rejection of a course of action by either force.

c. Indications provide the basis for orders and requests. The specific information which collection agencies are directed or requested to supply is the information which will confirm or deny the indication (pars. 63 and 64).

37. Analysis of EEI and Other Intelligence Requirements

a. EEI and other intelligence requirements are analyzed to determine the indications which by their existence or nonexistence provide an answer to an intelligence requirement. Normally, these are indications which are likely to exist when the enemy prepares to adopt or adopts any particular capability. Thus, a requirement which asks in part, "Will the enemy attack?" is analyzed by determining the indications of attack which may exist during the preparation or launching of offensive actions. These indications frequently include forward movement of hostile units, forward displacement of artillery, and strengthening of counter-reconnaissance screens.

b. The analysis requires a thorough knowledge of the enemy and the characteristics of the area of operations which can affect military operations. Particularly valuable is detailed knowledge of the enemy organization, equipment, tactical doctrine, and logistical methods; the probable enemy knowledge of the area under friendly control; the personalities of the opposing enemy commanders; and the past performance of the opposing enemy units.

c. At every headquarters, lists of enemy activities peculiar to each indication are compiled. The lists are disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units. For training exercises, FM 30-102 lists activities pertaining to operations of the maneuver enemy—Aggressor.

Section V. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

38. General

a. Sources of information are the actual origin from which information is obtained. Sources frequently are not under friendly control.

b. The source(s) of information pertaining to a given intelligence requirement is (are) an important consideration in the selection of collection agencies. For this reason, a knowledge of sources is essential to the planning of a collection effort.

c. The most common sources of information for intelligence purposes are enemy activity; prisoners of war; local civilians; recovered military personnel; captured enemy documents; captured enemy materiel; enemy signal communications and other electromagnetic emissions; duds; shell and missile fragments; craters; areas contaminated by chemical agents, biological agents, or residual nuclear radiations; nuclear bursts in enemy-held areas; imagery; maps; weather forecasts; studies and reports; and civilian agencies.

d. Other sources of information include informers; intelligence reports and studies prepared by higher, lower, and adjacent units; and reference materials prepared by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the other armed Services and governmental agencies.

39. Enemy Activity

a. Enemy activity is the source of most information of combat intelligence value. The volume and type of information available from enemy activities are limited by the capabilities of the means to detect and observe them and the measures taken by the enemy to mask his activities. For example, radar is limited to line of sight observation. In another case, the enemy may use the noise of artillery fire to cover the sound of vehicular movement.

b. Information that the enemy has not engaged in certain activities is often of greater value than information of what he has done or is doing. For example, information that the enemy has not moved his reserves may influence the commander's choice of a course of action.

40. Prisoners of War

a. Prisoners of war are valuable sources of information, particularly of the immediate battle area and of the effects of our psychological operations. Maximum information is obtained through skillful handling of prisoners of war from the time of capture until interrogation is completed. Interrogation personnel are carefully briefed on the information desired and are provided with aids such as maps and aerial photos.

b. Prisoners of war are interrogated briefly at company, battalion, and brigade levels for information of immediate tactical value. Detailed interrogation of selected prisoners of war takes place at division and field army within the combat zone. Corps may interrogate selected prisoners at division collecting points, and army group may do the same at field army prisoner of war cages. Both corps and army group may interrogate selected prisoners at cages in the vicinity of their own headquarters, in which case they evacuate and hold such prisoners.

c. Procedures for interrogation of Army captured prisoners of war by other Services and Allied forces are prescribed by theater or comparable headquarters. Prisoner of war interrogation personnel of other Services and Allied forces may be attached to army units for interrogation operations. Theater headquarters may establish a Joint Services Detailed Interrogation Center (JSDIC). The JSDIC is a highly specialized unit, staffed by qualified interrogators from all Services to permit thorough exploitation of military, technical, psychological, political, economic, and other areas of information. FM 30-15 (C) contains guidance for use of Interrogation Prisoner of War (IPW) specialists in U.S. Army command echelons and for discussion of techniques of prisoner of war interrogation. Actions of capturing units are discussed in FM 30-7. Handling of prisoners of war is discussed in FM 19-40.

41. Local Civilians

a. Civilians who have been within enemy-controlled areas may be valuable sources of information. Civilians in recently captured areas often give information readily. However, they

States as necessary. Details of their operations are contained in FM 30-16.

58. Special Staff Officers

Special staff officers and the troops under their control obtain information of intelligence value in the conduct of their normal duties. Special staff officers furnish the intelligence officer information and intelligence obtained through technical service channels. All special staff officers are capable of advising on enemy activities which are similar to those within their area of staff interest. The following special staff officers can furnish information of the types indicated:

a. Chemical. Information and intelligence are provided on enemy chemical and biological troops, materiel, installations, tactics, and capabilities; location, size, duration, and effects of chemical and biological contamination; and on location, extent, and degree of radiological contamination caused by or expected from nuclear weapons.

b. Engineer. Information and intelligence are provided on terrain, enemy fortifications, engineer troops, tactics, materiel, and capabilities. Terrain information includes stream data (width, depth, condition of banks and bottom, rate of flow); landing beach data, trafficability studies; traffic and road conditions within the area of operations; port, railroad, canal, pipeline, airfield and bridge data; and data concerning barrier target acquisition and site selection for ADM. (See FM 30-10.) Special engineer units, including engineer terrain detachments, prepare terrain studies, topographic maps, terrain models, and map supplements. Engineers also provide flood warning service (FM 5-30).

c. Medical. Information is provided on medical and public health aspects to include health hazards due to weather or disease; and on capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of enemy medical materiel and methods. Medical data from documents pertaining to enemy personnel under medical treatment also furnish valuable information.

d. Ordnance. Information and intelligence are furnished on the capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of enemy ordnance materiel;

maintenance methods and weaknesses; and location and composition of enemy ammunition stocks.

e. Provost Marshal. Information is provided on incidents involving enemy agents, saboteurs, guerrillas, bypassed units, enemy raiding parties, and other security threats.

f. Quartermaster. Information is furnished on the location and size of enemy petroleum and general supplies stocks; recognition aspects of enemy uniforms and insignia; and capabilities, limitations, and adequacy of enemy quartermaster-type materiel and services.

g. Signal. Information is furnished on the capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of enemy signal equipment and personnel to include the presence and use of special equipment such as radar, infrared, and other sensory devices, and enemy signal and electronic warfare practices; and the status of civilian communications systems in the area of operations.

h. Transportation. Information is provided on status of enemy transportation; operational characteristics; capacities, adequacy, and military use of transportation routes; and on equipment in the area of operations to include railroads, highways, waterways, ports, and beaches, with particular reference to capabilities to move units.

i. Staff Weather Officer. Climatic information, to include weather observations and weather summaries, is provided.

59. Stay-Behind Units

Stay-behind units are combat elements isolated in the enemy rear either deliberately or as a result of combat operations. In either circumstance, they are valuable for collecting information of enemy activities or for target acquisition. To be most effective, stay-behind units should be specially trained and equipped. They should be especially well equipped with suitable communication means. As part of the normal training program, all units should be trained in stay-behind roles in the event of isolation in the enemy rear area.

60. Agencies for Operation Behind Enemy Lines

a. Target acquisition and the collection of information of enemy activity deep in enemy

territory are highly suitable missions for long-range patrols, raiders, target survey teams (LRSS), clandestine agents, U.S. Army Special Forces, and guerrillas.

b. Long-range patrols, raiders, and target survey teams are usually controlled by corps and field army headquarters. Clandestine agents are usually controlled by field army and higher headquarters. U.S. Army Special Forces and guerrillas are usually controlled by the theater headquarters. In requesting the use of an agency, the requesting headquarters must consider the time required to process the request to the controlling headquarters, and the time required for the desired information to return.

c. The principal factors that limit the operations of these agencies in the collection of information are limited mobility and the necessity to escape detection. Generally, these agencies depend upon foot mobility; thus they cannot

move rapidly from one area to another in search of information. Furthermore, their movement is limited by threat of detection and by logistical problems. Threat of detection also limits their communications capabilities. Continuous communication with friendly forces is precluded because of the possibility of disclosing the presence of the agency or of revealing the location of communications facilities.

61. Other Services

Collection facilities of the Air Force and Navy include air reconnaissance and many other means which collect large quantities of information useful in producing intelligence to meet Army requirements.

62. Availability of Agencies

The agencies usually available at various echelons within the theater army are shown in appendix IV.

Section VII. ORDERS AND REQUESTS

63. Formulation of Orders and Requests

a. Orders and requests for specific information are based on indications (pars. 35-37). Collection agencies are directed or requested to supply the information which will confirm or deny the indications. Collection agencies are not given the responsibility for determining that the information obtained confirms or denies an indication. If location of hostile artillery in depth is a defense indication, collection agencies are not ordered to "report whether or not hostile artillery is located in depth." Instead, they are ordered to "report locations of hostile artillery in your zone." Determination of whether the indication has been substantiated is based on the information furnished. Orders and requests for information deal with a specific enemy activity, location, or characteristic, or a specific terrain or weather condition. These orders and requests are specific as to what information is desired and where it may be found. For example, the forward movement of hostile troops has been determined to be an *indication* of reinforcement. An analysis of the road nets, communications centers, and locations of enemy forces—integrated with a

knowledge of the enemy's tactical doctrine—indicates what routes the enemy most probably will use and where the effort of available collecting agencies should be concentrated. A proper order to collecting agencies is "report volume, type, and direction of traffic on the following roads:***."

b. Orders and requests based on indications of enemy vulnerabilities are formulated in the same manner. For example, it may have been determined that for an intelligence requirement, "Is the enemy vulnerable to a nuclear attack?" a battalion-sized troop unit disposed within a given area is the minimum target suitable for nuclear attack. Collecting agencies are not ordered to "report locations of battalions vulnerable to nuclear attack." Instead, they are ordered to "report location, composition, disposition, size, shape, and nuclear defense measures of battalion-sized troop units."

c. Orders and requests for specific information frequently deal with specific characteristics of the area of operations. For example, an intelligence requirement may ask, "What obstacles exist in our zone?" Map study reveals that streams cross the axis of advance. This is

an indication that natural obstacles may exist. The extent to which a located stream is actually an obstacle becomes the subject for orders and requests for specific information. Accordingly, the order or request to a collection agency may state, "Report width, depth, velocity, and condition of banks and bottom of JON River between WALIS and HERMANN."

d. Collecting agencies do not restrict their efforts to items specifically mentioned in orders and reports from higher headquarters. All pertinent information, even if not specifically requested, is reported.

64. Dissemination of Orders and Requests

Orders and requests for specific information are transmitted either as fragmentary orders or by means of the intelligence annex. Security is provided in the transmission of orders and requests, because enemy knowledge of our requirements would furnish him a basis for deducing the extent of our knowledge of his situation and our possible intentions.

a. Fragmentary orders are used most frequently because information requirements continually change.

b. Intelligence and intelligence instructions, to include orders and requests for the collection

of information, are disseminated by means of the intelligence annex. This annex normally accompanies each complete operation order issued by division and higher commands. The form for the intelligence annex, with examples, is contained in FM 101-5.

- (1) Paragraph 3 of the intelligence annex, "Orders and Requests for Information," implements the collection plan. It contains a complete list of current orders and requests for information. Except for collection orders which are a part of the unit SOP, previously issued collection orders and requests not repeated in the intelligence annex are automatically canceled. When orders and requests are lengthy, they may be placed in an appendix to the intelligence annex.
- (2) Paragraph 4 of the intelligence annex lists under separate subparagraphs items not covered in the previous paragraphs or items which require action different from that prescribed in the unit SOP. In preparing paragraph 4, the intelligence officer consults supporting intelligence agencies as appropriate.

Section VIII. THE COLLECTION WORKSHEET

65. General

a. Although a collection plan may be formulated mentally, a written collection worksheet is a valuable aid in the planning and supervision of collection activities. It assists in coordinating and integrating the efforts of collection agencies, and in keeping all elements of the intelligence section informed of collection activities directed by the headquarters. The collection worksheet is supplemented, as required, by other worksheets or plans such as those for air and ground reconnaissance and observation.

b. The collection worksheet covers an entire operation. Since the collection effort involves continuous planning, an entirely new collection worksheet rarely is prepared except when a unit first enters combat. The collection worksheet is continually revised as required. In effect, it is a sort of blackboard on which new

entries are added as necessary and obsolete entries are removed.

66. Contents of the Collection Worksheet

a. A collection worksheet includes the following:

- (1) The EEI and other intelligence requirements, usually stated in question form.
- (2) The indications pertinent to the EEI and other intelligence requirements.
- (3) The specific information sought in connection with each indication.
- (4) The agencies to be used to obtain the required information.
- (5) The place and time the information is to be reported if not specified in the unit SOP.

UNIT:

Period covered: From:

To:

(1) <i>Essential elements of information and other required intelligence items</i>	(2) <i>Indications (analysis of items in column (1))</i>	(3) <i>Basis for specific orders or requests</i>	(4) <i>Agencies to be used</i>						(5) <i>Place and time at which information is to be reported</i>	(6) <i>Remarks</i>
			<i>List all available agencies to be used in the collection of required information</i>							
List the EEI announced for the operation or period and other required intelligence items, spaced sufficiently to permit entry in column (2) of all indications pertinent to each item.	List opposite each item in column (1) those indications that best provide an answer to the question asked or implied by each item.	List the specific information sought in connection with each indication.	Place a cross (X) under each agency that has or can get the information bearing on each indication. The agency (or agencies) finally selected to obtain the information is indicated by circling (X) except for SOP items for agencies under the control of the unit.						Place: Headquarters or staff section to which information is to be reported if other than the issuing headquarters. Time may be a specific time, periodically, or as the information is obtained.	Notes for future actions and to indicate progress of the collection effort.

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Figure 4. A collection worksheet.

(6) A column to indicate the progress of the collection effort and notes for future action.

b. Figure 4 shows a collection worksheet. Subsequent paragraphs of this section amplify use of columns 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the worksheet.

c. Appendix V contains an example of a partially completed collection worksheet.

67. Basis for Specific Orders and Requests

a. There are frequent duplications in column 3. Not every entry is the basis for a separate order or request. The same specific information item may be sought in connection with several different indications. Indications of attack may include "location of artillery well forward;" indications of defense may include "location of artillery laterally and in depth." In both cases, the specific information desired from collection agencies is location of artillery by type and caliber.

b. The wording of an order or request is not necessarily the same as that used in this column. Frequently, the contents of several entries are combined into a single order or request.

68. Agencies To Be Used

a. All available collection agencies usually are listed at the top of column 4. Military intelligence specialist agencies such as prisoner of war interrogators and imagery interpreters may be specifically listed or grouped together. Supporting intelligence collection agencies also are listed.

b. Opposite each basis for specific orders or requests, an X is entered in the column of each collection agency capable of furnishing the required information. The factors of suitability, multiplicity, and balance (par. 51) are applied and circles are drawn around the X's of the agencies to be ordered or requested to furnish the information. An exception to this technique is the handling of SOP items for agencies under the control of the headquarters (par. 71).

69. Place and Time of Reporting Information

a. Information may be required by or at a specified time or times, at specified intervals, or upon the occurrence of specific events. A one-time report, as on the condition of a river bottom, may be required by a specified time.

Reports on certain enemy activities may be desired at specified times. Such a report may be required daily at the beginning of morning nautical twilight and at the end of evening nautical twilight. Reports of other enemy activities, such as movement along particular roads, may be required periodically, i.e., "every 4 hours beginning at 0800." Reports of identification of new units, enemy aerial activity, artillery bombardment, nuclear activity, and similar items, are usually required as obtained. Periodic negative reports pertaining to specified activities may also be required.

b. Entries in column 5 are determined in consultation with the operations officer. Information which arrives too late is of no value. Information received too soon may be inaccurate by the time it is used.

c. When the collection agency requires time for preparation before undertaking the task, allowance is made for the time needed to issue orders, prepare personnel for the mission, execute the mission, and report the results.

70. Remarks

a. Miscellaneous notes on the progress of the collection effort and notes for future action are recorded in column 6, "Remarks." A code consisting of plus and minus signs, check marks, and crosses may be used for showing whether positive or negative reports have been received, whether information is inadequate, or whether the indication concerned has been substantiated.

b. Notes on future cancellation or implementation of orders and requests, modifications of EEI and other intelligence requirements upon the occurrence of specific events, or other actions to be taken as the collection effort progresses are also entered in column 6.

71. SOP Items

As the collection worksheet is a means of facilitating analysis of the EEI and other intelligence requirements and insuring that pertinent orders and requests have been issued, entries are also made concerning information items specified by unit SOP. For example, SOP's ordinarily direct subordinate units to report newly obtained identifications immediately. Nevertheless, the collection worksheet is completed with respect to new unit identifications exactly as it would be if the SOP did not require such reporting. For such items, however, the X's under agencies to be used need not be encircled and "SOP" may be entered in the "Remarks" column to indicate that an order is not necessary. If the basis for specific orders or requests directs attention to a specific area, the item is treated as if it were not an SOP item even though it may be a type of information covered in the unit SOP. For example, the unit SOP may prescribe reporting the location of hostile minefields, demolitions, and other defensive works. However, a requirement for reporting the location of minefields in the vicinity of a specific area is not treated as an SOP item.

CHAPTER 3

PROCESSING OF INFORMATION

Section I. INTRODUCTION

72. General.

Processing is the step in the intelligence cycle whereby information becomes intelligence. Processing consists of three operations:

a. *Recording*, which is reducing information to writing or some form of graphical representation and the grouping together of related items.

b. *Evaluation*, which is a critical appraisal of information as a basis for its subsequent interpretation.

c. *Interpretation*, which is the process of determining the significance of the information with respect to information and intelligence already known, and drawing conclusions as to the probable *meaning* of the evaluated information.

73. Processing Procedure

a. Information is processed as received without waiting to collect additional information. The intelligence derived from incomplete information may be essential, particularly for nuclear targets. There is always a timelag between the buildup of a target and the time the information is available. Complete information of the target may not be available until after the target has begun to dissipate. If time permits, a search is directed for additional information to complete, confirm, or refute the intelligence developed from incomplete information.

b. The sequence in processing depends upon the nature and urgency of the information.

Usually, recording is first. For urgent items, recording may occur simultaneously with evaluation and interpretation, or even later. Information that is not pertinent is not processed. Information needed immediately by higher, lower, or adjacent units is disseminated immediately. Information not of immediate concern, but of possible present or future value, is completely processed, usually before being disseminated.

c. Evaluation and interpretation may be instantaneous and may be followed by immediate dissemination. For example, information from a reliable source and believed to be true may state that the enemy is about to launch a major attack. In this case, recording is of secondary importance and the intelligence report that an attack is imminent is disseminated at once.

d. Information is sometimes relayed to a higher echelon before any processing takes place. For example, to speed up production of intelligence related to nuclear targets, a commander may order that all information concerning specified enemy units, areas, or activities be reported without processing at any lower headquarters.

e. Figure 5 illustrates the flow of processing at a division, corps, or field army headquarters having a tactical operations center (TOC). The upper portion reflects processing when the message is first received at the TOC. The lower portion reflects processing when the message is first received at the G2 section outside the TOC.




Figure 5. Flow of processing.

Section II. RECORDING

74. General

a. Recording makes subsequent interpretation easier and more accurate, and facilitates preparation of intelligence reports by drawing together in convenient form all available information on a specific subject. The recording means used must be adequate to handle the volume of information and intelligence received and to serve the needs of those who must have access to it. Means and techniques of recording should permit timely dissemination of information and intelligence.

b. At headquarters above division, recording is of increased importance and complexity. Maximum use should be made of mechanical equipment and, when developed, automatic data processing systems.

c. Common aids currently used in recording are—

- (1) The journal.
- (2) Situation maps.
- (3) The intelligence worksheet.
- (4) Intelligence files.

75. Journal

The journal is a chronological log of intelligence activities covering a stated period, usually 24 hours. It is an index of reports and messages that have been received and transmitted, and of important events that have occurred. The journal is a permanent and official record. FM 101-5 gives an example of a staff journal.

76. Situation Maps

a. The enemy situation map is a temporary graphic record of the current dispositions and major activities of the enemy. Information of friendly forces on this map is usually limited to boundaries; location of command posts of higher, lower, and adjacent units; reconnaissance units; and the forward edge of the battle area. Separate overlays are often used to display separate categories of information. A typical overlay shows fortifications; another shows potential nuclear targets; and still another presents details of order of battle. The latest time at which the activity was observed

or the disposition was confirmed should be indicated when plotting enemy activities and dispositions.

b. Other information and intelligence aspects of the situation may be recorded on situation maps. Chemical officers at respective headquarters, for example, record CBR data on situation maps, and engineer officers similarly record mine and obstacle data.

c. Permanent recording of the information on situation maps is achieved by overlay tracing or photographing the map periodically.

77. Intelligence Worksheet

a. The worksheet aids in the sorting, evaluation, and interpretation of information and in the preparation of intelligence reports. It is not a permanent record and it is not distributed. The worksheet is kept current and obsolete entries are deleted. Specialized worksheets are usually maintained by each branch of the intelligence section at field army and higher headquarters.

b. There is no prescribed form for the worksheet. At division and lower headquarters, index tabs are labeled to assist in the preparation of paragraphs of the intelligence summary (INTSUM) (par. 95). At corps and higher headquarters, index tabs are labeled to assist in the preparation of the periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP) (par. 96). Figure 6 shows a type division level worksheet.

c. Information from incoming messages and reports is entered in the worksheet under appropriate headings. For example, at division, information on the identification of a new infantry unit would be recorded under "New Identifications" as well as "Infantry" (fig. 6). A message that furnishes information on different subjects results in several entries, none of which usually quotes the entire message. For example, a message containing information on the locations of a reserve armor unit and an artillery unit results in extracts under "Armor" and under "Artillery." Each entry in the worksheet based on an incoming message includes reference to the journal serial number

The diagram illustrates a typical division level intelligence worksheet. It consists of a main worksheet and a series of tabs for different intelligence categories. The main worksheet is labeled "G2 WORKSHEET" and has fields for "(Classification)", "Headquarters, _____", "Div _____", and another "(Classification)" field at the bottom. The tabs are labeled "Armor", "Infantry", and "Artillery". The "Artillery" tab is further divided into a list of categories: Air, Other forces, Potential nuclear targets, Nuclear activity, CBR Activity, Other activity, Personnel losses, Equipment losses, Obstacles and barriers, Administrative activities, New identifications, Enemy movements (units), Vehicular movements, Weather and terrain conditions, Counterintelligence, and Morale and combat efficiency.

Figure 6. Typical division level intelligence worksheet.

of that message. For example: "J2, 091200 April, from 20th Engr Cbt Bn: Bridge at LINDEN (2146) destroyed by bombing. Estimated out of action for 30 hours." "J2" refers to the journal serial number. The date-time group entered refers to the time of occurrence of the event.

78. Intelligence Files

Files are necessary to permit ready access to all available information. The files most commonly maintained are—

a. The *journal file*, which contains a copy or

record of each message or document entered in the journal. It supports the journal (par. 75).

b. The *information or reference file*, which is a cross-index file of all information of possible future value. Much information is collected which has no immediate interest but may be of future value. Because of the large volume of information filed at field army and higher headquarters, devices such as punch cards and electronic sorting machines are used where possible.

c. Order of battle files are described in chapter 9. Other specialized intelligence files are described in field manuals of the 30-series.

Section III. EVALUATION

79. General

a. Evaluation includes determining the pertinence of the information, the reliability of the source and agency through which the information was derived, and its accuracy.

b. The system discussed in paragraph 83 has been standardized for use by NATO Army Forces in indicating the reliability of source and accuracy of information (STANAG No. 2022, Edition No. 2).

80. Pertinence

The examination of information for pertinence specifically determine—

a. Whether the information pertains to the enemy or the characteristics of the area of operations.

b. Whether the information is needed immediately, and if so, by whom.

c. Whether the information is of possible present or future value, and if so, to whom.

81. Reliability

a. The source of information and the agency by which it was collected both are evaluated for reliability. The principal basis for judging the reliability of a source and an agency is previous experience. Experience with a particular enemy may indicate that prisoners of war are generally either reliable or unreliable sources. Members of some enemy units or nationalities may have proved to be more reliable sources than members of other units or nationalities. Knowledge of the training, experience, and past performance of troop units indicates the reliability of those units as collecting agencies. An additional test of source and agency reliability is "Under the conditions existing at the time, could this information have been obtained?"

b. The headquarters closest to the source and agency is ordinarily the best judge of the reliability of the source and agency. Consequently, higher headquarters normally accepts the reliability evaluation of the lower headquarters, and will consider only the reliability of the reporting headquarters.

82. Accuracy

a. Accuracy means the probable truth of the

information. Judgment of accuracy is based on the answers to the following questions:

- (1) Is the reported fact or event at all possible?
- (2) Is the report consistent within itself?
- (3) Is the report confirmed or corroborated by information from different sources or agencies?
- (4) Does the report agree or disagree in any way with other available information, particularly with information known to be true?
- (5) If the report does not agree with information from other sources or agencies, which is more likely to be true?

b. The most reliable method of judging accuracy is by comparison with other information. The intelligence officer, where possible, obtains the same information through different agencies and from many sources.

c. Marked differences in the evaluation of the accuracy of information may occur between higher and lower echelons. The reason for this is that higher echelons, which have more sources of information and intelligence than lower echelons, have a correspondingly greater opportunity to confirm, corroborate, or refute the accuracy of reported data. Regardless of the source, the accuracy of incoming information and intelligence is reevaluated at each echelon.

83. Evaluation Rating

a. The evaluation of each item of information is indicated by a standard system. The evaluation of reliability is shown by a letter and the evaluation of accuracy by a numeral. Evaluation ratings are made at the lowest headquarters possible. If information is incomplete, a partial evaluation rating may be given.

b. Evaluation of the reliability of source and agency is shown as follows:

- A—Completely reliable
- B—Usually reliable.
- C—Fairly reliable.
- D—Not usually reliable.
- E—Unreliable.
- F—Reliability cannot be judged.

(1) An A evaluation of source is assigned under only the most unusual circumstances. For example, when the source has long experience and extensive background with the type of information reported. A rating of B indicates a source of known integrity. An F rating is assigned when there is no adequate basis for estimating the reliability of the source.

(2) Agencies are ordinarily rated A, B, or C. However, when the source of an item and collecting-reporting agency are evaluated differently, only the lower degree of reliability is indicated.

c. Evaluation of the accuracy of an item of information is indicated as follows:

1—Confirmed by other sources.

If it can be stated *with certainty* that the reported information originates from a source other than that for already existing information on the same subject, it will be classified as "confirmed by other sources" and will be rated "1."

2—Probably true.

If no proof in the above sense can be established, and if no reason exists to suspect that the reported information comes from the same source as the information already available on this subject, it will be classified as "probably true" and will be rated "2."

If the contents of the report are confirmed in essential parts by information already available, the above procedure will also apply to unconfirmed information contained in the report.

3—Possibly true.

If the investigation reveals that the reported facts—on which no further information is yet available—comply with behavior of the target as observed up to now, or if the known background of a person leads to the conclusion that he might have acted as reported, the information received will be classified as "possibly true" and will be rated "3."

4—Doubtfully true.

Reported but unconfirmed information the contents of which contradict the es-

timate of the development or the hitherto known behavior of the target will be classified as "doubtful" and will be rated "4" as long as this information cannot be disproved by available facts.

5—Improbable.

Reported information which is not confirmed by available data and which contradicts the experience hitherto assumed to be reliable with regard to the development of a case is classified as "improbable" and will be rated in category "5." The same classification is given to reported information that contradicts existing data on a subject originally rated "1" or "2."

6—Truth cannot be judged.

If the investigation of a report reveals that a basis for allocating ratings "1" to "5" is not given, the reported information will be classified as "Truth cannot be judged" and will be rated "6."

The statement that a report cannot be judged as to accuracy must always be preferred to an inaccurate use of the ratings "1" to "5." However, a rating "1" or "2" should always be tried; but if such a rating is not possible because of lack of other information on the same target, the rating "6" has to be given.

d. Although both letters and numerals are used to indicate the evaluation of an item of information, they are independent of each other. A completely reliable agency may report information obtained from a completely reliable source which, on the basis of other information, is judged to be improbable. In such a case, the evaluation of the information is A-5. A source known to be unreliable may provide information that is confirmed by other sources and is of undoubted accuracy. In such a case, a report is evaluated E-1. A report evaluated F-6 may be accurate and should not be arbitrarily discarded.

e. A report disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units contains the evaluation for each item of information. For example, "The division artillery of the Aggressor 42d Tk div can fire nuclear rounds of 0.5 KT yield (C-3)***."

Section IV. INTERPRETATION

84. General

Interpretation is the result of critical judgment involving *analysis* (taking apart), *integration* (putting together), and *deduction* (forming conclusions).

85. Analysis

a. Analysis is the sifting and sorting evaluated information to isolate significant elements with respect to the mission and operations of the command. Analysis requires good judgment and a thorough knowledge of the principles of military operations, the characteristics of the area of operations, and the enemy situation to include enemy doctrine and past practices.

b. Analysis at headquarters above division often involves detailed research. Analysis increases in difficulty as the volume of information increases. When the volume of information is great and engages many individuals in analysis work, these individuals must keep the mission of the command clearly in mind to avoid irrelevant expenditure of staff effort.

86. Integration

a. Integration is the combination of the elements isolated in analysis with other known information to form a logical picture, or hypothesis, of enemy activities or the influence of the characteristics of the area of operations on the mission of the command. In the process, more than one hypothesis may be formulated based upon existing intelligence.

b. Integration, particularly the development of hypotheses, requires the same good judgment and thorough background knowledge essential

to analysis. In formulating hypotheses, the intelligence officer must avoid preconceived opinions and hypotheses based on what he would do if he were the enemy commander.

c. When formulated, all hypotheses are analyzed and tested. Analysis of an hypothesis includes determining indications that should exist if the hypothesis is valid. Testing includes verifying the existence or nonexistence of these indications within the limitations of the available time and means.

d. Integration may be a mental process completed in a few moments, or it may be lengthy and involve the collection of a large volume of additional information.

87. Deduction

The last step in processing is the deduction of meaning from the hypothesis developed, tested, and considered valid as a result of integration. Deduction answers the question, "What does this information mean in relation to the enemy situation and the area of operations?"

88. Bearing on the Current Intelligence Estimate of the Situation

As each new item of information is processed, it affects in some way the current intelligence estimate of the situation (pars. 112-114). The conclusions already drawn in the current estimate are altered or confirmed. New capabilities are determined and old ones are discarded; as a result, the relative probability of adoption of the enemy's courses of action become clearer. The estimate is continuously revised and kept up-to-date in the light of new intelligence.

CHAPTER 4

DISSEMINATION AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION

Section I. INTRODUCTION

89. General

a. Although the commander may have to make a decision without adequate information and intelligence, he uses that which is available as a basis for his decision, for making his estimate, and for preparing his plans.

b. The staff uses information and intelligence as a basis for making estimates and recommendations, and for evaluating and interpreting information subsequently received.

c. Information and intelligence are primary instruments in detecting and locating hostile targets to permit effective employment of combat power.

d. The above uses require that information and intelligence be disseminated in such form and detail as to be of maximum utility and in time to serve the intended purpose.

90. Dissemination Considerations

a. The means and methods selected for dissemination depend upon the detail, pertinence, and urgency of the information and intelligence as well as its intended use. Consideration is given to the needs of the user, his resources for handling the disseminated material, and the capabilities of available communications.

b. Often it is impossible to determine whether a single item of information or intelligence is applicable exclusively to a single user. Surveillance reports are integrated with all available information to provide the composite information required for target analysis and evaluation. Pertinent information from all sources is disseminated to the appropriate fire support and fire support coordination agencies in time to be used in target analysis. Frequently, poten-

tial targets, particularly those suitable for attack by nuclear weapons, are determined by the analysis and integration of apparently unrelated items of information and intelligence. Also, items of information and intelligence used for target acquisition are used as well for determining enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities.

c. Intelligence is disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units, to include combat service support units, in the area of operations. Normally, dissemination to lower echelons poses the most difficult problem. Changes in the situation may occur rapidly at lower echelons; timeliness then becomes a critical factor. In opposition to the requirement for timeliness is the usual requirement for greater detail at successively lower echelons. Brigade and lower echelon commanders wish to know the exact location of enemy weapons, and other details of the enemy's organization of the ground; the army commander may be content to know general locations and activities.

d. Each echelon disseminates to its subordinates only pertinent and usable intelligence information. Thus the necessity to search large volumes of intelligence traffic for relevant material at successive lower echelons is avoided.

e. The timeliness and importance of each item of intelligence must be weighed carefully as a basis for selecting the dissemination means to be used. Information and intelligence must reach the users in time to permit further evaluation and interpretation, formulation of plans, and initiation of appropriate action. However, habitual or unnecessary use of priority communications inevitably interferes with other traffic.

Section II. DISSEMINATION MEANS

91. General

a. Dissemination within a headquarters is usually made by personal contact, oral reports, briefings, distribution of an intelligence estimate (pars. 112-114), an analysis of the area of operations (pars. 109-111), and written reports sent to and received from other headquarters.

b. Dissemination to higher, lower, and adjacent units is by means of reports, summaries and studies, intelligence estimates and analyses of the area of operations, operational plans and orders, and maps.

c. Intelligence reports transmitting observed facts should include analysis, integration, and conclusions as far as practicable; but these must be clearly separated and identified.

d. The value which the enemy would obtain from the information being disseminated dictates the degree of security classification to be given in each case.

92. Spot Reports

Spot reports (hot report, NATO) are one-time reports containing information or intelligence for which speed of transmission is a prime essential. A spot report does not follow a prescribed form. It should, as far as practicable, answer the questions: *Who? What? When? Where? and How?*

93. Intelligence Report (INTREP)

a. The INTREP is a NATO-standardized intelligence report (STANAG No. 2022) used to report information concerning enemy capabilities.

b. An INTREP will be sent spontaneously and without regard to a specific time schedule in all cases where facts influencing enemy capabilities have been newly observed or have undergone changes as compared with previous reports, and where the information might be of importance for the recipient's appreciation of enemy capabilities.

c. As far as practicable, the INTREP should include the intelligence staff's deduction which, in principle, should be approved by the commander.

d. The report will be disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters at the discretion of the commander. It will be disseminated by the quickest means appropriate.

e. INTREP's have no prescribed content or format except that the word "INTREP" will be the first item to appear in the report.

94. Supplementary Intelligence Report (SUPINTREP)

a. The SUPINTREP is a NATO-standardized intelligence report (STANAG No. 2022) used for more comprehensive reviews produced on special request or in preparation of a particular operation.

b. The SUPINTREP may concern one or several intelligence targets; or it may contain all intelligence data collected over an extended period of time, including items contained in previous INTREP's (par. 93) or INTSUM's (par. 95).

c. The nature of any SUPINTREP will dictate the specific dissemination required. It will be disseminated by the most suitable means.

d. No format is prescribed, except that the word SUPINTREP will appear at the beginning of the report.

95. Intelligence Summary (INTSUM)

a. The INTSUM is a NATO standardized intelligence report (STANAG No. 2022) which is a brief summary of items of intelligence information. It provides a summary of the enemy situation in forward and rear areas, enemy operations and capabilities, and weather and terrain characteristics. It should give a lead to recipients in assessing the situation. It includes negative information but rigidly excludes nonoperational intelligence. It shows the intelligence staff's deductions which, in principle, should be approved by the commander.

b. The INTSUM normally is prepared at division and higher headquarters. Smaller units may be required to submit INTSUM's by the next higher commander.

c. The INTSUM covers a period directed by the next higher headquarters. The length of the period will vary with the situation and the

desires of the commander directing the submission of the report.

d. Dissemination is to higher, lower, and adjacent commands by the quickest means appropriate.

e. INTSUM's have no prescribed format, except that the word "INTSUM" will be the first item in the report. A type format and an example are shown in appendix VII.

96. Periodic Intelligence Report

a. The periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP) is a summary of the intelligence situation covering a longer period than the INTSUM. It is a means of disseminating detailed information and intelligence. It covers the enemy situation and enemy operations, capabilities, vulnerabilities; characteristics of the area of operations; and counterintelligence. It does not contain details of friendly forces which may be of value to the enemy. Other intelligence documents such as technical intelligence summaries, prisoner of war interrogation reports, translations of captured documents, and weather and climate summaries may be disseminated as appendices to the PERINTREP. The PERINTREP is concise but complete and makes maximum use of sketches, overlays, marked maps, and annexes. The use of abbreviations and unnecessary references to map coordinates are avoided. The format for a PERINTREP and an example are contained in FM 101-5.

b. The PERINTREP is normally prepared at corps and higher echelons. Corps may dispense with the PERINTREP if the situation does not permit timely dissemination. At field army, a PERINTREP is always issued. The PERINTREP is disseminated to the staff, adjacent units, and to the subordinate and higher headquarters at the next two higher and lower echelons. The period covered by the PERINTREP is prescribed by the next higher headquarters. The period varies with the tempo of intelligence activities. In combat, a PERINTREP normally is published every 24 hours. The beginning and end of the period is selected to permit dissemination of the PERINTREP in time for its use in daily planning. The PERINTREP is disseminated by the most suit-

able means considering its volume and urgency, usually by liaison officers or messengers.

97. Weekly Intelligence Summary

This report generally follows the format of a PERINTREP. It serves to highlight trends that are useful in planning future operations and in processing current information. These reports may be issued at field army and higher headquarters.

98. Imagery Interpretation Reports

a. Information or intelligence obtained by imagery interpretation is disseminated by imagery interpretation reports. The basic types of interpretation reports are spot reports (hot report, NATO), immediate reports, mission review reports, summary reports, detailed reports, and special reports. A detailed discussion and examples of these reports are contained in FM 30-20 and TM 30-245.

b. The *spot report* (hot report, NATO) is rendered at the earliest possible time after the imagery is interpreted. It provides information in response to the specific purpose for which the mission was flown, or reports any new developments vital to current operations. The report is disseminated to the operational units concerned by the most rapid communication means available.

c. The *immediate report* is a short written report produced in addition to, or in lieu of, a spot report (hot report, NATO) when—

- (1) A wide distribution is required, or
- (2) The exact operational activity concerned was unknown at the time of the spot report, or
- (3) A permanent record of the report is desirable, or
- (4) Additional data on information transmitted in a spot report are requested.

d. The *mission review report* is prepared on each imagery mission or sortie. It contains a resume of the intelligence items covered on an imagery mission or sortie. Mission review reports are prepared and disseminated by the Military Intelligence Bn, Air Reconnaissance Support, Field Army (MIB (ARS)) usually within 48 hours, in accordance with procedures

established by the field army G2. Mission review reports provide a basis for order of prints or requests for the detailed reports described below.

e. Summary reports consolidate information from earlier imagery reports by category and time period, develop trends and patterns pertaining to targets covered, and describe the current status of the targets. These reports are valuable in acquiring targets deep in enemy-held areas. Summary reports are normally prepared by the MIB (ARS) as requested.

f. Detailed reports give complete information on individual targets or areas for use in strategic and tactical planning. They contain detailed and precise information gained from thorough study of imagery and other intelligence sources. These reports are prepared as required at corps and higher echelons.

g. Special reports are used to present information not included in the above reports. Special reports usually thoroughly treat a subject or a group of related subjects and normally require considerable time for completion and publication. These reports are prepared as required at corps and higher echelons.

99. Prisoner of War Interrogation and Translation Reports

These reports summarize, or report in full, the results of interrogation of one or more prisoners of war, and translations of extracts or summaries of enemy documents. Information of immediate value is disseminated as a spot report. Other information is disseminated in the most convenient form considering the needs of the users. At corps and higher echelons, detailed reports of these types usually are distributed as annexes to the PERINTREP (par. 96).

100. Bombing, Shelling, and Mortaring Reports

Information of enemy bombing, shelling, or mortaring activity is initially disseminated by means of a BOMREP, SHELLREP, or MORTREP, as appropriate. Submission is a responsibility of the affected unit. Reports are rendered as normal messages and are transmitted by the fastest means available to the next higher

headquarters. Further dissemination of the information is accomplished by the higher headquarters as required. Initial report format is standardized and follows Standardization Agreement (STANAG No. 2008) (app. II).

101. Nuclear Burst and Biological or Chemical Attack Reports

a. Initial reports and followup data of enemy or unidentified nuclear bursts, or of enemy biological or chemical attack, are disseminated from the source level through intermediate headquarters to the highest headquarters practicable by the most expeditious means available. Report format is standardized and follows Standardization Agreement (STANAG No. 2103) (app. III).

b. Initial and followup reports are evaluated at each headquarters and the results are appropriately disseminated. The report format for dissemination of evaluated data is standardized and follows Standardization Agreement (STANAG No. 2103) (app. III).

c. Warning of expected contamination from a nuclear burst or biological or chemical attack is disseminated by the first headquarters capable of determining such information. A standardized report following Standardization Agreement (STANAG No. 2103) is used (app. III). Paragraph 102 contains additional discussion of means of disseminating radiological contamination information and intelligence.

102. Radiological Contamination Estimates and Reports

a. Radiological contamination information is disseminated by means of current or future contamination charts. The *current contamination chart* is a plot of dose rate contours of operational interest extracted from the radiation situation map maintained by the CBRE. In *future contamination charts*, decay factors are applied to estimate the radiation situation at future times. Current and future contamination charts are disseminated to interested staff sections, agencies, and other headquarters. Contamination charts are prepared and disseminated by the chemical element of the command.

b. *Fallout predictions* from enemy or friendly use of nuclear weapons are prepared in the CBRE of the TOC or similar agency before and

after the burst. Fallout predictions are scale plots which indicate only the possible danger areas from fallouts; dose rates are not predicted. The plots contain earliest times of arrival points. Radiation predictions are based on current or forecast meteorological data and actual or assumed ground zero, yield, height of burst, and cloud data. Fallout predictions provide information which is used as a basis for planning and estimating. Fallout predictions are distributed to interested staff officers,

agencies, and higher, adjacent, and subordinate units (FM 3-12).

103. Weather Forecasts

a. A *weather forecast* is a prediction of the weather conditions expected at a place, or within an area, or along a route at a specified future time, or during a specified period. The accuracy and reliability of weather forecasts depend upon such factors as characteristics of the area, available weather data, reliability of weather com-

	3 to 5 day forecast ¹	48-hour forecast	24-hour forecast	12-hour forecast ²	12-hour flight forecast for aviation	Route and terminal forecasts for individual army aviation flights ³	Forecasts for use of nuclear weapons	Radiological defense forecasts	CBR forecast
Altitude of tropopause in feet -----		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	See FM 3-10
Atmospheric pressure -----	X	X							
Cloud coverage—height and amount in general terms -----	X	X							
Cloud coverage—height in feet above ground and amount in eights of sky -----			X	X	X	X	X		
Cloud decks thickness in feet -----					X	X	X		
Density altitude—information required established in local SOP -----					X	X			
Frontal conditions -----						X	X		
General wind pattern -----		X							
Precipitation, type, character, intensity, time of beginning, and duration -----	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Relative humidity—stated as low, medium, high -----		X							
Relative humidity—stated in percentages -----			X	X			X		
Temperatures in degrees centigrade, wind direction to nearest 10 degrees, and windspeed to nearest 5 knots at 2,000-foot intervals from surface to 30,000 feet -----					X	X			
Temperature in degrees centigrade, wind direction in tens of miles, and windspeed to nearest knot, in 2,000-meter zones to 32,000 meters ⁵ -----							X	X	
Temperature ranges including freeze and thaw -----	X	X	X	X					
Terminal conditions at specified terminals to include ceiling in feet above ground, airstrip visibility, precipitation, surface winds, temperature, and dew point -----					X	X			
Surface winds—general direction and speed -----		X	X	X					
Visibility—in units of distance with restrictive elements -----	X	X	X	X	X ⁴	X ⁴	X		
Weather phenomena to include items such as tornadoes, thunderstorms, squalls, blowing dust, blowing sand, and fog -----		X	X	X	X	X			

¹ Time of significant changes in weather elements should be given, when possible.

² This forecast gives weather conditions along the forward edge of the battle area. It should be subdivided, as appropriate, for the brigades, regiments, and battalions concerned.

³ Information is for a specified route for a specific period. Additional information required are altimeter settings at destination and alternate strip.

⁴ At flight altitudes.

⁵ Surface to 18,000 meters each 2 hours and surface to 32,000 meters each 6 hours.

Figure 7. Contents of weather forecasts.

munications facilities; forecast period length, and the experience of the forecaster. Reliability of forecasts generally decreases as the forecast period increases. Weather forecasts are in coded (numerical); graphical (pictorial), or written (plain language) format. Weather forecasts for use by troop units are usually in plain language form. Figure 7 indicates the contents of weather forecasts.

b. Forecasts are classified as short period, extended period, and long period. A short period forecast covers up to 48 hours in advance of the time of issue. Short period forecasts are also referred to by the length of the period covered; such as "12-hour," "24-hour," or "48-hour" forecasts. An extended period forecast covers a period of from 3 to 5 days; and a long period forecast covers a period more than 5 days in advance of the time of issue.

c. Because of the changing nature of weather forecasts, especially short period forecasts, timeliness is a critical factor in their dissemination. Weather forecasts normally are transmitted by electrical means.

d. The intelligence officer makes provisions for the dissemination of severe weather warnings. These special forecasts of hazardous weather are issued to enable units to take necessary action to prevent injury to personnel and damage to materiel. The type of weather for which severe warnings are issued depends upon the needs of the unit. Severe weather warnings usually cover tornadoes, thunderstorms, dust or sand storms, extremely heavy precipitation, freezing temperatures, winds above specified speeds, and freezing precipitation. Warnings are issued by the supporting air weather service detachment as requested. Flood warnings are the responsibility of the unit engineer. Severe weather warnings are normally disseminated as priority or operational immediate spot reports.

104. Current Weather Reports

These reports contain information on existing weather conditions or specific weather elements. They may be oral, written, or graphic representations. They are made by Army aviators, field artillery target acquisition units, artillery meteorological sections, and air weather service detachments. Other units furnish current weather reports as directed. Reports of

current weather are used in connection with operations of aircraft or use of artillery; nuclear weapons, CBR agents, and other activities. Normally, these reports are disseminated direct to the user by the collecting agency.

105. Summaries of Weather and Climate

a. These are information summaries used as a basis for other estimates and plans. Usually they are prepared by the supporting air weather service detachments as requested by the intelligence officer. The summaries are disseminated by intelligence documents such as written analyses of the area of operations, intelligence estimates, and PERINTREPS.

b. A *weather summary* is a description of the weather at a point, along a route, or within an area during a specified recent period. Weather summaries are used in analyzing the effects of weather on recent operations and in estimating the effects of weather on future operations. They are required for engineer forecasts of streamflow, condition of ground, and trafficability. Weather summaries have no prescribed form or content. Content is determined by the requester based on intended use.

c. A *climatic summary* gives statistical data in terms of averages, extremes, and frequencies of occurrence for a specified period of time such as year, season, month, at a given point, along a route, or within an area. Climatic summaries are compiled from historical records of weather observations over long periods. Appendix VI contains an example of a climatic summary.

106. Climatic Studies

A climatic study is the analysis and interpretation of climatic information (climatic summary) in the light of probable effects on operations. Climatic studies usually are prepared at corps and higher headquarters. Detailed climatic studies for strategic areas of the world are in the National Intelligence Survey. The supporting air weather service element, at the request of the intelligence officer, prepares climatic studies for specific studies to meet the particular requirements of the command. Climatic studies are disseminated on the same basis as weather and climatic summaries.

107. Technical Intelligence Bulletins and Summaries

Technical bulletins and summaries are prepared at corps and higher headquarters. These reports are used to disseminate the results of examination of enemy materiel. Bulletins usually deal with individual items, while summaries are broader in scope. They are disseminated through command channels, technical intelligence channels, or technical service channels depending upon the scope and nature of the contents.

108. Order of Battle Books and Handbooks

a. Order of battle books contain lists, histories, code names, and other data on foreign units, and biographical data on foreign military personalities.

b. Order of battle handbooks contain data concerning the political structure, military system and organization, and tactical doctrine of foreign nations.

c. Order of battle books and handbooks are usually prepared by the Department of the Army and theater headquarters. Field army may issue supplements to keep these documents current.

Section III. THE ANALYSIS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

109. General

The analysis of the area of operations shows the effects of the characteristics of the area on the general courses of action that the enemy and friendly forces may adopt. The analysis includes use of intelligence to serve as a basis for development of specific friendly courses of action and enemy capabilities (courses of action) in the commander's estimate, the operations estimate, the intelligence estimate, and other staff estimates. The analysis is oriented on the mission of the command within limiting considerations such as operational environment, time, and boundaries. Appendix XI provides additional guidance on the analysis of the area of operations.

110. Frequency of Preparation

a. An analysis of the area of operations is required for each mission. It may involve the preparation of an entirely new analysis, or the updating of an existing but appropriate analysis.

b. An analysis of the area of operations is prepared before the mission is received, if a logical mission can be assumed based upon the known situation. Analyses based on assumed missions are reevaluated on receipt of the actual mission.

c. Analyses usually require revision in light of the commander's decision, the uncovering of new areas, and the receipt of additional or more accurate information.

111. Form of Presentation

a. At corps and higher headquarters, the planning of projected operations requires the preparation of a written analysis.

b. At division level and below, an abbreviated content of the analysis is included in the intelligence estimate. As with the other content of the intelligence estimate, this abbreviated analysis normally is given orally. A written analysis at division level usually is prepared only for operations to be carried out a great distances. Amphibious or long-range airborne or airmobile operations are examples.

Section IV. THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

112. General

The intelligence estimate is a study of the area of operations and the enemy situation. It includes use of intelligence to determine the influence of the area of operations and the enemy situation on friendly courses of action,

courses of action which the enemy can adopt and is most likely to adopt, and enemy vulnerabilities that may influence the selection of a friendly course of action. Appendix XII provides additional guidance to assist in the use of information contained in the intelligence

estimate. FM 101-5 contains a form which, with minor modification, is applicable for oral or written estimates at all echelons.

113. Frequency of Preparation

The intelligence estimate is kept current. It reflects all available information and intelligence. All or selected portions of the intelligence estimate are presented by the intelligence officer as required by the commander, or as required by changes in the estimate which must be brought to the attention of the commander or other members of the staff.

114. Form of Presentation

a. The intelligence estimate may be presented

orally or in writing. A written intelligence estimate is prepared for projected operations when time is available, when dissemination is required and oral presentation is not feasible, and when a historical record is desired. Oral and written presentations are brief, consistent with adequacy of detail.

b. In oral presentations, maximum use is made of graphic aids such as terrain models, colored maps and overlays, charts, and graphs. Information and intelligence that is common knowledge or readily apparent from the graphic aids is not repeated. At appropriate points in the presentation, previously furnished intelligence or information which has not changed may be identified.

Section V. OPERATION PLANS AND ORDERS

115. Paragraph 1 of an Operation Plan or Order

Intelligence is disseminated in paragraph 1a of operation plans and orders. Paragraph 1a may be a reference to an intelligence annex; a summary of the enemy situation necessary to understand the plan or order; or both. If an intelligence annex is not published, reference is usually made to an appropriate current intelligence document such as a specific INTSUM or PERINTREP.

116. Intelligence Annex

The intelligence annex is a NATO standardized formal intelligence order that may accompany an operation plan or order. The first paragraph of an intelligence annex gives a summary of the enemy situation required to understand the plan or order. The paragraph may refer to marked maps, enemy situation overlays, or current intelligence reports.

Section VI. MAPS

117. General

a. Timely planning insures that sufficient quantities of suitable maps are available when and where needed. Map planning is governed by area of coverage, scales, and allowances for the maps required. The intelligence officer, the operations officer, and the unit engineer plan the unit map requirements. Based upon operational plans, the intelligence officer and the operations officer decide on the types and scales of maps to be used. The unit engineer—or, in the case of divisions, the support command commander—advises on the availability of maps, including types and scales. Unit boundaries are projected by the operations officer to indicate the area for which coverage is desired. For tactical units, this area usually extends

forward to include at least the area of influence. It is desirable to include coverage of the area of interest. The unit engineer—or, in divisions, the support command commander—calculates actual map requirements based upon this information and allowance tables (par. 120).

b. The intelligence officer exercises staff supervision over all activities concerning military topographic surveys and maps, including their acquisition, reproduction, storage, and distribution. At echelons above division, the engineer is responsible for the procurement, storage, reproduction, and distribution of military maps and allied materials, to include trig lists and gazeteers. In divisions, procurement, storage, and distribution is a responsibility of the support command commander (FM 54-2).

118. Area of Coverage

Map coverage is the number of sheets of the same scale required to cover the terrain considered and appropriate adjacent areas. A reserve unit requires coverage of the entire area of operations of its parent echelon and of adjacent areas as determined by the reserve unit's mission. For computation purposes, a map sheet is required by a unit if more than 20 percent of the area of the sheet is in the unit area of operations. Overlap is required for planning and coordination. The number of map sheets required at each scale is determined from a map index. The required map coverage is marked on the index, and the sheets included within the area are counted and listed by appropriate identification symbols.

119. Map Scales

Map scale requirements are influenced by the nature of the friendly force, character of the terrain, and type of operations. Small-scale maps are used for general planning and for strategic studies. Large-scale maps are used for technical and tactical needs. Maps covering the area of present and projected operations are sufficiently large scale to provide the details required. Coverage outside the unit area of operations usually is of smaller scale.

120. Map Allowances

a. Map allowances are based on tables published by theater or theater army headquarters or on those listed in FM 101-10. Tables specify types of maps and quantities authorized according to map scale and type of unit. These tables, used in conjunction with inventories of avail-

able maps, provide a distribution guide for a particular type and scale map.

b. An initial issue of maps is based upon the initial allowances set forth in the tables described above. It is the number of copies of map sheets, by type or scale, which units can requisition without approval by higher headquarters.

c. A replenishment issue is based upon prescribed replenishment allowances. It includes authorized supplemental issues to cover normal losses. Replenishment requirements are calculated by applying a percentage factor to the number of copies in the initial issue. Emergency issues are made as required to meet unforeseen needs.

121. Map Distribution

a. Changes in tactical plans affect map requirements. The distribution system must respond rapidly to such changes if needed maps are to be provided in time.

b. Distribution is influenced by the difficulty in issuing maps to individuals and small units, particularly in fast-moving operations; by the bulkiness of maps that makes it impracticable to supply them to individuals and small units for a prolonged operation; and by logistical limitations that prevent the maintenance of large reserves of maps.

c. Paragraph 4 of the intelligence annex to an operation order lists the maps, including quantities and classification or scale, to be furnished each unit for the operation; and instructions concerning special requisitions and distribution.

CHAPTER 5

COMBAT SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE AND COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE, AND TARGET ACQUISITION

Section I. COMBAT SURVEILLANCE

122. General

a. Combat surveillance is a principal means through which enemy objects and activities are detected. It encompasses all techniques of accomplishing a continuous (all-weather, day and night) systematic watch over the battle areas to provide timely information for tactical ground operations.

b. Ground surveillance is characterized by generally severe line-of-sight limitations, dependence upon terrain for movement routes and site locations, and a generally inadequate capability of surface transport to displace surveillance means in time to be responsive to immediate requirements in new areas. These limitations notwithstanding, ground surveillance is essential to all-weather, day-and-night surveillance of the battle area.

c. Aerial surveillance is characterized by a capability to extend line-of-sight, nondependence upon terrain for movement routes and site locations, and a capability to adjust to new requirements rapidly. The mobility of aerial surveillance platforms and their ability to operate at high elevations provide a capability to conduct surveillance over large areas or to adjust to new situations rapidly. Generally, visibility restrictions and inclement weather will reduce the effectiveness of aerial surveillance. Problems of coordination and control of the use of the airspace may impose limitations on the use of aerial surveillance.

123. Combat Surveillance Requirements Within Field Army

a. *Division Requirements.* At division level, surveillance requirements are characterized by the immediacy of operations. Continuous surveillance is required to detect or obtain infor-

mation of movements into or within the division area of influence, enemy dispositions, employment of supporting weapons, electromagnetic radiations, nuclear explosions, CBR or air threats, weather, and topographical features. Periodic area surveillance is required for general information of the enemy and terrain to supplement current general intelligence. During fluid situations, continuous area surveillance is required. During static situations, periodic coverage of the area may suffice.

b. *Corps Requirements.* At corps level, surveillance requirements are generated by both immediate and future operations. They are characterized by deep penetration of enemy territory and a general reliance upon aerial surveillance means. Continuous surveillance is required to detect or obtain information of movements of enemy reserves into or within the corps area of influence, location of enemy reserves and fire support weapons in the corps area of influence, missile attack, CBR and air attack, nuclear explosions, electromagnetic radiations, and weather. Periodic area surveillance is required for supplemental information of the enemy and terrain required for planning the next operation. During fluid situations, continuous area surveillance is required to assist in determining the enemy's course of action and the location of main efforts. In static situations, periodic area coverage may suffice.

c. *Field Army Requirements.* At field army level, surveillance requirements are characterized by the depth of penetration required and a lesser need for continuous surveillance coverage. Enemy objects and activities subject to surveillance include movement and location of major reserves, long-range missile sites, command posts and combat service support complexes, and electromagnetic radiations. Other

surveillance requirements include information of the terrain, weather, nuclear explosions, and contaminated areas. Normally, periodic surveillance will suffice. The length of time between missions will vary with the situation. In fluid situations, continuous surveillance of given activities or objects for short periods may be required.

124. Combat Surveillance Means

Combat surveillance means available to the commander consist of personnel, such as patrols, forward observers, aerial observers, and specially trained units; and devices, such as optical instruments, battlefield illumination, aircraft, drones, cameras, radar, infrared, magnetic, radiac instruments, chemical detector kits, and sound.

125. Combat Surveillance Planning

a. All surveillance means are integrated to provide for their effective application and coordinated use in covering the commander's area of influence. This is particularly necessary in view of the ever-increasing enemy capabilities to deny use of the airspace and to impair

or to deny use of electronic detection and communications devices.

b. In assigning orders and requests for specific information, the capabilities of the surveillance means available to collecting agencies are considered in the same manner as the capabilities of other collection means. When the desired use of subordinate unit collection means is incompatible with the assigned mission of the unit to which the means belong, then the lowest subordinate headquarters controlling the means may be placed under the higher commander's control. For example, if the mission assigned to a division armored cavalry squadron does not permit use of certain ground radars of the squadron as desired by the division commander, the particular radar unit may temporarily be placed under division control.

c. Detailed control, coordination, and supervision are necessary to guard against gaps or similar deficiencies in the combat surveillance coverage of the area of influence. Provisions are made for inspections, reports, maintenance of patrol, reconnaissance and surveillance plans, and surveillance capability overlays.

Section II. RECONNAISSANCE AND COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

126. General

a. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, through observation, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; and data concerning the weather, terrain, and other environmental factors of a particular area. Observation includes use of sensory devices. Reconnaissance missions may require combat operations.

b. Counterreconnaissance operations are measures taken to prevent or reduce the effectiveness of hostile reconnaissance. Offensive counterreconnaissance seeks out and destroys enemy reconnaissance elements. Defensive counterreconnaissance denies enemy access to certain areas. Counterreconnaissance becomes more difficult as dispersion of units increases.

c. All units have reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance capabilities and responsibilities. These responsibilities may be limited to short patrols or defensive counterreconnaissance

measures during the conduct of normal mission activities, or they may extend to offensive operations involving specific reconnaissance or counterreconnaissance tasks. Certain units are specifically organized for such operations.

d. Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance cannot readily be separated. Effective reconnaissance helps security. Forces executing reconnaissance missions may simultaneously be employed on counterreconnaissance. Counterreconnaissance activities also provide reconnaissance information. However, the order to the force must state which mission has priority. Because of these interrelationships, counterreconnaissance is discussed in this section rather than in chapter 6.

127. Planning Reconnaissance Activities

a. Reconnaissance plans are completed in advance to give the executing units enough time to make their own preparations, conduct the reconnaissance, and report the results by the

specified deadline. Adjacent and supporting units concerned are informed of reconnaissance plans to insure coordination. Where appropriate, plans include provisions for interrogating participating personnel after the reconnaissance has been completed.

b. Only missions within the capabilities of reconnaissance agencies are assigned to them. Missions are specific. Broad generalizations such as "report strength and disposition of the enemy" are avoided. The specific time that the information is desired or the latest time that the information will be of value is included in the order or request. More than one mission may be assigned to one agency at a given time. In such cases, definite priorities are stated.

128. Control of Reconnaissance Activities

The intelligence officer plans and coordinates reconnaissance. He participates with the operations officer in planning reconnaissance in force and reconnaissance by fire to insure that these activities result in the collection of the required information. The intelligence officer consults with the operations officer on the availability of troops; he consults with the entire staff to insure coordination of reconnaissance activities with other activities. Reconnaissance planned by subordinate units is coordinated to avoid duplication of effort and conflicts of interest. Night reconnaissance requires the highest degree of coordination and control.

129. Principles of Conducting Reconnaissance

The reconnaissance techniques used by the combat arms are described in branch field manuals. The principles for reconnaissance patrolling are to—

a. *Gain Surveillance Contact As Soon As Possible and Maintain it Continuously.* Ground reconnaissance elements gain and maintain observation of the enemy; and by working continuously to the front, flank, and to the rear, determine the location, identification, disposition, and strength of the enemy force, and the approach of enemy reinforcements. Army aviation is used to assist ground reconnaissance.

b. *Maneuver Freely in Conformity with Operations.* Patrols and reconnaissance units maneuver freely and keep pace with the activity

of the enemy. Reconnaissance units orient on the enemy and not on other friendly elements. Reconnaissance of other portions of the assigned area, in addition to canalized routes such as roads, valleys, and ridge lines, will result in procurement of maximum information.

c. *Fight Only When Necessary to Gain Information.* Reconnaissance is conducted preferably by stealth and observation of the enemy without his knowledge. Combat is resorted to only when necessary to prevent destruction or capture, when prisoners are desired, or when the mission requires combat to obtain the desired information. Reconnaissance forces are provided with the means to accomplish their mission by close combat if necessary.

d. *Report All Items of Information As Soon As Possible Even If Negative or Seemingly Unimportant.* All information is reported as soon as possible. Much information has importance that is not obvious at the time of its collection. Negative information shows where the enemy is not going, or where he is not located, at a given time.

130. Principles of Counterreconnaissance

a. The principles of counterreconnaissance operations are as follows:

- (1) Operations are adjusted to and oriented on the friendly forces being screened.
- (2) Enemy reconnaissance elements are destroyed or neutralized by combat.
- (3) Screening forces are echeloned in depth to provide mutual support and to limit penetrations by enemy reconnaissance elements.

b. The counterreconnaissance screen prevents enemy reconnaissance forces from entering certain areas or places. A counterreconnaissance screen may be moving or stationary depending upon the activities of the force being screened.

131. Agencies

a. Ground reconnaissance agencies consist of personnel manning ground observation posts or surveillance devices, elements of all arms, and units especially organized or designated to perform ground reconnaissance. Infantry,

armor, and engineer elements are suited for patrolling. Armored cavalry reconnaissance units are suited for reconnaissance deep in enemy areas. The depth at which reconnaissance patrols may operate in enemy-held areas is increased by the use of helicopters and other transportation means to deliver and retrieve patrols. The ability of ground patrols to produce timely information depends in part upon their mobility and upon their communications means for transmitting information and receiving new instructions.

b. Ground units specifically organized for reconnaissance include the—

- (1) Ground surveillance section in each

infantry battalion headquarters and headquarters company and rifle company.

- (2) Ground surveillance section in each tank company.
- (3) Armored cavalry platoon in each tank battalion.
- (4) Reconnaissance or armored cavalry platoon in each infantry battalion.
- (5) Armored cavalry squadron in each division.
- (6) Armored cavalry regiment in the type corps and type field army.

c. Aerial reconnaissance agencies are discussed in paragraphs 140 and 141.

Section III. RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE AND BY FIRE

132. Reconnaissance in Force

A reconnaissance in force is a limited objective operation by a force to discover and test the enemy's dispositions and strength, or to develop other intelligence. If the enemy situation must be developed along a broad front, a reconnaissance in force may be conducted using strong probing actions to determine the enemy situation at selected points. The size of the force used is of such strength as to cause the enemy to react sufficiently to disclose his location, dispositions, and strength. Reconnaissance in force operations may result in unacceptable losses, may disclose the com-

mander's ultimate intentions, or may provoke an unwanted general engagement. When the enemy possesses appropriate nuclear delivery means, the risk of presenting a profitable target may outweigh the value of the information desired.

133. Reconnaissance by Fire

This is a reconnaissance method in which fire is placed on a suspected enemy position to destroy camouflage or to cause the enemy to react either by movement or by return of the fire. The enemy reaction permits observation of his locations, dispositions, and strength.

Section IV. AERIAL/AIR RECONNAISSANCE

134. General

a. Aerial/air reconnaissance, using any type of air vehicle, is an effective and generally reliable means of penetrating deep into enemy territory and rapidly securing information on terrain and enemy activities over large areas.

b. Aerial/air reconnaissance is frequently executed in conjunction with ground reconnaissance of enemy forward areas. It is useful in selecting routes for ground reconnaissance agencies and in locating enemy forces which delay or endanger long-range patrols or armored reconnaissance elements. It also is used to confirm and obtain additional information of

activities and installations detected by ground reconnaissance/surveillance.

c. Aerial/air reconnaissance missions include visual observation, permanent record image (photo, infrared, radar, electromagnetic, intercept), electronic intelligence, weather, and radiological survey.

d. Aerial/air reconnaissance may be restricted by adverse weather conditions and enemy air defense measures.

e. FM 30-20 discusses in detail aerial surveillance-reconnaissance in the field army, to include procedures in requesting support.

135. Visual Aerial Surveillance

a. Visual aerial surveillance is defined as the gathering of information through observation by aircraft crews. Current information of the enemy and the area of operations can be obtained rapidly by this means. The value of visual aerial surveillance lies in the speed with which information of fleeting targets can be relayed to friendly units capable of attacking those targets. There are five general types of visual aerial surveillance: area search, specific search, route reconnaissance, artillery adjustment, and contact reconnaissance.

b. Much information is collected by a trained and experienced observer; however, he is limited by the speed and vibration of the aircraft, the distance from which he must observe (visual acuity), enemy air defense and concealment measures, and poor visibility. Many limited by the speed and vibration of the air- be overcome by use of sensory devices to verify and supplement visual sightings.

136. Permanent Record Imagery Reconnaissance

Permanent record imagery is essential before, during, and after operations. All commanders require information concerning the location and disposition of the enemy. Aerial imagery can normally meet this requirement by providing recorded images which are studied, analyzed, and interpreted by trained image interpreters. Such analysis is more detailed and more accurate than that derived from visual observation. The use of permanent record imagery requires sensory and recording equipment of various degrees of complexity. The time lag between acquisition and interpretation of permanent imagery may reduce or negate the value of information collected concerning transient and fleeting targets. Permanent imagery may be obtained through use of—

a. Cameras—the general types of coverage are shown in figure 8.

b. Emission detectors (light and heat in the infrared portion of the electromagnetic spectrum).

c. Radar.

d. Electromagnetic intercept devices.

137. Electronic Intelligence Reconnaissance

Electronic intelligence reconnaissance is the collection of information of the location and purpose of enemy noncommunication electromagnetic radiation emitters. It is sometimes known as “ferreting.” The information collected is used to—

a. Determine the enemy electronic order of battle.

b. Determine the most effective countermeasures.

138. Weather Reconnaissance

Weather reconnaissance by the tactical air force is the action taken to obtain weather data over areas where weather reports are not available. Weather reconnaissance is accomplished—

a. To obtain weather data for use in preparing weather analysis and forecasts. These missions fall into two general classes as follows:

(1) Scheduled missions which make weather observations, to include atmospheric soundings at predetermined locations and at scheduled times.

(2) Unscheduled missions to investigate doubtful weather conditions that will affect the battle area.

b. To obtain special reports of weather conditions along the routes to, and in, the vicinity of targets for proposed air operations. These reports are required to permit immediate operational decisions such as diversion, change of flight track, or cancellation of mission.

139. Use of Radar and Infrared Devices in Air Reconnaissance

a. Portrayal methods used by radar and infrared devices include scope presentation for instantaneous viewing, imagery recording for retention and detailed study, and transmission of a ground station. Airborne radar and infrared sensory devices are particularly valuable during periods of poor visibility.

b. Airborne radar, in drones or manned aircraft, can provide acceptable imagery during periods of darkness and in conditions of light rain, smoke, haze and dust. It is valuable as a moving target indicator. Information thus

(1) Photo coverage	(2) Major uses	(3) Types of photos	(4) Area of coverage	(5) Frequency	(6) Distribution
Basic cover.	General intelligence requirements, such as basic information on terrain, routes of communication, and enemy activities. Planning Operations. Mapping.	Usually vertical stereo pairs.	Projected areas of operations.	As necessary to show seasonal changes.	Normally requested by field army which makes automatic initial distribution to subordinate units according to areas of interest. Supplementary issues are made as the campaign progresses. See FM 101-10 for typical allowances.
Tactical cover.	Conduct of current tactical operations. Target acquisition.	Usually vertical stereo pairs.	Unit area of influence and specified portions of the unit area of interest.	As required by the tactical situation, terrain characteristics, and other variables. At times, daily coverage of only portions of the battle area is required. In moving situations, only coverage specified areas and immediate objectives may be required.	Normally requested by divisions and high headquarters. See FM 101-10 for typical allowances.
Special cover.	Study of specific targets or objectives for information for immediate requirements and for specific planning.	As required.	As required.	As required.	As required.
Mapping cover.	Preparation and revision of maps.	Usually small scale vertical stereo pairs.*	As required.	As required.	Normally requested by corps and higher headquarters and distributed to topographic units.

* Often supplemented with large scale photos of culturally developed areas.

Figure 8. Types of aerial photographic coverage.

obtained must be supplemented by use of other means, such as visual observation and photography, which can better determine the nature of the activity detected by the radar. Airborne radar can cover large areas quickly. Side-looking airborne radars can operate from behind the forward edge of friendly dispositions. Airborne radar is dependent upon line-of-sight and may be detected and jammed or spoofed.

c. Airborne passive infrared and thermal detection devices are valuable in penetrating camouflage and collecting information at night. As with airborne radar, the information obtained by these devices must be corroborated

by other means, such as visual observation and photography, which can better determine the nature of the detected activity. Airborne passive infrared and thermal detection devices can cover large areas quickly but are currently limited to line-of-sight coverage and use of ground-based tracking and plotting systems to locate the detected activities. Passive infrared and thermal detection devices are invulnerable to countermeasures but are susceptible to enemy deception measures. The effectiveness of these devices is reduced by fog, clouds, and precipitation (FM 30-20).

Section V. AERIAL/AIR RECONNAISSANCE AGENCIES

140. Army Aviation

a. Army observation aircraft perform day and night visual, photo (limited night photo), radar, infrared, and radiological survey missions. Currently, drones perform photographic missions; they have a potential use for radar and infrared surveillance and radiological survey missions. The depth to which Army aviation can penetrate into the enemy area depends on the characteristics of available aircraft and the enemy air defenses. Army aerial reconnaissance missions provide information faster than air reconnaissance missions performed by supporting Services. Requests for Army aerial reconnaissance missions by units or agencies not having aviation in direct support, or for missions beyond the capabilities of direct support aviation, are coordinated by the G2 Air (FM 30-20).

b. Army observation aircraft radio communications permit—

- (1) Immediate transmission of information to combat battalions, brigades, separate battalions or task forces, and to division, corps, or field army headquarters.
- (2) In-flight diversion of aircraft to higher priority missions, and requests for adjustment of artillery fires.
- (3) Direction of close offensive air support.
- (4) Use of a radio relay station for ground reconnaissance elements.

141. Supporting Services

a. Tactical reconnaissance wings of a tactical air force (TAF) of the Air Force normally support Army operations. Air reconnaissance wings support the field army from dispersed airfields. The reconnaissance wings include both reconnaissance-fighter type and reconnaissance-bomber type aircraft. Reconnaissance-bomber type aircraft normally provide night photographic, radar photographic, weather, and limited visual reconnaissance information. Information on significant sightings made during all reconnaissance missions is transmitted in flight over the TAF tactical air observation net which is monitored by the spot report receivers at Army units and appropriate Air Force agencies. TAF high performance reconnaissance aircraft, with fighter cover when required, can perform air reconnaissance missions over the forward areas as well as at great distances beyond the forward edge of the battle area.

b. Naval and Marine Air may provide reconnaissance support of all types for Army units.

- (1) Navy and Marine carrier-based air reconnaissance support is normal in amphibious operations. The Navy/Marine Corps system for requesting and coordinating air reconnaissance requests is used.
- (2) In all other types of operations, Navy and Marine air reconnaissance support may be used when aircraft car-

riers or other air facilities are within range. Usually, Navy and Marine air reconnaissance activities are coordinated by the tactical air force; normal Army-Air Force request and coordinating procedures are used. In some cases, Navy and Marine air units may provide direct support to Army units in accordance with specially established procedures.

(3) Because of limited imagery reproduction facilities on aircraft carriers, Army reproduction elements may be required with naval air reconnaissance units. Imagery may be delivered to Army units by Navy, Marine, or Army couriers. Army imagery interpreters and liaison officers are normally located with supporting Navy or Marine air reconnaissance units.

Section VI. TARGET ACQUISITION

142. General

a. Target acquisition is that part of intelligence activities which involves accurate and timely detection, identification, and location of ground targets for the purpose of target analysis, target evaluation, and effective employment of weapons. Target acquisition results from applying information collected from all sources and agencies to a special purpose. Target acquisition and other types of information-gathering differ in degree rather than in kind.

b. Detection determines the existence or presence of the target. Identification determines the nature, composition, and size of the target. Location consists of determining the three-dimensional positions of the target with respect to known points or weapons, i.e. with respect to a common grid. Location requires, greater accuracy for target acquisition purposes than for general intelligence purposes.

c. Target intelligence must be sufficiently detailed to permit an evaluation of the target's importance in relation to the mission of the command.

d. Target intelligence must also be sufficiently detailed to permit analysis to determine the most effective weapon for use against the target.

143. Target Acquisition Planning

a. Early in the planning stage of an operation, a list of potential targets is developed. Such factors as mission, information of the enemy, characteristics of the area of operations, and enemy tactics and practices are studied to select areas in which targets are probable.

b. The collection effort insures systematic combat surveillance to detect targets. Areas of particular importance to operational plans are subjected to more intensive surveillance than other areas.

c. The target acquisition effort is then directed toward securing information to verify, identify, accurately locate, or disprove the presence of suspected targets. This is accomplished by assigning suitable collection task to collection agencies.

d. The collection worksheet, observation plans, air reconnaissance plans, and patrol plans are used to assist in coordinating the target acquisition effort.

144. Requirements for Precision

a. The effectiveness of the attack on a target will depend largely upon the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of target intelligence.

b. Target analysts require specific target area information to include location, size, shape, concentration, vulnerability, recuperability, and permanence. The degree of accuracy and completeness of this information influences the validity of the target analysis.

c. Collection agencies must be impressed with the requirement to provide complete and accurate target information in order to satisfy the needs of specific users.

145. Requirements for Timeliness

a. Timeliness in acquiring targets is absolutely essential. The enemy will try to avoid presenting lucrative targets, and those that are presented will be made as transitory as possible. Timely acquisition will help to reduce our re-

action time between target buildup and weapon delivery.

b. To insure timeliness in target acquisition, subordinate commands may be required to report information directly to intelligence elements of the tactical operations center or to an appropriate fire support or fire support coordination agency of the highest headquarters. Such direct reporting is limited to specific items of information. Reporting agencies insure that their own headquarters are informed when direct reports are rendered out of channels.

146. Requirements for Dissemination

a. Target acquisition is dependent upon a flow of information which provides direction

to the acquisition effort. A SHELREP can focus attention along a particular azimuth or in a general area. A PW interrogation report can provide a general location for concentrated target acquisition effort. Without such bits and pieces of information, target acquisition must become, in effect, combat surveillance. Consequently, the general considerations discussed in paragraph 90 are particularly important to a successful target acquisition effort.

b. Highly accurate target acquisition information is particularly valuable for general intelligence purposes. Thus, information acquired by target acquisition, though obtained primarily for use in the attack of targets, should receive thorough consideration for dissemination to higher, lower, and adjacent commands.

CHAPTER 6

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

147. General

Counterintelligence is essential to the success of any military operation. The element of surprise in military operations depends not only upon reliable intelligence and rapidity of movement, but also upon efficient counterintelligence. Also, by denying information to the enemy and thereby decreasing his ability to use his combat power effectively, counterintelligence aids in reducing the risks of a command.

148. Counterintelligence Measures

a. *Passive* counterintelligence measures conceal information from the enemy. They include measures such as secrecy discipline, security of classified documents and materiel, communications and electronics security, movement control, censorship, camouflage, use of concealment, and electronic countercountermeasures. Passive counterintelligence measures generally are readily standardized in the unit SOP regardless of the specific nature of the unit mission.

b. *Active* counterintelligence measures actively block the enemy's attempts to gain information or to engage in sabotage or subversion. They include counterreconnaissance, counterespionage, countersabotage, countersubversion, and the use of smoke to deny enemy observation. Active counterintelligence measures vary with the mission of the unit.

149. Counterintelligence Agencies

a. The individual soldier is the ultimate counterintelligence agency. Passive counterintelligence operations depend upon his ability to

carry out proper security, camouflage, and observation and reporting procedures in his daily activities; to evade the enemy if isolated; and, if captured, to resist enemy interrogation, adhere to the code of conduct, and escape if possible. Also, evaders and recovered U.S. prisoners of war are valuable counterintelligence agencies for information concerning enemy intelligence activities including subversion.

b. The Intelligence Corps (INTC) contains the Army's counterintelligence specialists. In the field army, counterintelligence specialists are assigned to the military intelligence company (counterintelligence) of the military intelligence battalion and the counterintelligence sections of corps and division military intelligence detachments (FM 30-9 and FM 30-17).

c. All units are, in effect, counterintelligence agencies as they must implement appropriate counterintelligence measures to deny the enemy information of their activities, locations, and dispositions. Some units, such as U.S. Army Security Agency units and censorship units, have specialized counterintelligence functions arising from the nature of their missions. Every staff officer and subordinate commander must be cognizant of the counterintelligence aspects of his particular activity.

d. Other Federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and the Department of State perform certain counterintelligence functions that assist Army counterintelligence operations.

Section II. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

150. General

Counterintelligence operations are classified generally as operations pertaining to military security; civil security; port, frontier, and travel security; censorship; and special operations.

a. Military security counterintelligence operations include both passive and active counterintelligence measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, enemy observation, subversion, sabotage, or surprise. Typical measures encompass security discipline, safeguarding of classified information and equipment, security of troop movements, neutralization of counterintelligence targets in tactical operations, use of passwords, and special handling of escapees and evaders.

b. Civil security counterintelligence operations include all the counterintelligence activities affecting the civilian population of the area. These operations are extensive in commands with large territorial responsibilities, in heavily populated areas, and in cold war situations. Typical civil security counterintelligence measures are control of circulation of personnel, censorship, security screening of civilian labor, monitoring of suspect political groups, and industrial plant protection.

c. Port, frontier, and travel security counterintelligence operations consist of the special application of military and civil counterintelligence measures to the control of airports, sea ports, land and sea frontiers, international air boundaries, and all nonmilitary travel into and out of a theater of operations. Typical of such operations are military travel permit systems, sea and land frontier patrols, and security screening and control of "frontaliers" (legal daily frontier crossers).

d. Censorship is the examination and control of all types of communications other than certain exempted official communications for the purpose of preventing information of value from reaching the enemy, as well as for collecting information of value to the United States or its allies.

e. Special operations include the specialized employment of active and deceptive counter-

intelligence techniques and procedures in the conduct of secret operations against hostile and unfriendly intelligence organizations and activities. Type operations include the compilation and dissemination of counterintelligence target data and operation of special interrogation centers for processing captured enemy agents.

151. Division

a. Counterintelligence at division level is primarily concerned with denying target information to the enemy. Of particular concern are military security measures for the neutralization of enemy target acquisition efforts directed toward locating nuclear weapons systems. To the extent possible, division counterintelligence measures are reduced to SOP's.

b. Counterintelligence operations at division level may include internal security measures and counterintelligence coverage of the area for which the division is responsible. Activities appropriate for supervision by the division counterintelligence branch and performance by INTC (CI) specialists may include—

- (1) Military security measures which encompass personnel, document, and physical security to provide internal security to the division headquarters, communications centers, and other division installations and areas. This includes counterintelligence surveys, inspections, checks, and personnel security investigations.
- (2) Screening of refugees, linecrossers, and PW of counterintelligence interest.
- (3) Neutralization and exploitation, to the extent possible, of counterintelligence targets assigned to the division and targets of opportunity. Typical targets include enemy intelligence agents, installations utilized by enemy intelligence, counterintelligence or paramilitary organizations, enemy communications media, selected enemy personnel in the political and scientific fields, records and files of intelligence and counterintelligence interest, and white-list personnel.

c. Counterintelligence specialists are not organic to divisions. A counterintelligence section composed of specialists is organic to the military intelligence detachment normally attached to a division. The senior officer of the counterintelligence section is usually designated chief of the counterintelligence branch of the G2 section and, as such, is responsible to the division G2 for the implementation and execution of the division counterintelligence effort.

d. Frequently, situations may arise that are beyond the capability of the counterintelligence section. An example is the security screening of an abnormally large influx of refugees into the division area or of an unusually large number of high-priority counterintelligence targets. In such cases, counterintelligence augmentation personnel may be requested by the division G2 from the augmentation pool maintained under the control of the INTC(CI) group at theater army level. See FM 30-17 for details of augmentation.

152. Corps

a. Counterintelligence operations at corps generally are the same as at division except for the greater number of units and the larger areas involved. In addition, corps counterintelligence operations are concerned with long-range as well as current operations. Field army will normally delineate the scope of the long-range counterintelligence operations for subsequent implementation by the corps counterintelligence branch. Activities appropriate for supervision by a corps counterintelligence branch may include military security, civil security, frontier and travel security, and censorship operations.

b. INTC(CI) operations at corps level may differ from those at division level. Normally, corps has no area responsibility; therefore, the counterintelligence section of the military intelligence detachment attached to corps confines its activities to internal security functions of the corps headquarters and to any other security functions that are related to the corps mission and fall within the mission and functions of the INTC. However, there may be instances when, because of nuclear battlefield conditions, independent actions, or an increase in the workload and responsibilities of the field

army military intelligence company (CI), the corps counterintelligence section may be called upon to expand its normal operations to include area coverage or to engage in counterintelligence operations that are normally the responsibility of field army and division counterintelligence specialists of the INTC.

c. When, because of conditions mentioned before, corps counterintelligence section operations are expanded, augmentation personnel from theater army INTC(CI) group may be requested by the corps G2 for temporary assignment to the corps counterintelligence section.

153. Field Army

a. Field army counterintelligence operations are similar to those of corps and divisions. Operations are broader in scope because of the greater number of units and the larger area involved and because of the requirement for longer-range planning. The territorial responsibilities of the field army usually result in more extensive counterintelligence operations pertaining to civil security and special operations than is true at lower echelons. Field army counterintelligence operations pertaining to civil security are based upon support of tactical operations as well as later transfer of territorial responsibility to TALOG.

b. The field army frequently conducts counterintelligence operations within corps areas. Such activities are coordinated with the corps intelligence officer to avoid conflict and duplication of effort.

c. Counterintelligence specialists of the military intelligence company (CI) of the military intelligence battalion assigned to field army may be called upon by the field army G2 to implement counterintelligence measures and operations that are related to the mission of the field army and fall within the scope of the operational activity engaged in by counterintelligence elements of the INTC in tactical operations.

d. Normally, one field office of the military intelligence company (CI) will be located at each army corps area. Other field offices will be so located as to maintain effective counterintelligence coverage in the remaining field army area. The military intelligence company (CI)

may be strengthened as necessary by augmentation personnel from the INTC(CI) group at theater army.

154. Army Group

Army group has no territorial responsibilities and conducts only such counterintelligence operations as apply to army group headquarters. Counterintelligence plans of army group are usually general in nature and take the form of policy guidance to coordinate counterintelligence operations of subordinate units. Major emphasis is placed upon security of military operations. This involves considering enemy activities which threaten military security and the necessary civil and military security countermeasures. Counterintelligence operations in support of the army group cover those of subordinate units. Deception plans usually are assigned to subordinate units for execution.

155. Logistical Commands

a. Counterintelligence is a major activity of the intelligence operations of logistical commands. Denying the enemy information of the supplies, service installations, nuclear weapons systems, and transportation and communication means, and their protection against sabotage, are vital to the accomplishment of the logistical command's mission. The large territorial responsibilities of the theater army logistical command headquarters require extensive counterintelligence operations of all types. Although the scope and emphasis vary, counterintelligence procedures of logistical commands are similar to those at tactical headquarters.

b. Logistical command counterintelligence measures and operations are relatively passive in nature; however, the importance of the security of the logistical command cannot be overemphasized. To assist the logistical commander in the implementation of his counterintelligence responsibilities, theater army INTC(CI) group organizes counterintelligence regions and field offices within the area of the logistical command. These counterintelligence regions and field offices remain under the operational control of the theater army INTC(CI) group for effective theater-wide area coverage; however, there is close and continuing coordination at all

times between the logistical commander and the INTC(CI) group through the counterintelligence regional offices. The logistical commander may call upon the INTC(CI) elements within his area to recommend and test security measures for the safeguarding of installations, materiel, staging and marshalling areas, and lines of communications; and to give any other assistance of a specialized nature which falls within the mission of the INTC.

156. Theater Army

a. Theater army usually delegates its territorial responsibilities to the field armies and to theater army logistical command headquarters (TALOG). Except for security of the theater army headquarters and for missions not suitable for assignment to subordinate commands, theater army counterintelligence activities are usually confined to the coordination and supervision of operations of subordinate commands and the administrative control of counterintelligence specialist personnel assigned to the theater. Essentially, theater army coordinates and supervises counterintelligence operations by—

- (1) Publishing policy statements and directives.
- (2) Planning and supervising the assumption of counterintelligence control of army rear areas by TALOG. Coordination usually is direct between the armies and the advance logistical commands (ADLOG) of TALOG.
- (3) Supervising the activities of subordinate commands to insure complete counterintelligence coverage.
- (4) Planning the procurement of counterintelligence specialists.

b. The theater army commander exercises operational control of the INTC(CI) Group assigned to the theater army through his ACofS, G2. Elements of the INTC(CI) Group may be utilized as needed by the G2 to recommend and test security measures within the theater army headquarters and to provide any other counterintelligence support needed by theater army consistent with the mission of the INTC(CI). An example of this type of support to the theater commander would be long-range, theater-wide, special operations which

necessitate centralized control of the INTC (CI) Group by theater army.

c. The INTC (CI) Group normally has counterintelligence area coverage responsibilities up to the rear of the combat zone and must be prepared to assume area coverage responsibility for former combat zone areas as the combat zone moves forward. The group may be organized into subordinate region, field, and resident offices, as required. All of these offices remain under the direct operational control of the group commander, although they may be so located as to support communications zone elements at all levels. Close liaison and rapid interchange of requirements are essential.

157. Theater Army Civil Affairs Command

Theater army civil affairs command head-

quarters is concerned with internal headquarters security and with providing policies, guidance, and supervision of counterintelligence operations pertaining primarily to civil security and civil aspects of censorship and port, frontier, and travel security. These operations usually are carried out by subordinate civil affairs units, field armies, and logistical commands (FM 41-10).

158. Theater Army Air Defense Command

Theater army air defense command headquarters is concerned with internal headquarters security and with providing policies, guidance and supervision. Counterintelligence operations within the theater army air defense command are concerned primarily with military security, with emphasis upon protection of weapons and target acquisition means.

Section III. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLANNING AND ORDERS

159. General

a. Counterintelligence planning is based on enemy capabilities to obtain information of friendly activities. Counterintelligence planning develops appropriate countermeasures to prevent the enemy from learning of those friendly dispositions and activities which disclose the intentions of the command or which, if disrupted, would imperil the accomplishment of the mission.

b. Planning the counterintelligence measures for, and support of, any operation is concurrent with the planning and conduct of the operation. It begins with the inception of the operation plan and continues until the operation is completed. The procedures used in counterintelligence planning generally are similar to the planning of the collection effort described in chapter 2.

160. Counterintelligence Estimate

a. The counterintelligence estimate is an evaluation of the enemy's intelligence, sabotage, and subversive capabilities to determine the relative probability of enemy adoption of these capabilities; it includes the effects of these capabilities on friendly courses of action. How

effectively existing counterintelligence measures can counter enemy capabilities is considered, and the need for additional measures or increased emphasis on certain measures is determined.

b. The estimate is based on knowledge of the order of battle of the enemy units and agencies that collect intelligence information and conduct sabotage and subversive activities. Of specific interest are organization, training, equipment, doctrine, techniques, and deployment of these units and agencies.

c. Written counterintelligence estimates are rare at corps and division; they are common at field army and logistical commands in the communications zone. With minor modifications, the intelligence estimate form is suitable for counterintelligence estimates. Usually, the counterintelligence estimate is prepared for the intelligence officer by the chief of the counterintelligence branch of the intelligence section. A counterintelligence estimate form is shown at appendix VIII.

161. Counterintelligence Measures Worksheet

Based upon the conclusions reached in the

Period covered: From _____ To: _____

[illegible]

2-1698

terintelligence measures worksheet is shown at appendix IX.

The counterintelligence plan is a systematic listing of all the counterintelligence measures to be carried out by a command, indicating the agencies responsible for the execution of each task. It is prepared from the counterintelligence measures worksheet and, when completed becomes an appendix to the intelligence annex to the operation order or as paragraph 4 of the intelligence annex (FM 101-5).

CHAPTER 7

INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, SPECIAL OPERATIONAL METHODS, OR SPECIAL PURPOSE OPERATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

163. Introduction

a. The intelligence operations described in the previous chapters are generally applicable to any military operation. However, certain aspects of intelligence operations receive increased emphasis depending upon the limitations and requirements of unusual characteristics in the operational environment.

b. Unusual characteristics in the operational environment are of two general types. One is concerned with special environmental conditions such as extremes of weather or terrain. The other is the result of special operational methods such as airborne, amphibious, and air-mobile operations; or operations for specialized

purposes such as cover and deception, psychological operations, and counterinsurgency operations.

c. This chapter discusses intelligence aspects of these unusual characteristics and provides references for more detailed coverage.

164. Use of Strategic Intelligence in Special Operations

Strategic intelligence is used extensively in planning for special operations, particularly those to be conducted in a distant area. Strategic intelligence used for this purpose is confirmed and supplemented by combat intelligence as soon as practicable.

Section II. EXTREMES OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN

165. General

a. Operations in extremes of weather and terrain depend upon a detailed knowledge of the terrain and climatology of the area of operations. The collection of information of the extreme characteristics of weather, together with the determination of the effects of these extremes on both friendly and enemy broad courses of action, is a prerequisite to the initiation of an operation.

b. Operations in extremes of weather and terrain affect intelligence operations by creating special intelligence requirements and by generally impeding collection and dissemination of information and intelligence. Specific intelligence requirements and problems posed by extremes of weather and terrain are discussed in certain field manuals of the 31-series. Paragraphs 166 and 167 point up significant intelligence considerations.

166. Extremes in Weather

a. Provision must be made for frequent weather forecasting and for rapid dissemination of forecasts to the lowest echelons. Forecasts must include special items of particular significance to the military operation. Wind velocity in northern operations is extremely important because of its use in determining the windchill factor. In mountain operations, storms of all types are critical factors in the conduct of operations. Weather forecasts and forecasting capabilities must be responsive to these special conditions. Additional equipment or units may be required to meet the need.

b. Extremes in weather affect intelligence requirements concerning enemy capabilities. Specific information of the enemy's capabilities for moving cross-country and for living and fighting for prolonged periods in extreme weather is an essential intelligence requirement.

c. Preplanning is necessary to minimize the effects of weather extremes on intelligence collection efforts. Extremes of cold or heat affect the operation of surveillance devices; prolonged periods of darkness reduce the effectiveness of visual and photographic capabilities; and sudden storms place limitations on all combat surveillance operations.

167. Extremes in Terrain

a. Extreme terrain increases the magnitude of the effort required to collect needed information. This is caused as much by terrain obstacles to collection as by the more detailed information required because of the extreme terrain variations. Jungle areas require close

examination in order to penetrate the jungle cover; mountainous regions limit observation, especially when the high ground cannot be occupied; and northern regions or deserts are conspicuous by their lack of easily identified and located terrain objects.

b. Generally, areas of extreme terrain lack geodetic and map coverage. This creates a requirement for greater detail in the collection of terrain information.

c. Early examination and evaluation of the collection efforts required, and prior planning and preparation will minimize collection problems during the conduct of the military operation.

Section III. SPECIAL OPERATIONAL METHODS

168. Airborne Operations

a. The production and dissemination of intelligence are influenced by the following considerations characteristic of airborne operations:

- (1) Planning is centralized.
- (2) Higher headquarters provide most of the information and intelligence for airborne units during the planning phase.
- (3) Terrain analyses are more detailed and require special emphasis upon areas suitable for drop zones and landing zones for assault aircraft.
- (4) Weather information must be broader in scope and more detailed; weather forecasts must be more frequent than for ground-based operations.
- (5) Secrecy measures are stringent and rigidly enforced. However, intelligence disseminated to subordinate units is as extensive and detailed as time permits.

b. Certain enemy capabilities receive special emphasis. Examples are his capability to employ nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and airstrikes against the airborne force in the departure area, en route, and in the objective area; his armor capability; and his air defense capability (FM 57-10).

c. Intelligence techniques peculiar to air-

borne operations include the preparation of the landing area intelligence study and the enemy airfield summary.

169. Airmobile Operations

a. Intelligence requirements characteristic of airmobile operations or requiring emphasis include terrain analyses of landing areas, detailed and frequent weather forecasts, and accurate locations of enemy air defense installations.

b. The determination of air avenues of approach and landing zones is a major requirement. Normally, this requirement cannot be fully accomplished by ground reconnaissance. For areas immediately in front of the FEBA, information can be obtained from the units in contact. Visual and photo aerial reconnaissance is employed in the objective area and in other areas beyond the capabilities of the units in contact.

170. Amphibious Operations

a. Special considerations that affect intelligence requirements for amphibious operations include the following:

- (1) Length of time elapsing between the initiation of planning and the execution of the operation.
- (2) Dependence upon higher echelons for information and intelligence.
- (3) Lack of opportunity for supplemental

ground reconnaissance prior to initiation of landing.

- (4) Difficulty in dissemination of intelligence during the initial stages of the landing.

b. Intelligence requirements that receive spe-

cial emphasis include information about beaches and the terrain inland to the beachhead line, including obstacles and demolitions on beaches and under water; weather conditions; and current information of the enemy situation just prior to and during the assault landing (FM 31-12).

Section IV. SPECIAL WARFARE

171. General

Special warfare embraces all the military and paramilitary measures and activities related to *unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological operations.*

172. Unconventional Warfare

Intelligence requirements at all command levels concerned with the conduct of unconventional warfare operation encompass the entire spectrum of intelligence.

a. *Guerrilla Warfare.*

- (1) Coordination for intelligence and counterintelligence activities in support of guerrilla forces is normally accomplished by the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF). When a JUWTF is not established, coordination may be accomplished through an unconventional warfare section within the J3 staff division of the unified or specified command. When the area of influence of the field army (or other conventional force commander) overlaps a guerrilla warfare area, operational control of the guerrilla forces concerned is passed to the appropriate force commander. Coordination for intelligence and counterintelligence activities in support of the guerrillas is then accomplished through the G2 of the headquarters staff.

- (2) Intelligence requirements are characterized by the scope and detail necessary for effectiveness. They are primarily directed toward information which—

- (a) Provides a thorough background knowledge of the operational area to include an intimate understanding

of the indigenous population within the operational area and an evaluation of their resistance potential.

- (b) Aids in determining political trends.
 - (c) Aids in determining enemy activities and capabilities.
 - (d) Supports guerrilla psychological operations.
 - (e) Supports the expansion of guerrilla operations.
 - (f) Provides weather data.
- (3) The use of guerrilla forces as collection agencies for commanders of theater and component forces is restricted by communications limitations. The security of guerrilla forces dictates restrictions on radio traffic and, consequently, the amount of intelligence that can be provided. This limitation notwithstanding, guerrilla forces are ideally suited to contribute to the theater intelligence effort—chiefly target acquisition and damage assessment (FM 31-21 and FM 31-21A).

b. *Evasion and Escape.*

- (1) Information and intelligence of the area of operations and enemy procedures and techniques are required for an effective evasion and escape program.
- (2) Information on the area of operations is collected using normal collection methods. Specific requirements include information on usable routes for escapees and evaders, cover and concealment, sources of water and subsistence, areas to be avoided, areas safe for use as removal areas, borders, and the attitude of the local population according to social, ethnic, religious, and economic groups, if possible.

- (3) Requirements concerning enemy procedures and techniques in countering the evasion and escape operation are collected primarily by interrogation of knowledgeable prisoners of war, refugees, escapees, and evaders.
- (4) The intelligence officer, in consultation with the operations officer, analyzes information and intelligence and assists the operations officer in devising escape and evasion plans. He coordinates counterintelligence measures to support the plans, and assists in the intelligence aspects of evasion and escape training.
- (5) Details on evasion and escape are discussed in FM 21-77.

c. Resistance.

- (1) Intelligence requirements generally parallel those for guerrilla warfare. Forces involved are underground resistance elements primarily involved in covert actions for the purpose of reducing the military, economic, psychological, or political potential of the enemy. Coordination of intelligence and counterintelligence activities are more difficult because of the absence of a normal organization, adequate communications, and centralized control.
- (2) Resistance elements are a potential source of information and intelligence. However, practical limitations paralleling but exceeding those for guerrilla operations create obstacles that require careful planning and utmost secrecy (FM 31-21 and FM 33-5).

173. Counterinsurgency

a. Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence is essential to successful counterinsurgency operations. The nature of the enemy, the tactical deployment of troops, and the presence of both friendly and hostile civilians in the area dictate modification of normal collection procedures.

b. Intelligence activities are characterized by extensive coordination with, and participation

in, police-, detection-, and penetration-type operations such as—

- (1) Search and seizure.
- (2) Establishment and operation of checkpoints and roadblocks.
- (3) Documentation of civilians.
- (4) Censorship.
- (5) Physical and electronic surveillance of suspects and meeting places.
- (6) Maintenance of extensive dossiers.
- (7) Intensive interrogation.

c. Intensive effort is required to expose, thwart, destroy, or neutralize the irregular force intelligence system. Counterintelligence operations are complicated by the degree of reliance that must be placed on local organizations and individuals, the difficulty in distinguishing between friendly and hostile members of the population, and political considerations which will frequently hinder proper counterintelligence operations. Often a larger number of intelligence and counterintelligence personnel is needed than would be required for normal combat operations (FM 31-15).

174. Psychological Operations

a. Psychological operations at the tactical level are concerned with immediate short-range plans and operations aimed at enemy frontline troops and civilians in the area, and the civilian populace in the tactical area of interest.

b. Intelligence requirements for planning pertain to the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of the civilian populace in the area; attitudes and predispositions of social, ethnic, religious, and economic groups; and information and analysis of attitudes of enemy forces such as confidence in leadership, troop response to physical conditions, feeling toward the military situation and military leaders, and attitude toward surrender.

c. Requirements during tactical operations include all of the above and, in addition, detailed information on the physical appearance and environment of the enemy soldier, his equipment, and other information such as nicknames of commanders and the best time for making loudspeaker broadcasts (FM 33-5 and FM 101-5).

Section V. SPECIAL PURPOSE OPERATIONS

175. Tactical Cover and Deception

a. Tactical cover and deception plans are based on knowledge of the enemy's psychology and intelligence capabilities. To prepare a deception story, information and intelligence of the following are necessary: enemy means of collecting information and the capabilities of these means; how the enemy processes information to include what he considers to be indications; at what enemy command level action is taken on the deception story; and the personalities of the enemy intelligence officers and commanders who can be expected to act on the deception story. This information and intelligence is derived in part from studies of enemy procedures and order of battle of enemy units that collect and process information.

b. To execute tactical cover and deception operations, it is essential to have intelligence on the progress of the operations. Early warning of enemy suspicions that a deception operation is being used against him also is required. This information and intelligence is produced by the use of normal collection means and special use of communications, intelligence, and covert agencies.

c. Part of any tactical cover and deception plan is the denial of certain information to the enemy. Security of cover and deception plans and operations are supported by counterintelligence measures. Information on every phase of tactical cover and deception plans and operations is disseminated on a need-to-know basis. To safeguard this information, special procedures such as restricted areas, security checks, special passes, and special handling of documents and equipment are established.

d. Continued success of tactical cover and deception operations depends in part upon convincing the enemy that his failure was due to faulty evaluation of information. To accomplish this, the normal pattern of intelligence activities is continued during and after tactical cover and deception operations. See FM 31-40 for further details.

176. Electronic Warfare (EW)

a. The intelligence aspects of EW encompass both communication and electronic intelligence.

(1) Communication intelligence (COMINT) comprises all measures taken to obtain information through the intercept of communications other than foreign press and propaganda broadcasts.

(2) Electronic intelligence (ELINT) comprises the collection (observing and recording) and technical processing of information on foreign non-communication electromagnetic radiations that emanate from sources other than nuclear detonations.

b. Information and intelligence are required of enemy offensive and defensive electronic means, including types of equipment, locations, place and purpose in the enemy order of battle, and operating frequencies. All available collection agencies are used to secure this information and intelligence. Such agencies include technical intelligence detachments and those intelligence agencies supporting the field army which are capable of gathering the necessary technical data. These data, once gathered and interpreted, are used to plan electronic countermeasures (ECM) using existing equipment, or for developing new ECM equipment to fill the particular requirement.

c. The overall implications of active countermeasures must be carefully considered in planning EW operations. COMINT can be a lucrative source of intelligence. The undesirable effects of jamming on communications intelligence sources are weighed against possible diversion of enemy resources to evade the jamming. The immediate tactical advantages to be gained by interference in the enemy's command and control system are also considered.

d. FM 24-150 contains details on electronic warfare.

177. Chemical and Biological Operations

a. The enemy's chemical and biological capabilities and the effects of chemical or biological agents on the area of operations are considered in analyses of the area of operations, intelligence estimates, and collection plans. The surprise with which chemical and biological

agents can be used and the difficulties involved in the immediate detection of their use—but particularly verification of a biological attack—make indications of the use of these agents an important element in intelligence collection planning.

b. The unit counterintelligence plan includes measures to prevent the enemy from learning of our intentions regarding the use of chemical or biological agents.

c. Effective use of chemical and biological

weapons requires information and intelligence of targets and target areas for attack by our forces. Predictions are required as to the effects of the characteristics of the area of operations on the use of chemical and biological weapons. Specifically, information is required on the effects of wind speed and direction, temperature, terrain, the degree of humidity, and the amount of precipitation on the use of chemical or biological agents. See FM 3-5, FM 3-10, FM 3-10A, and FM 3-130.

CHAPTER 8

INTELLIGENCE TRAINING AND INTELLIGENCE STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

Section I. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

178. General

Intelligence training, including counterintelligence training, is given to all personnel. Personnel whose primary duties are concerned with intelligence are given additional training appropriate to their assignments.

179. Conduct of Intelligence Training

a. Intelligence training is integrated with other training except for specialized subjects and orientation. It is not conducted as a separate activity distinct from all other training.

b. Intelligence training emphasizes speed of collection and processing of information and the extension of collection activities to the depth of the area of influence of the unit.

c. In training exercises, units should be provided with the intelligence means normally required during combat operations. Realistic training situations requiring the use of these means should be provided.

180. Responsibilities

a. All commanders are responsible for the intelligence training of their units. All staff officers are responsible for the intelligence training of their staff sections.

b. The intelligence officer, in coordination with the operations officer, exercises staff supervision of intelligence training within the command. He prepares the intelligence training program, conducts intelligence schools, supervises intelligence training, conducts tests, and assists lower units in obtaining training aids and qualified instructors. He informs the operations officer of the time needed for intelligence training and requirements for facilities, training aids, and instructors. Close coordination between the intelligence officer and other mem-

bers of the staff helps insure the integration of intelligence training with other training.

c. Unit training in reconnaissance and the collection of information is planned and supervised by the intelligence officer in coordination with the operations officer. Orders directing unit intelligence training are issued by the operations officer in the name of the commander.

181. Specialized Intelligence Instruction Methods

a. The methods of instruction prescribed by FM 21-5 are applicable to specialized intelligence training. In most cases, specialized intelligence training is best accomplished by centralized instruction.

b. A system of intelligence schools within the command helps establish standard practices throughout the command.

- (1) A theater-level intelligence school should be established for instruction of all officers and selected noncommissioned officers assigned to intelligence duties. Instruction should be area oriented and should interpret the effects of conditions peculiar to the command and the area of operations on intelligence functions and procedures.
- (2) Division-level schools should be established for instruction of all officers and selected noncommissioned officers assigned to intelligence duties. Subordinate units conduct intelligence schools to train their regularly assigned intelligence personnel and those of their subordinate units. These schools are conducted by unit intelligence officers, with the assistance and under the supervision of the intelligence officer of the division or com-

parable unit. Instructors should preferably have attended the school established at the next higher level.

c. Training is not concluded with the completion of the division-level and subordinate intelligence schools; rather it is conducted on a continuous basis and is perfected by integration with on-the-job and other training.

182. Intelligence Training and Maneuvers

a. Intelligence play in maneuvers should be designed to furnish realistic training in every aspect of combat intelligence. The use of Aggressor as a maneuver enemy improves realism and helps make commanders, staffs, and troops conscious of the enemy as a real opposing force.

b. Intelligence measures used in maneuvers include aerial surveillance, ground reconnaissance, use of surveillance devices, safeguarding military information, use of camouflage and camouflage discipline, restrictions on the use of communications, identification of aircraft, radiological monitoring, reporting of nuclear bursts, detecting and reporting chemical and biological attacks, preparation and distribution of photos as supplements to maps, and the requisition and distribution of maps.

c. Intelligence training should include training individuals to understand weather elements and to effectively use weather information. The effects of weather upon tactical operations, personnel, weapons, equipment, terrain, and movement should be emphasized.

Section II. INTELLIGENCE STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

183. Section SOP

The intelligence officer prepares the SOP for the routine activities of the intelligence section. The format and content of the SOP will depend upon the level of command, the nature of the operations, and the desires of the intelligence officer (FM 101-5).

184. Command SOP

The intelligence officer usually prepares that portion of the command SOP that pertains to intelligence activities. A form for a command SOP is contained in FM 101-5. An example of a division SOP is contained in FM 61-100. Intelligence entries therein can be used as a guide in the preparation of the intelligence portion of a command SOP.

CHAPTER 9

ORDER OF BATTLE

(To be published)

APPENDIX I

REFERENCES

FM 1-15	Aviation Battalion, Infantry, Airborne, Mechanized and Armored Divisions
FM 1-100	Army Aviation
FM 3-5	Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Operations
FM 3-10	Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment
(S) FM 3-10A	Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment (U)
FM 3-12	Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense
(C) FM 3-130	U.S. Army Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Intelligence (U)
FM 5-20	Camouflage, Basic Principles and Field Camouflage
FM 5-30	Engineer Intelligence
FM 6-15	Artillery Meteorology
FM 6-20-1	Field Artillery Tactics
FM 11-30	Signal Corps Technical Intelligence
FM 11-40	Signal Corps Pictorial Operations
FM 19-30	Physical Security
FM 19-40	Handling Prisoners of War
FM 20-60	Battle Field Illumination
FM 21-5	Military Training
FM 21-6	Techniques of Military Instruction
FM 21-26	Map Reading
FM 21-30	Military Symbols
FM 21-31	Topographic Symbols
FM 21-40	Small Unit Procedures in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare
FM 21-77	Evasion and Escape
(C) FM 21-77A	Evasion and Escape (U)
(C) FM 24-150	Electronic Warfare (Ground Based) (U)
FM 30-7	Combat Intelligence Battle Group, Combat Command and Smaller Units
FM 30-9	Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army
(S) FM 30-9A	Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army (U)
FM 30-10	Terrain Intelligence
(S) FM 30-15	Interrogation (U)
FM 30-16	Technical Intelligence
(C) FM 30-17	Counterintelligence Operations, Intelligence Corps, U.S. Army (U)
FM 30-20	Aerial Surveillance—Reconnaissance, Field Army
FM 30-28	Armed Forces Censorship (Army)
FM 30-101	Aggressor, The Maneuver Enemy
FM 30-102	Handbook on Aggressor Military Forces
FM 30-103	Aggressor Order of Battle
FM 31-15	Operations Against Irregular Forces
FM 31-18	Long Range Patrols, Division, Corps and Army
(C) FM 31-20	Special Forces Operational Techniques (U)
FM 31-21	Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations
(S) FM 31-21A	Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations (U)
FM 31-30	Jungle Operations

(C) FM 31-40	Tactical Cover and Deception (U)
FM 31-71	Northern Operations
FM 31-72	Mountain Operations
(CM) FM 32-5	Communications Security (U)
(S) FM 32-10	United States Army Security Agency in Support of a Field Army (U)
FM 33-5	Psychological Operations
FM 41-10	Civil Affairs Operations
FM 44-1	U.S. Army Air Defense Employment
FM 55-8	Transportation Intelligence
FM 57-10	Army Forces in Joint Airborne Operations
FM 57-35	Airmobile Operations
FM 61-100	The Division
(S) FM 100-1	Doctrinal Guidance (U)
FM 100-5	Field Service Regulations, Operations
FM 100-10	Field Service Regulations, Administration
FM 100-15	Field Service Regulations, Larger Units
FM 101-5	SOFM, Staff Organization and Procedures
FM 101-10-series	SOFM, Organization, Technical and Logistical Data
FM 101-31-series	Nuclear Weapons Employment
FM 105-5	Maneuver Control
FM 110-101	Intelligence: Joint Landing Force Manual
DA Pam 108-1	Index of Army Motion Pictures, Film Strips, Slides, and Phono-Recordings
DA Pam 310-series	Military Publications Indexes
(C) DA Pam 381-1	Combat Intelligence Field Army 1965-1975 (U)
TC 5-9	Near Infrared Night Vision and Detection Equipment and its Application
JCS Pub 1	Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage
JCS Pub 2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
(C) AR 10-122	United States Army Security Agency (U)
AR 95-51	Aerial Observer Training
AR 320-5	Dictionary of United States Army Terms
AR 320-50	Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes
AR 350-30	Code of Conduct
AR 350-225	Survival, Evasion and Escape Training
AR 380-5	Safeguarding Defense Information
(C) AR 381-100	Counterintelligence Corps; Mission and Employment (U)
AR 381-115	Counterintelligence Investigative Agencies
AR 604-5	Investigation and Clearance of Personnel for Handling Cryptologic, Top Secret, Secret and Confidential Material and Information
AR 604-10	Military Personnel Security Program
SR 550-25-1	Retention of War Trophies and Registration of War Trophy Firearms
TM 3-210	Fallout Prediction
TM 3-240	Field Behavior of Chemical Agents
TM 5-545	Geology and Its Military Application
TM 30-245	Photographic Interpretation Handbook
TM 30-246	Tactical Interpretation of Air Photos
STANAG No. 2008 (Edition No. 2)	Standard Method of Rendering Enemy Bombing, Shelling, Mortaring and Toxic Reports
STANAG No. 2022 (Edition No. 2)	Intelligence Reports
STANAG No. 2073	NATO Intelligence Subject Code
STANAG No. 2076 (Edition No. 2)	Method of Enemy Army Forces Strength Computation

STANAG No. 2084 (Edition No. 2)	Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Documents and Equipment
STANAG No. 2094	Sign Posting of Radiologically Contaminated Areas
STANAG No. 2098	Intelligence Annex to Operation Orders
STANAG No. 2103	Reporting Nuclear Detonations Radio-Active Fallout and Biological and Chemical Attacks

APPENDIX II

STANDARD SHELLING, MORTARING, AND BOMBING REPORT

- (SHELLREP) (MORTREP) (BOMREP) (state which)
- A. UNIT OF ORIGIN (use current call-sign, address group, or code name).
 - B. POSITION OF OBSERVER (grid reference preferred—encode if this discloses the location of a headquarters or important observation post, or if F1 below, is used).
 - C. GRID OR MAGNETIC (state which) BEARING OR AZIMUTH OF FLASH OR SOUND OR GROOVE OF SHELL OR ORIGIN OF FLIGHT PATH OF MISSILES (state which) IN MILS OR DEGREES (state which). (Omit for aircraft.)
 - D. TIME FROM
 - E. TIME TO
 - F. AREA SHELLED, MORTARED, OR BOMBED. May be sent either as:
 - 1. Bearing/azimuth (in degrees or mils—state which) and a distance (in meters) from the observer. (This information must be encoded.)
 - OR
 - 2. Grid reference (clear reference will be used).
 - G. NUMBER AND NATURE OF GUNS, MORTARS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS, AIRCRAFT, OR OTHER METHODS OF DELIVERY.
 - H. NATURE OF FIRE (registration, bombardment, harassment, etc.). (May be omitted for aircraft.)
 - I. NUMBER, TYPE, AND CALIBER (state whether measured or assumed) of SHELLS, ROCKETS (OR MISSILES), BOMBS, ETC.
 - J. TIME OF FLASH TO BANG. (Omit for aircraft.)
 - K. DAMAGE.

NOTES: 1. The report must be preceded by the appropriate code word, i.e., SHELLREP, MORTREP, OR BOMBREP.

2. Paragraph headings are *not* transmitted. Only the letter corresponding to the paragraph heading is used.

3. Paragraphs which cannot be completed or are not applicable will be omitted in the transmission of the report.

4. Higher classification may be used when the originator considers prevailing conditions warrant such action.

APPENDIX III **REPORTING NUCLEAR DETONATIONS, AND BIOLOGICAL AND** **CHEMICAL ATTACKS**

1. GENERAL

a. The formats presented in this appendix are standardized by Standardization Agreement (STANAG No. 2103 (2d draft)).

b. The letter code and meanings used in these reports follow Standardization Agreement. Only the letter corresponding to the paragraph meaning is transmitted in the report.

2. FORMAT FOR OBSERVERS' INITIAL REPORT (REPORT FORM NBC 1)

LETTER	MEANING	EXAMPLE (NUCLEAR)	EXAMPLE (TOXIC)	EXAMPLE (BIOLOGICAL)
	*Precedence			
	Date/Time (Zulu)			
	Security			
	From			
	To			
	Type of Report	NBC 1	NBC 1	NBC 1
B.	Position of Observer	B. LB 196400	B. MAR-VILLE.	
C.	Bearing or Azimuth of attack from observer (in degrees or mils, say which)	C. 60 degrees.	C. 60 degrees.	
D.	Date/Time of attack	D. 201405 Z.	D. 201405 Z.	D. 201405 Z.
E.	Illumination time (secs) or time attack ended	E. 4.	E. 201412 Z.	
F.	Location of attack			F. LB 206306 actual.
G.	Means of delivery, if known		G. Aerial spray.	
H.	Type of burst, Air, Surface, or Unknown, or type of toxic agent, if known, or type of attack (BW, CW, registration, harassing, etc.)	H. Surface.	H. Nerve.	H. Biological.
I.	Number of shells, etc.			
J.	Flash to bang time (secs)			
K.	Crater present or absent and diameter if known (in meters)			
L.	Fireball width, immediately after passage of shock wave (sound of detonations) (degrees or mils, say which)			
M.	Cloud height top or bottom, 10 mins after burst (degrees, mils, meters, or feet, say which)	M. 40,000 feet TOP.		

* As appropriate or as per unit SOP.

NOTE: The items "Type of Report", D, H, and either B or C or F must always be reported; other items are optional.

3. FORMAT FOR DISSEMINATING EVALUATED DATA (REPORT FORM NBC 2).

<u>LETTER</u>	<u>MEANING</u>	<u>EXAMPLE</u> (NUCLEAR)	<u>EXAMPLE</u> (TOXIC)
	Precedence		
	Date/Time (Z)		
	Security		
	From		
	To		
	Type of Report	NBC 2.	NBC 2:
A.	Strike serial number.	A. 24.	A. 1:
D.	Date/Time of attack (Z).	D. 201405 Z.	D. 200945 Z.
F.	Location of attack.	F. LB 187486.	F. LB 126456.
G.	Means of delivery, if known.		
H.	Type of burst, Air, Surface, or Unknown (say which), or type of toxic agent.	H. Surface.	H. Nerve.
N.	Estimate Yield (KT).	N. 50.	

- NOTES: a. This report is normally based on two or more NBC Forms 1. It includes an estimated GZ and in the case of nuclear detonations an evaluated yield.
- b. Items A, D, F, H, and N may be repeated as often as necessary to produce a summary report.

4. FORMAT FOR DISSEMINATION OF IMMEDIATE WARNING OF EXPECTED CONTAMINATION (REPORT FORM NBC 3).

<u>LETTER</u>	<u>MEANING</u>	<u>EXAMPLE</u> (NUCLEAR)	<u>EXAMPLE</u> (TOXIC)
	Precedence		
	Date/Time (Z)		
	Security		
	From		
	To		
	Type of Report	NBC 3.	NBC 3.
D.	Date/Time of Attack (Z)	D. 201405 Z.	D. 201405 Z.
F.	Location of attack (UTM)	F. LB 187486.	F. LB 206300.
P.	Area of expected contamination (UTM)		P. LB 208320 LB 210320 LB 206310
Y.	Azimuths of radial lines		
Z.	Effective wind speed (KPH3); downwind distance (Z one I-Km); cloud Radius (Km).		

APPENDIX IV

AVAILABILITY OF AGENCIES

1. Division, Corps, and Field Army

The agencies usually available at a division, corps, and field army are shown in figures 10, 11, and 12.

2. Army Group

The agencies normally available at the army group are—

- a. Subordinate forces.
- b. Army group special staff.
- c. Adjacent army groups.
- d. Tactical air force.
- e. Theater task forces.
- f. Theater Army logistical command, theater Army civil affairs command, and theater Army air defense command.
- g. Theater Army, theater Navy, and theater Air Force.
- h. Military intelligence units.

3. Communications Zone

Agencies available to major Army commands

located within the communications zone are shown in figures 13, 14, and 15.

4. Theater Army

The agencies available at theater Army vary with the organization of the theater and generally include—

- a. Subordinate army commands.
- b. Theater Army special staff sections.
- c. Army Security Agency units.
- d. Army special forces elements.
- e. Clandestine units.
- f. Military intelligence units.
- g. Agencies organized primarily for production of strategic intelligence, but which also develop combat intelligence and information. Such agencies may include interrogation centers, enemy documents centers, and materiel centers.
- h. Comparable headquarters of other services, Allied forces, and joint commands subordinate to theater headquarters.
- i. Higher headquarters.




Figure 10. Intelligence collection agencies available to division.




Figure 11. Intelligence collection agencies available to corps.




Figure 12. Intelligence collection agencies available to field army.




Figure 13. Intelligence collection agencies available to theater Army logistical command.





Figure 14. Intelligence collection agencies available to theater Army civil affairs command.



LEGEND

- Assigned or attached.
- - - - - Support available by request.

Figure 15. Intelligence collection agencies available to theater Army air defense command.

APPENDIX V

EXAMPLE OF A PARTIALLY COMPLETED COLLECTION WORKSHEET

UNIT: 20th Inf Div

Period covered: From 131530 Jul. To: Capture of high ground at 1055-1457.

(1) Essential elements of information and other required intelligence items	(2) Indications (analysis of items in column 1)	(3) Basis for specific orders or requests and notes for future action	(4) Agencies to be used												(5) Hour and destination of reports	(6) Remarks	
			1st Bde	2d Bde	3d Bde	1/21 Cav	Div Arty	20th Inf Bn	20th Ann Bn	262d USAS Co (Dis. Sp)	55th Inf Div	22d Inf Div	1st Corps	Auxiliary agencies			
EEI 1. What are the enemy dispositions? Special attention to organization of the ground, troops occupying strongpoints, and locations and activities of reserves.	a. Location and strengths of— (1) Units in contact. (2) Reserves. (3) Artillery. (4) Others.	(1) Report location, strength, and activities of troops on JANINA-CELINA Ridge.		(X)		(X)	(X)		(X)	(X)	X		(X)	(X)	(1) As obtained. Negative reports every 2 hours starting 131800 July.	Assign to 3d Bde when committed. ✓	
		(2) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints vicinity Hill 408 (1651) and Hill 282 (1251).		(X)				(X)		X			X	(X)	(2) Same as (1).	✓	
		(3) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints vicinity Plateau BELLERIVE.	(X)				(X)	(X)		X			X	(X)	(3) Same as (1).	+	
		(4) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints vicinity BRAZOS Woods.	(X)	(X)			(X)	(X)		X			X	(X)	(4) Same as (1).	✓	
		(5) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints on PETROV Woods Ridge vicinity 2050.	(X)				(X)	(X)		X			(X)	(X)	(5) Same as (1).	✓	
		(6) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints on PETROV Woods Ridge vicinity 1849.		(X)			(X)	(X)		X			(X)	(X)	(6) Same as (1).	If positive, notify 1st Corps without delay and make maximum effort to get details for target analysis. + If positive, notify 22d Inf Div and 1st Corps. +	
		(7) Report location and strength of troops in LARUNA River Valley vicinity LEON (1647).					(X)	X		(X)			(X)	(X)	(7) Same as (1).		
		(8) Report location and strength of troops vicinity Hill 326 (1153).		(X)			(X)	(X)		X		X	(X)	(X)	(8) Same as (1).		
		(9) Report location of all artillery and mortar positions in zone to include those unoccupied and number of pieces.	(X)	(X)			(X)	(X)		(X)	(X)	X	X	(X)	(X)	(9) As obtained.	Cancel after damage assessment reports received. ✓ Check corps and army PERINTREPT's. ✓
	b. Presence of demolitions, gassed areas, radiological and biological contamination, obstacles, and minefields.	(10) Report location and extent of demolitions, gassed areas, radiological and biological contamination, obstacles, and minefields to front, flanks, and forward of present position.	X	X			X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	(10) As obtained.	SOP. +
		c. Entrenching and erecting bands of wire.	(11) Report hostile entrenching and erection of bands of wire along present line of contact.	(X)	(X)			(X)	(X)						(X)	(11) As obtained.	Cancel at 140430. ✓
			(12) Report hostile entrenching and bands of wire on JANINA-CELINA Ridge.		(X)			(X)	(X)						(X)	(X)	(12) As obtained.
		d. Dumping ammunition and engineer supplies and equipment, fortifying buildings.	(13) Report evidences of fortification of buildings in zone, particularly WACO (1451) and ST GEORGE (1554).		(X)									X	(X)	(13) As obtained.	If no information by 132300, try 1st Corps. ✓
		e. Location of command posts and supply and evacuation installations.	(14) Report location of command posts and supply and evacuation installations in division zone north of road LA PALOMA-WACO special attention to vicinity CR 1356.					(X)	(X)		(X)	(X)		(X)	(X)	(14) As obtained.	+
Other Intelligence requirements 2. Will the enemy attack prior to 140430 July? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the axes LEON (1647)-OSTRO (2046); Hill 406 (1849)-Hill 418 (1848).	a. Movement of hostile units forward.	(15) Report volume and type of traffic across TAKASAN Canal and on roads leading south from CELINA, JANINA, CR 1356, and CR 1255.						(X)	(X)		(X)	(X)	X	X	X	(15) Same as (1).	Assign to 1st Bde, 2d Bde when railroad through LAY is reached. ✓
		(16) Report location of troops, types, and numbers, vicinity 1550.						(X)	(X)		X			(X)	(16) As obtained.	Cancel at 140430. ✓	
		(17) Report location of troops, types, and numbers, vicinity 1851.		(X)			(X)			X			(X)	(17) As obtained.	Cancel at 140430. ✓		
	b. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within own position.	(18) Report clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in zone.	(X)	(X)			(X)	X	(X)	X					(18) As obtained.	Cancel at 140430. +	
		(19) Report the number, size, composition, routes, and time observed of enemy patrols in zone.	(X)	(X)	(X)		(X)	(X)							(19) As obtained.	✓	
	d. Increased patrolling.	(20) Report activity and size of units blocking our patrolling along line of contact.	(X)	(X)			(X)								(20) As obtained.	Cancel at 140430. ✓	
	e. Establishment and strengthening of counterreconnaissance screen.	(21) Report any marked change in artillery fire to include time, location, direction of fire, number of rounds, rate and caliber received in zone or area.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X					(21) As obtained.	SOP. +	
	f. Extensive artillery preparations.	(22) Report amount and type of air activity in zone or area.	X	X	X	X	X		X						(22) As obtained.	SOP. +	
	g. Increased air reconnaissance.	(23) Report new identifications.	X	X		X				(X)	X	X	X	X	(23) As obtained.	SOP. +	
	h. Forces in contact being replaced or reinforced by new units.																

APPENDIX VI

EXAMPLE OF A CLIMATIC SUMMARY

CLIMATIC SUMMARY FOR THE MONTH OF JULY 3d CORPS AREA

1. General Circulation

Generally air flows from the west and north-west. Occasionally warm, dry continental air from Russia causes a relatively intense, dry heat with temperatures 90° or more.

2. Temperatures

Afternoon temperatures generally are in the 70s and morning temperatures are in the 50s. There are occasional periods of hot, dry spells that last more than a week with temperatures in the 90s.

The highest temperature ever recorded was 101°F.

3. Thunderstorms

Occur frequently. They usually develop during the day and reach maximum intensity in the late afternoon and evening.

4. Surface Winds

Average wind speed is 5.8 knots. The most predominant direction is northeast, with a mean speed of 8.4 knots. The strongest mean wind is from the east-northeast 10.0 knots. Calms are frequent occurring 25.2 percent of the time, and usually in the early morning. Calms or near calms often last the whole day.

Percentage frequency of surface winds by direction for month of July

S	SSW	SW	WSW	W	WNW	NW	NNW	N	NNE	NE	ENE	E	ESE	SE	SSE
2.1	2.0	8.6	1.0	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.0	1.2	2.1	19.5	10.9	12.2	2.7	9.6	1.0

Average surface wind speed by direction for month of July

S	SSW	SW	WSW	W	WNW	NW	NNW	N	NNE	NE	ENE	E	ESE	SE	SSE
5.6	9.4	8.8	7.6	6.8	8.3	3.2	0.0	5.0	6.3	8.4	10.0	7.1	6.6	6.0	4.0

5. Cloudiness

Mornings frequently are clear. Clouds develop by noon and cloud cover reaches a maximum in the late afternoon, decreasing to nil just before sunset.

6. Visibility

Normal visibilities are 7 to 13 kilometers and

occasionally farther. Occasional haze may reduce visibility to about 3 kilometers.

7. Precipitation

Thunderstorms are the usual cause of precipitation. Occasionally a southwesterly wind will cause continued drizzle and low, overcast skies for 1 to 3 days. This is the only time low visibilities occur.

	Jun	Jul	Aug	Annual	Years recorded
Mean precipitation (inches)	2.56	2.48	2.36	26.97	40
Mean number of days with thunderstorm ----	4	4	3	18	11
Temperature (°F.)					
Absolute max -----	95	101	97	--	10
Absolute min -----	50	43	43	--	10
Mean daily max -----	71	74	73	--	40
Mean daily min -----	51	55	53	--	40
Mean number of days with fog -----	2	2	4	57	11

APPENDIX VII

FORMAT AND EXAMPLE OF AN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (INTSUM)

1. FORMAT OF AN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

NOTE: Omit items not applicable unless otherwise indicated.

1. Issuing unit (always included).
2. Time and date of issue (always included).
3. Summary of enemy activity for period.
 - a. Ground activity.
 - b. Trace of forward elements.
 - c. Potential targets for nuclear weapons.
 - d. Nuclear activity.
 - e. CBR activity.
 - f. Air activity.
 - g. Other (new tactics, counterintelligence, etc.).
4. Personnel and equipment losses.
 - a. Personnel (KIA, WIA).
 - b. Prisoners of war.
 - c. Equipment destroyed or captured.
5. New obstacles and barriers.
6. Administrative activities.
7. New identifications.
 - a. Units.
 - b. Personalities.
8. Enemy movements.
9. Estimates number and types of vehicles.
10. Weather and terrain conditions.
11. Brief discussion of capabilities and vulnerabilities (always included).
12. Conclusions (always included).

2. EXAMPLES OF A DIVISION INTSUM (full distribution not indicated)

FM CG 52D MECH DIV

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TO CG 2D CORPS

INTSUM NUMBER 144 ENDING 040600 PARA 3 ALFA AGGRESSOR CONTINUED DEFENSE IN ZONE EXCEPT FOR LOCAL ATTACK AT 0415 VICINITY R376759 WITH ESTIMATED 90 MEN CMM 3 MEDIUM TANKS CMM AND LIGHT ARTILLERY SUPPORT PD ATTACK REPULSED PD PARA 3 DELTA ATTACK PRECEDED AT 0410 BY VERY HIGH AIR BURST NUCLEAR WEAPON CMM GROUND ZERO R374761 CMM DELIVERY MEANS UNDETERMINED CMM YIELD ESTIMATED AT 0 PD 5 KT PD PARA 3 FOXTROT ATTACK SUPPORTED BY 2 JET ATTACK AIRPLANES BOMBING AND STRAFING VICINITY R396756 FOR 5 MINUTES STARTING AT 0425 PD PARA 4 ALFA CONFIRMED 20 KIA CMM ESTIMATED

5 KIA CMM ESTIMATED 30 WIA PD PARA 4 BRAVO 10 INCLUDING
2 WIA PD PARA 4 CHARLIE 2 MEDIUM TANKS DESTROYED CMM
1 DAMAGED CMM 1 JET ATTACK AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN PD PARA
6 PRISONER STATES AMMUNITION SUPPLY IN FORWARD UNITS
RUNNING LOW PAREN CHARLIE DASH 3 PAREN PD PARA 7 ALFA
(PATROL REPORTS BATTERY 152 MM HOWITZERS AT R303292
PD PRISONERS CONFIRM LOCATION 2D BATTALION CMM 17F
MTZD RIFLE REGIMENT VICINITY R375758 PAREN BRAVO DASH
1 PAREN PARA 8 AIRBORNE RADAR RECONNAISSANCE DETECT-
ED 10 TRUCKS MOVING SOUTH ON ROAD AT R330280 AT 0345 PD
PARA 9 PROBABLY ROUTINE SUPPLY VEHICLES PD PARA 10
SNOW STARTED AT 040545 AND CONTINUING PD GROUND
FROZEN HARD AND SUPPORTS ALL TYPES OF VEHICLES PD
PARA 11 LOCAL ATTACK REPORTED PROBABLY WAS TO SEIZE
HILL 405 PD ENEMY IS CAPABLE OF CONTINUING DEFENSE IN
PRESENT POSITION CMM MAKING LOCAL ATTACKS TO IMPROVE
HIS DEFENSIVE POSITION CMM WITHDRAWING TO STRONGER
POSITION ALONG LAURIEX RIVER PD PARA 12 CONTINUED DE-
FENSE IN PRESENT POSITION MOST PROBABLE.

APPENDIX VIII

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FORMAT

(Classification)

Issuing section and headquarters¹

Place

Date and time

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NR

Reference: Maps or charts or other documents.

1. MISSION

State the assigned or assumed mission.

2. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

This paragraph discusses characteristics of the area and their effect on enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage operations and on our counterintelligence operations and measures.

a. Weather.

(1) Existing situation.

(2) Effect on enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage operations.

(3) Effect on our counterintelligence operations and measures.

b. Terrain.

Analyze under the same headings as weather.

c. Other characteristics. The following additional characteristics are considered, as pertinent, in separate subparagraphs: sociology, politics, economics, psychology, and other factors. Other factors may include such items as science, material, transportation, manpower, and hydrography. They are analyzed under the same headings as weather.

3. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE, SABOTAGE, AND SUBVERSIVE SITUATION

a. Disposition

b. Composition.

c. Strength, including efficiency of enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage organization.

d. Recent and present significant intelligence, subversive, and sabotage activities (including enemy's knowledge of our intelligence situation).

e. Peculiarities and weaknesses.

¹ If distributed outside the headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command and the ending modified accordingly.

(Classification)

(Classification)

4. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE, SABOTAGE, AND SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES

a. List all capabilities under the following headings:

- (1) Intelligence. (Include all methods of which the enemy is known or estimated to be capable.)
 - (2) Sabotage. (Include all capabilities of military, political, and economic sabotage possible of execution by agents and guerrillas.)
 - (3) Subversion. (Include all types, such as propaganda, sedition, treason, disaffection affecting own troops, allies, and local civilians, and assistance in evasion and escape of hostile civilians.)
- b. Analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities to provide a basis for conclusions as to relative probability of adoption of enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage capabilities.

5. CONCLUSIONS

- a. Relative probability of adoption of enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage capabilities.
- b. Effects of enemy capabilities on our courses of action.
- c. Effectiveness of own counterintelligence measures and additional requirements or emphasis needed.

/s/ _____
Chief, Counterintelligence Branch

(Classification)

APPENDIX IX PARTIALLY COMPLETED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MEASURES WORKSHEET

UNIT: 20th Inf Div

Period covered: From 180800 August TO: Seizure of SHIMENDRICK and destruction of enemy in zone.

(1) Phases or periods of the operation	(2) Categories of counterintelligence activities involved	(3) Counterintelligence measures to be adopted	(4) Agencies responsible for execution of counterintelligence measures										(5) Instructions regarding entries in columns (3) and (4), notes for future action, and staff coordination measures
			Civil affairs platoon	Signal officer	Intelligence officer	Provost marshal	USMC support company	All units	Aviation officer	Division artillery	Security section		
Period in assembly areas before attack.	1. MILITARY SECURITY a. Secrecy discipline. b. Security of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. c. Safe guarding of classified defense information and equipment. d. Communication security. e. Security of troop movements.	(1) Cover or paint all vehicle and aircraft markings.											Coordinate with G4. Provost marshal report violations. Coordinate with G1. Provost marshal report violations. Coordinate with G1. Provost marshal report violations. Coordinate with G3. Security section assist with instruction and check. SOP. Coordinate with G1, G3, and G4. Coordinate with G4. Coordinate with G5. SOP: Security section check. SOP: Security section check. Coordinate with G3 and signal officer. SOP. SOP: Check with signal officer for compliance. Coordinate with 1st Corps and 22d Inf Div. Coordinate with G3 and G4. Provost marshal report violations.
		(2) Remove identifications from uniforms.											
		(3) Restrict personnel to areas except when on official business.											
		(4) Emphasize security discipline in command posts and elsewhere, with particular reference to handling of documents and maps, phone conversations, loose talk, and speculation which might convey information to the enemy. All personnel will be instructed regarding same.											
		(5) Report all breaches and suspected compromise of security at once to G2.											
		(6) Disseminate location of nuclear weapons on need-to-know basis.											
		(7) Nuclear weapons units draw all supplies from division distribution points by use of own vehicles.											
		(8) Collect and place under guard or evacuate, as determined appropriate by unit commander, civilians in position to observe nuclear weapons, storage, and delivery sites.											
		(9) Check SOP plans for security of cryptographic devices, for destruction, and for report of loss or compromise.											
		(10) Check plans and equipment for destruction of documents in event of imminent capture.											
		(11) Maintain radio silence until further orders. No signal panels displayed.											
		(12) Check that unauthorized personnel are prohibited from entering message centers.											
		(13) Patrol all wire lines used by units of division.											
		(14) Cut all wire lines leading into aggressor occupied territory.											
		(15) Prohibit movement of all military vehicles during hours of daylight except for staff parties and messengers authorized by brigade, separate battalion, train commander, and higher headquarters.											
	2. CIVIL SECURITY a. Control of circulation. b. Curfew. c. Passes and permits. d. Restricted areas.	(31) Place roadblocks around perimeter of bivouac.											Coordinate with G1. Coordinate with G3, G4, and G1. Provost marshal report violations. SOP. Coordinate with G3. Coordinate with G3 and 1st Corps. Coordinate with G5. Coordinate with G5. Notify all units and provost marshal. Provost marshal report violations. G5 disseminate to civilians. Coordinate with G5. SOP. Coordinate with G5.
		(32) Limit all movement to zone of 23d Inf Div before attack to reconnaissance parties. Approval before each trip obtained from division headquarters.											
		(33) No firing at hostile planes unless directly attacked.											
		(34) Establish ground surveillance to detect enemy parachute drops, infiltrators, and guerrillas.											
		(35) Guard bridge across the SCHLIMAZEL River.											
		(36) Establish motor patrols and checkpoints along highways to control and check movement of civilians.											
		(37) Restrict all civilians to area within 3 kilometers of homes. Permits to exceed this limit issued through civil affairs.											
		(38) Prohibit civilians to ride in military vehicles without authorization of unit commander.											
		(39) Enforce curfew for all civilians in area from 2000 to 0500 daily.											
		(40) Enforce civilian pass system in accordance with theater pass plan.											
		(41) Prohibit civilians, other than those living in the area or employed by our forces, to enter troop areas.											

APPENDIX X

HANDLING OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND MATERIEL

STANAG NO. 2084 — EDITION NO. 2

1. Enemy Documents

a. Captured documents will be divided into the following categories:

- (1) *Type A.* Documents which contain information concerning significant intelligence subjects, such as enemy order of battle, the employment of new weapons and equipment by the enemy, his logistic and morale situation, his losses, etc. Such documents require immediate operational exploitation, and the originals or microfilm copies must reach appropriate operational intelligence staffs at the earliest possible moment.
- (2) *Type B.* Documents which contain information of value to intelligence staffs, but which is not of sufficient urgency for the document in question to be classified as Type A.
- (3) *Type C.* Documents which contain no information of apparent value to intelligence staffs.
- (4) *Type D.* Documents which contain no information of value to intelligence staffs, but which require special handling.
- (5) *Type E.* Cryptographic documents, all encrypted items and all documents relating to enemy radio systems.

b. Captured documents will be forwarded without delay by the capturing unit to the staff under which the unit is operating, with details of the date, time, and place of capturing unit and the circumstances under which the document was found. Documents taken from a prisoner of war are evacuated with the prisoner, in custody of a guard, so that the prisoner can be interrogated as to the content of the documents.

c. Documents will be clearly tagged, or otherwise identified so as to avoid defacing by the capturing unit, in the following way:

- (1) Identification letters. Documents will be tagged showing the nationality of the capturing force by the national identifying letters prescribed in STANAG No. 1059—National Distinguishing Letters for Use by All NATO Armed Forces.
- (2) Designation of capturing units. This will include the service to which the unit belongs.
- (3) Serial number. Units will give each document a serial number and should record the dispatch of the document in a way diary.
- (4) Date/time of capture.
- (5) Place of capture (with map coordinates).
- (6) Summary of circumstances under which the document was found.

d. Documents taken from crashed aircraft, including Type E code books, call signs, frequency tables, identification symbols, etc. should be forwarded without delay to the nearest Air Force headquarters. Documents from a ship, including Type E code books, call signs, frequency tables, identification symbols, etc. should be forwarded without delay to the nearest Naval Force headquarters.

e. Below division level, documents are inspected quickly for information of immediate tactical value and then promptly forwarded to the intelligence officer of the next higher headquarters. FM 41-10 discusses disposition of historical and cultural documents and records of archival nature. FM 30-15 discusses examination, and processing of other captured documents.

f. Priority of transmission is determined by the system of classification described in *a* above. "A" documents receive highest priority.

2. Enemy Materiel

a. Handling of Captured Enemy Materiel.

- (1) Units locating enemy equipment of potential intelligence value submit a preliminary technical report concerning it. These reports are described in *b* below. Those containing information which could have an immediate effect on the current situation are transmitted through the accelerated intelligence reporting procedure. Others are transmitted by the quickest alternative means available, with the precedence determined by the commander submitting the report.
- (2) Unit commanders will be responsible for placing the captured enemy equipment under guard in order to prevent looting, misuse, or destruction before the arrival of the Technical Intelligence Field Teams.
- (3) All technical documents should be tagged TECH, DOC, or otherwise identified so as to avoid defacing by capturing units or appropriate agen-

cies so that in the normal exploitation of captured documents the command concerned can provide duplicate copies for the guidance of all Technical Intelligence and Specialist Teams in their examinations. All such copies should accompany captured equipment until technical exploitation is finished.

b. Preliminary Technical Report (PRETECHREP). A preliminary technical report is submitted by each unit which captures any significant item of enemy equipment. The report is submitted as soon after the acquisition of the equipment as possible and is directed to the designated technical intelligence element through appropriate channels. The report consists of the following information:

- (1) Date found, location (map reference).
- (2) Type of equipment and quantity.
- (3) Origin or apparent source of item, if known.
- (4) Brief description with distinguishing marks.
- (5) Technical characteristics with an immediate value.
- (6) Signature of the commander of capturing unit.
- (7) Time and origin of the message.

APPENDIX XI

THE ANALYSIS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

1. General

a. The analysis of the area of operations shows the effects of the characteristics of the area on the general courses of action that the enemy and friendly forces may adopt. Elements considered in an analysis of the area of operations include climatic or weather conditions, relief and drainage systems, vegetation, surface materials, manmade features, military aspects of the area, observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain features, avenues of approach, air avenues of approach, and effects of the area on combat service support.

b. The preparation of the analysis of the area of operations is a responsibility of the intelligence officer, although other staff officers assist in preparation.

2. Sources of Information

a. Analysis of the area of operations and studies prepared by higher headquarters are valuable source materials in the preparation of an analysis of the area of operations. The conclusions of analyses prepared by higher headquarters are usually not directly applicable to a subordinate unit. Considerations that are important to the higher commander's mission are not necessarily applicable at the subordinate headquarters.

b. Technical reports, maps and photos, and reports of ground and air reconnaissance are valuable as sources of information in the preparation of an analyses of the area of operations.

c. Other staff officers assist in the preparation of the analysis by furnishing specialized information (par. 58).

- (1) At all echelons of command, the engineer produces and distributes terrain studies including soil analyses and technical interpretation of terrain characteristics of military significance

including obstacles, routes, avenues of approach, cover and concealment, and trafficability.

- (2) At field army and at comparable and higher headquarters, the preparation of intelligence studies of manmade features of the area of operations is the responsibility of the technical service staff officer concerned with such features.
- (3) Weather information of both a general and a special nature is provided by the staff weather officer.
- (4) Information and analyses of political, economic, sociological, and psychological aspects of the civil community are obtained from the civil affairs officer.

3. Contents of the Analysis

a. An annotated example of a written analysis of the area of operations is contained in FM 101-5.

b. Additional guidance is provided in subsequent paragraphs, the titles of which correspond to selected paragraphs and subparagraphs of the example.

4. Climatic or Weather Conditions

a. This paragraph of the analysis lists the items of weather information that have military significance. Throughout the remainder of the analysis, the weather information is interpreted as to its operational effects. For example, winds at low temperatures are interpreted in terms of the windchill factor and the resulting effects on operations, such as an attack or defense which must face the prevailing winds, or the use of open or closed storage facilities.

b. Light data always are given as it is necessary for the selection of courses of action and the conduct of military activities.

- (1) The beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT) and the end of eve-

ning nautical twilight (EENT) are the beginning and end, respectively, of enough light for limited visibility. The beginning of morning civil twilight (BMCT) and the end of evening civil twilight (EECT) are the beginning and end, respectively, of adequate light for large-scale operations.

- (2) Moon phases and other phenomena such as atmospheric conditions and star brilliance, influence night operations. During full moonlight, conditions of visibility sometimes approach that of daylight. Such conditions are anticipated as they influence friendly and enemy courses of action such as attacks, patrolling, and changes in dispositions at night.

5. Relief and Drainage System

Drainage and ridge lines are the basic elements in studying terrain as they clearly indicate the general shape of the ground. A complete study of the relief and drainage includes detailed information about slope, configuration, elevation of ground forms, and depth, width, and condition of banks and bottoms of streams and rivers. These items can be portrayed graphically on maps by various methods.

6. Vegetation

Vegetation studies are best presented in the form of colored, or otherwise marked, overlays.

7. Surface Materials

These data, if extensive, are best presented in colored or marked overlays. In preparing these data, soil maps made by the agricultural services of various countries are particularly valuable. The information contained in soil maps can frequently be translated into a trafficability map and a map of areas susceptible to high intensities of induced radioactivity. A trafficability map, based on weather forecasts, and colored or marked to indicate degrees of trafficability, effectively shows areas suitable for cross-country movement.

8. Manmade Features

These data provide detailed information of military significant manmade features. These

features, if extensive, are best presented on a map or marked overlays.

9. Additional Characteristics

Only those characteristics which influence the choice of a course of action by either force are included. Only the pertinent data of applicable characteristics which influence the choice of a course of action by either opposing force are listed. Lengthy data are presented in annexes, preferably in tabular form.

10. Military Aspects of the Area

This paragraph analyzes the facts listed in the "General Description of the Area" paragraph and determines their influence on the tactical and combat service support factors that are considered in the selection of a course of action by either force. In the analysis of these factors, the effects of and on nuclear fires, chemical and biological agents, and important devices and equipment used in implementing courses of action are integrated as appropriate. The tactical aspects of observation and fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain features, avenues of approach, and the combat service aspects are discussed in the following paragraphs.

11. Observation and Fire

a. Observation depends on conditions of weather and terrain which permit a force to see the enemy either visually or through the use of surveillance devices. The highest terrain in an area usually provides the best observation. The increased use of equipment with line-of-sight characteristics requires the availability of suitable terrain features for sighting purposes. The capability of employing organic aerial platforms reduces the requirement to use such terrain. Smoke clouds from materials (vegetation and buildings) set on fire by thermal effects of nuclear weapons obstruct visual and some types of electronic observation. Dust clouds caused by nuclear blast reduce both visual and electronic observation. Other factors that limit or deny observation include smoke, fog, precipitation, darkness, woods, and tall vegetation.

b. Fire, as used in the analysis of the area of operations, includes the field of fire of the weapon and characteristics of weapons delivery systems affected by weather and terrain. For example, gusty surface winds affect the use of

free rockets. High, irregular, terrain features may limit the field of fire of weapons. A field of fire is an area that weapons can cover effectively with fire from given positions. Although observation is essential to effective control of fire, the best observation does not always guarantee the best field of fire. An ideal field of fire for flat-trajectory weapons is an open area in which the enemy can be seen and on which he has no protection from the fire of such weapons.

12. Concealment and Cover

a. Concealment is protection from enemy observation and may be provided by woods, underbrush, snowdrifts, tall grass, cultivated vegetation, darkness, smoke, dust, fog, ground haze, rain, or falling snow.

b. Cover is protection from the effects of enemy fires and is provided by ditches, quarries, caves, riverbanks, folds in the ground, shell craters, buildings, walls, railroad embankments and cuts, sunken roads, and highway fills. Defiladed areas which provide protection against nonnuclear weapons do not necessarily protect against effects of nuclear fires. Unless the forward slopes of a terrain mass are very steep, blast will affect personnel and materiel on the reverse slope because the blast wave follows the configuration of all but the most rugged terrain. When a nuclear weapon is fired over a deep valley, or the valley axis points toward ground zero, the blast effects may be channeled and increase damage. Irregular terrain provides some cover from thermal radiation of nuclear fires. Few buildings are sufficiently strong to withstand all effects of blast and, if not damaged or destroyed by blast, may be damaged by thermal radiation. Foxholes, bunkers, and tunnel type shelters offer the simplest forms of effective cover.

c. Concealment and cover are desirable for both the attack and the defense. If troops can move forward under the concealment of woods, fog, or a moonless night, the chances of achieving surprise are greater. If troops can move protected from enemy's fire by ditches, embankments, or walls, the attack will be more effective. A defender seeks to defend behind an area which has cover for the defending troops and concealment for their organization of the ground, but does not offer the enemy covered approaches.

d. The mobility of the command is considered in determining available cover and concealment. Cover and concealment are desirable during troop movements by any means. Routes which afford good cover and concealment reduce the vulnerability of a moving force to detection and to destruction by fire.

13. Obstacles

a. An obstacle is any natural or artificial terrain feature which stops or impedes military movement. Natural obstacles include rivers, streams, canals, lakes, swamps, cliffs, steep slopes, dense woods, jungles, deserts, mountains, cities, and certain types of unstable soil. Artificial obstacles are works of construction and destruction executed to stop or impede military movement. They include minefields, craters, antitank ditches, trenches, abatis, roadblocks, deliberately flooded areas, areas contaminated with chemical and biological agents, extensive rubble, forest fires, tree blowdown caused by nuclear fires, and areas contaminated with residual nuclear radiation.

b. Obstacles to be fully effective must be covered by observation and fire. However, even undefended obstacles may channelize an attacker into concentrations which are easier to detect and are suitable for nuclear attack. Obstacles perpendicular to a direction of attack favor the defender by slowing the enemy, forcing him into concentrations that tend to occur while crossing obstacles, and holding the attacker for a longer time under the effective fires of the defense. Obstacles parallel to an axis of advance may give the attacker flank protection. However, parallel obstacles may interfere with lateral movement and coordination.

14. Key Terrain Features

a. A key terrain feature is any locality or area whose seizure or control affords a marked advantage to either opposing force. Key terrain features are selected to indicate areas and localities whose seizure or control must be considered in formulating and selecting courses of action. The selection is based on the mission of the command. Those terrain features are selected which in our control give us a marked advantage in the accomplishment of our mission, or which if seized or controlled by the

enemy hinder materially the accomplishment of the mission. For example, a bridge over an unfordable river may give access to the opposite shore³ without requiring an assault crossing. Control of a road or rail center may reduce the enemy's ability to resist our advance. A level clearing in rough terrain may be the only accessible landing field for airmobile operations. Key terrain varies with the level of command. For example, to an army commander, a large city may afford marked advantages as a communications center, but to a division commander, the high ground which dominates the city may be more important, and the city itself may be an obstacle. Obstacles are rarely key terrain features. The high ground dominating a river rather than the river itself, is usually the key terrain feature for the lower unit commander.

b. Key terrain, in addition to influencing the mission accomplishment, is also highly significant in applying combat power. Control is not insured only by seizure and occupation. Seizure and physical occupancy of key terrain features by relatively large forces may not be feasible. Destructive fires delivered by long-range means can destroy forces physically occupying key terrain. The commander controls key terrain and avoids destruction of his forces while keeping the enemy from gaining control. Control includes maneuver, surveillance, security, and use of fires. Terrain which permits or denies maneuver may be key terrain. Tactical use of terrain often is directed at increasing the capability for applying combat power and at the same time forcing the enemy into areas which result in reduction of his ability to apply his combat power. Terrain which permits this also may be key terrain. The effect of terrain on maneuver, application of combat power, and preservation of force integrity are considerations in selecting key terrain, its control, and tactical use.

c. In the offense, key terrain features are usually forward of the friendly dispositions and are often assigned as objectives. However, terrain features in adjacent sectors may be key terrain features if their control is necessary for the continuation of the attack or the accomplishment of the mission. If the mission is to destroy enemy forces, terrain may be

selected whose seizure helps insure the required destruction. If the mission is to seize or secure an area, terrain is selected which insures control of the area. Terrain which gives the enemy effective observation along an axis of advance to be used by the friendly forces may be key terrain if the enemy must be denied its possession or control. Key terrain may be within friendly territory when its control is essential to the success of an offensive operation. For example, if the enemy can attack before our attack and seize or control a terrain feature which prevents or hinders the launching of our attack, then the control of that terrain feature affords us a marked advantage and it is key terrain.

d. In the defense, key terrain features are usually within the assigned sector and within or behind the selected defensive area. These features are normally—

- (1) Terrain which gives good observation over avenues of approach to and into the defensive position.
- (2) Terrain which permits the defender to cover an obstacle by fire.
- (3) Important communication centers which affect command, communications, and the use of reserves.

e. Key terrain features also may be forward of the defensive area or in adjacent sectors. For example, a terrain feature forward of the edge of the battle area, or in an adjacent sector which gives the enemy good observation over defended localities, communication routes, or enemy avenues of approach, is a key terrain feature when active measures must be taken to reduce the enemy advantage. The defender may move his position forward to include the feature or take action to minimize the enemy advantage by the use of fire, chemicals, smoke, concealment, and cover.

15. Avenues of Approach

a. An avenue of approach is a relatively easy route for a force of a particular size to reach an objective or key terrain. To be considered an avenue of approach, a route must provide some ease of movement and enough width for dispersion of a force of a sufficient size to affect significantly the outcome of the operation. The division G2 usually considers avenues of ap-

proach adequate for at least the type brigade of the particular division. The corps and higher G2 usually consider avenues of approach adequate for at least a division. In determining the width of dispersion, consideration is given to the deployment patterns, mobility means, and the area required for maneuver to prevent presenting lucrative targets for nuclear fires.

b. A valley approach gives the advancing force some cover from enemy direct fire and some concealment from enemy observation. A valley approach includes the floor of the valley, the slopes of the ridges, and the military crests. Control of the military crests on each side of the valley is essential. In a valley approach, the best axis of advance is that which offers the best observation, cross-country trafficability, road net, fields of fire, concealment and cover, and dispersion. In evaluating the use of a deep valley approach, the possible intensification of nuclear effects and resulting greater casualties on the valley floor are considered. At times, the best axis may be along the slopes of a ridge below the military crests, rather than along the valley floor.

c. The use of a ridge approach depends upon the width and shape of the ridge, the size and deployment of the units involved, and the distance to the elevation of adjacent ridges. A ridge approach usually has the advantage of placing the axis of advance along good observation. However, there may be little protection from enemy fire on the ridge. The best axis of advance in a ridge approach is often slightly below the topographical crest, with sufficient force on the crest to control it.

16. Air Avenues of Approach

a. An air avenue of approach is a route which provides a suitable flight path for a particular number of aircraft to reach a drop or landing zone. To be considered an air avenue of approach, a flight path must afford some ease of movement for a force of sufficient size to produce a significant effect on the operation. In selecting air avenues of approach the major considerations are adequate airspace for rapid movement of the aircraft to landing or drop zones, ground observation, easily recognized terrain features, terrain corridors, and length of the flight path.

b. In selecting avenues of approach for tactical helicopter operations, the major concern is concealment. Routes selected provide defilade and are easy to follow; therefore, navigation at low altitudes is not a problem. Ridge lines are crossed as infrequently as possible to reduce exposure time to radar detection. Steep defiles or canyons are avoided, especially when there is an appreciable amount of surface wind because momentary loss of aircraft control occurs from downdrafts. Heavily forested and swampy areas provide good routes as ground troops have little opportunity to see, or to take under fire, the helicopters passing overhead at tree-top level. Low altitude operations over heavy foliage distort the acoustic wave from aircraft and decrease the distance at which the sound can be detected. It also hampers determination of the direction of the noise source by ground observers. Aviation officers assist in evaluating the effect of air density, altitude, and visibility on selected avenues of approach.

17. Combat Service Support Aspects

a. The analysis of the facts and subconclusions developed in the preceding parts of the analysis are further studied for their effects on both friendly and enemy combat service support activities. In this paragraph the effects of the characteristics of the area on combat service support that influence the selection of a course of action by either force are determined.

b. In studying the influence of the area, consideration is given to effects on matters such as availability of adequate routes for lines of communication, facilities for maintenance and storage, construction resources, public health situation, required shelter for administrative facilities, availability of labor, maintenance of discipline, law and order, and control of refugees.

18. Effects of Characteristics of the Area

This paragraph contains the conclusions reached on the basis of the facts and subconclusions previously developed. The effects of the characteristics of the area of operations on each significant course of action of which the enemy is physically capable and which, if adopted, affect the accomplishment of our mission are discussed. Usually, the discussion in-

cludes as a minimum, effects on the enemy's ability to defend and on his ability to attack. It also includes, as appropriate, the effects on the enemy's ability to delay, use his reserves, amphibious or airborne forces, nuclear fires, guerrilla forces, chemical and biological agents,

cover and deception, surveillance devices, or to conduct special operations, and support his forces administratively. The discussion of the effects on our courses of action is limited to those required for the accomplishment of the mission.

APPENDIX XII

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Note. The titles of sections I, II, III, and IV of this appendix correspond with the paragraphs of the form for the intelligence estimate as given in FM 101-5. The titles of paragraphs 2 to 16 correspond with subparagraphs of the intelligence estimate form.

Section I. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

1. General

a. (1) Weather and terrain always are included in the characteristics of the area of operations discussed in paragraph 2 of the intelligence estimate. Other characteristics are included if they are important in selecting courses of action by either force to carry out their mission, assigned or assumed. Characteristics, other than weather and terrain, are of greater importance in areas of operations which have large civilian populations and to commands with extensive territorial or combat service support responsibilities.

(2) The effects of each characteristic on nuclear weapons and chemical and biological agents are discussed when either combatant has the capability to use them. The discussion includes consideration of both the weapons effects and the effects on the delivery means.

b. The discussion of the effects of each characteristic of the area of operations on possible enemy courses of action normally includes consideration of ability to attack and to defend. It also includes, as applicable, consideration of effects on other possible enemy courses of action, such as delay, and on the enemy's possible use of particular weapons, methods, techniques, or forces.

c. The extent of consideration of the effects of each characteristic on broad friendly courses of action is limited by the mission. When the mission is offensive, the discussion does not in-

clude consideration of defensive courses of action. It does, however, include considerations of security.

2. Weather

The estimate usually includes a current weather forecast. When operations cover a long period, or are at a future time, climatic information may replace weather forecasts. Light data, in tabular form, include the beginning of morning nautical and civil twilights, the ending of evening nautical and civil twilights, moonrise, moonset, phase of the moon, and other information as required.

3. Terrain

The existing terrain situation usually is described in terms of the tactical aspects of the area, observation and fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain features, and avenues of approach. The discussion of each of these aspects is oriented on their influence on the selection of broad courses of action by either force. For example, for a combat service support unit, the discussion of cover and concealment is oriented on their influence on those courses of action, including installation locations, required to accomplish the combat service support mission and on enemy forces which can interfere with the accomplishment of the mission. In combat service support unit intelligence estimates, discussion of key terrain features is omitted unless the enemy has the capability to seize or control terrain features which will materially effect the accomplishment of the mission.

Section II. ENEMY SITUATION

4. Composition

a. This subparagraph lists the data used for later determination of the strength the enemy may use to prevent the accomplishment of the mission. It lists all the units, including counterinsurgency and guerrilla-type forces, with identifications, that can affect the accomplishment of the mission. Included are such supporting units as air, nuclear delivery, and electronic warfare units that also can affect the accomplishment of the mission. In determining which enemy units can affect the accomplishment of the mission, time and space factors are considered.

b. This subparagraph also lists the guerrilla and paramilitary forces that are operating in the area. These are important considerations for combat service support units and in cold war and in limited war. Other forces, including long-range weapons delivery units, that may be used in support of the enemy ground elements in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission also are listed. Enemy units believed to be under control of the opposing comparable command but which are committed outside the zone of the friendly unit also are listed by tactical units. Elements of the opposing enemy force deployed in areas where time and space factors do not permit their use in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission are indicated specifically.

5. Strength

a. This subparagraph lists all the opposing enemy forces which can be logically employed against the command in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. The total forces listed cannot exceed, but can equal or be less than, the total forces listed in the "composition" subparagraph.

b. Enemy strength is categorized as committed forces, reinforcements, air, nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare. Air, nuclear, chemical, or biological warfare units are omitted, as appropriate, when the enemy lacks such capabilities to interfere with the accomplishment of the mission.

6. Committed Forces

a. Committed forces are those enemy ground units, their immediate reserves, and their supporting ground fire units, committed against the friendly unit, whose area of employment is not expected to change to counter the specific course of action selected by the friendly commander. Committed forces may change dispositions within their area of employment, but no significant delay is involved in their employment. Designation of enemy forces as committed forces depends primarily upon their disposition, location at the time of the estimate, and the echelon at which the estimate is being prepared. If there is doubt whether an enemy unit is a committed force, it is considered as a reinforcement (par. 7, this app.). This reduces the risk of the friendly command being surprised.

b. Usually a G2 accounts for committed enemy forces by the size unit used to oppose the friendly size unit used in his headquarters as a basis for planning and conducting operations. For example, against Aggressor organized as given in FM 30-102, a division G2 usually counts committed forces in terms of battalions; a corps G2 in terms of regiments; and field army and higher headquarters, in terms of divisions. At headquarters above field army a statement of the number of armies and army groups the enemy has committed also is included. For example, "The committed forces facing this army group consist of 1 army group (3 combined arms armies with a total of 11 motorized rifle divisions and 3 tank divisions) * * *." Where the committed forces, such as guerrillas, do not have a known organization, the strength is stated in total numbers.

c. Illustrative example:

- (1) *Situation.* See figure 16. The 20th Inf Div, an interior division, is advancing to the south. The advance of the division has been stopped by elements of two reinforced motorized rifle regiments of the Aggressor 17th Mtz Rifle Div. Each of these 2 motorized rifle regiments has 2 motorized




Figure 16. Schematic sketch.




Figure 17. Schematic situation sketch.

rifle battalions (reinforced) in contact and 1 motorized rifle battalion (reinforced) in regimental reserve. The third motorized rifle regiment of this division is in contact with the 72d Inf Div on the flank of the 20th Inf Div. About 25 miles in rear of the 17th Mtz Rifle Div, and in the area of the 20th Inf Div objective, 2 motorized rifle regiments of the Aggressor 11th Mtz Rifle Div are preparing field fortifications.

- (2) *Discussion.* Only the 4 committed battalions (those in contact) of the 2 motorized rifle regiments in contact with the 20th Inf Div are considered as committed forces by the division G2. Regardless of the specific courses of action selected by the commander of the 20th Inf Div to continue the advance, the area of employment of these four battalions in contact will not change appreciably, even if they shift subordinate elements within their areas. Their reserve battalions can be employed in differing areas. The battalions of the 17th Mtz Rifle Div are not considered as committed forces as they are not launched in action against the 20th Inf Div. The two regiments of the 11th Mtz Rifle Div are not considered as committed forces because they are not committed against the 20th Inf Div and the area of their commitment, considering their present location, may depend on the particular courses of action selected by the commanders of the 20th Inf Div and the adjacent divisions, and enemy plans. At this time, the enemy commander is free to commit all or part of them against the 20th Inf Div or adjacent divisions, at various points subject to time and space considerations. The regiment of the 17th Mtz Rifle Div in contact with the 72d Inf Div is mentioned in the "composition" subparagraph. Only the reserve battalion is mentioned in the reinforcement portion of the strength subparagraph because the other two battalions are committed outside the zone of the 20th Inf Div.

d. Illustrative example:

- (1) *Situation.* The 20th Inf Div is attacking to the east (fig. 17).
- (2) *Discussion.* The committed forces are 1 battalion of the 3d Mtz Rifle Regt, 3 battalions of the 5th Mtz Rifle Regt, and 1 battalion of the 6th Mtz Rifle Regt. The 3d Bn of the Aggressor 3d Mtz Rifle Regt is from its location, in regimental reserve and has not been committed. As all battalions of the 5th Mtz Rifle Regt appear to be committed against the 20th Inf Div, they are committed forces. The 2d Bn of the 6th Mtz Regt on the south is, from its location, the reserve of the 6th Mtz Rifle Regt and has not been committed. The other units not discussed are not committed forces because they are not committed against the 20th Inf Div and their area of commitment depends on the courses of action selected by the commanders of the 20th Inf Div and the adjacent divisions and enemy plans.

7. Reinforcements

a. Reinforcements are those enemy forces whose area of possible employment against the friendly force depends on the friendly selection of a specific course of action and enemy plans. Reinforcements include all known enemy forces which are neither committed against a friendly force nor committed outside the friendly zone or sector, but which can reasonably be considered capable of closing with the friendly force in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. All uncommitted enemy forces are considered as reinforcements if they can be committed in time to affect the accomplishment of its mission.

b. Illustrative example:

- (1) *Situation.* Same as described in paragraph 6c(1), this appendix.
- (2) *Discussion.* The 2 regiments of the Aggressor 11th Mtz Rifle Div and the 3 motorized rifle battalions apparently in regimental reserve are considered as reinforcements. These units are not committed against the friendly

force and can be committed in time to affect the mission of the 20th Inf Div. Although the two regiments of the 11th Mtz Rifle Div are digging field fortifications in the vicinity of the division objective, the enemy commander can employ them against the 20th Inf Div at various times and places in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. The enemy also can employ these units against the divisions adjacent to the 20th Inf Div.

c. Illustrative example:

- (1) *Situation.* See figure 17.
- (2) *Discussion.* The Aggressor rifle regiment and tank regiment in the assembly area astride the 20th Inf Div north boundary, the Aggressor rifle regiment south of the south boundary, and the two uncommitted battalions forward, are reinforcements. None of these units are committed. From their locations and dispositions, it is apparent that they are the reserves of the two Aggressor divisions and the reserves of the regiments committed against the 20th Inf Div. Depending on the course of action selected by the commander of the 20th Inf Div and the enemy plans, all or part of these Aggressor elements can be employed against the 20th Inf Div at various times and places, in time to affect the accomplishment of the division mission.

d. Reinforcements are stated in convenient and meaningful terms. For example, if the opposing division has a rifle regiment in reserve, this reinforcement is referred to as a "rifle regiment," rather than "three rifle battalions." When enemy units, either committed forces or reinforcements are very much understrength, the estimated remaining strength is expressed. Two divisions, each at half strength, are usually more formidable than a single division at full strength because of the added flexibility of employment and the additional combat support probably available. A half strength field artillery battalion is more than half as effective as a full strength battalion.

8. Air

The enemy air capability is based upon numbers of enemy aircraft within operational radius, maintenance facilities, expected attrition, the ground tactical situation, and other factors. The supporting tactical air force furnishes intelligence on the number of sorties, by type, which the enemy can be expected to make within the field army or comparable areas. The estimate usually is not prorated below the field army level. Usually no attempt is made to calculate the number of sorties the enemy can or may make against a subordinate command of the field army or communications zone section. Corps, division, and communications zone section intelligence officers usually quote the estimate furnished by the higher headquarters in stating enemy air capabilities. For example, a corps or division G2 might state, "30th Army estimates that the enemy can be expected to attack within the army area with as many as 150 fighter, 100 attack, and 75 bomber sorties daily. By massing all aircraft within operational radius, the enemy can make a maximum of 250 fighter, 300 attack, and 250 bomber sorties daily."

9. Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Warfare

a. Estimates of these enemy capabilities usually are prepared at field army and higher headquarters. Units below field army level usually lack the means to gather the information to make such estimates, and use the estimates of the higher headquarters, modifying them with available information.

b. The determination of enemy nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare capabilities is based primarily on estimates of numbers and types of weapons and amount and types of agents available, knowledge of enemy doctrine, past experience, and estimates of enemy capabilities involving the employment of ground troops. As with the enemy air capability, it is rarely feasible to estimate what proportion of the available enemy nuclear or CB effort may be used against a division or corps within a field army or a command in the communication zone. It is also rarely feasible to estimate the number of nuclear weapons the enemy is capable of using within a period as short as

1 day. The period selected is a month or other period depending on the available information and past experience.

c. The statement of the enemy capabilities to use chemical and biological warfare agents includes, if known, the amount, type, and delivery means of available chemical and biological munitions.

10. Recent and Present Significant Activities

This paragraph summarizes recent and current enemy activities which may point to future enemy actions. Significant enemy failures to take actions also are listed. For example, if the enemy is apparently defending behind a river obstacle but has failed to destroy certain bridges, the omission is listed as a significant activity. Any basis for belief that the enemy has specific knowledge of the friendly situation or intentions also is listed. For example, mention is made of capture by the enemy of an operation order, or compromise of current signal operation instructions or cover and deception operations.

11. Peculiarities and Weaknesses

a. This paragraph lists peculiarities and weaknesses and briefly discusses each, indicating the extent to which it is a vulnerability and how the selection of broad friendly courses of action are affected. For example, if the enemy has an open flank, the fact is stated in the "operations" part of the subparagraph and the extent to which the open flank constitutes an exploitable vulnerability is discussed briefly. If enemy reserves are small and are poorly positioned to extend the flank, the vulnerability may be great. If the enemy reserves are large and in position to extend the flank or to counterattack an enveloping force, the vulnerability is probably insignificant. The G2 might state it as, "The enemy north flank is open. Available reserves are adequate to extend this flank a distance of only about 3,000 yards. Positions to extend the flank have not been prepared. The enemy is vulnerable to a flank attack." Conversely, it might be stated as, "The enemy north flank is open. However, available reserves are adequate either to extend this flank beyond our zone, or to counterattack an enveloping force. Positions suitable to block an at-

tempted envelopment have been prepared as shown on the enemy situation map." In the first case, the enemy's vulnerability to a flank attack is carried forward to the "Conclusions" paragraph of the intelligence estimate. In the second case, the open flank apparently is not a vulnerability, and is not carried any further. Another example, if the guerrilla forces are poorly equipped with antitank means of all types, the fact is stated in the "logistics" part of the subparagraph and the extent to which this is an exploitable vulnerability is discussed briefly. The intelligence officer might state, "The guerrilla forces in our area are poorly equipped with antitank means. They cannot effectively defend against armored vehicles." The inability to defend against armored vehicles is carried forward to the "Conclusions" paragraph as vulnerability.

b. Typical peculiarities and weaknesses include—

(1) Personnel.

Replacement situation (shortages or overages, particularly in specialists).

Morale less than excellent, or exceptionally high. Disproportionate number of very young or very old men.

High rate of sickness.

Percentage of authorized strength, if less than 80 percent.

(2) Intelligence.

Susceptibility to deception or neutralization of certain enemy information collecting agencies.

Overdependence on one or more categories of information sources.

Ineffectiveness of enemy intelligence.

(3) Operations.

Habitual repetition of certain schemes of maneuver, or unconventional patterns of operations.

Faulty organization of the ground.

Faulty disposition of reserves.

Susceptibility to electronic countermeasures.

Inadequate troop training, especially in defense against nuclear weapons or chemical and biological agents.

Lack of adequate mobility.

Inadequate air or artillery support, or nuclear weapons delivery systems.
Pronounced failure to disperse and dig in.
Habitual failure to attack certain types of targets.

(4) *Logistics.*

Shortages or inadequacies of particular supplies and materiel, including nuclear weapons.

Status of equipment, if less than 80 percent.

Large concentrations of supplies.

Location of vulnerable points and bottlenecks in the logistics system or lines of communication.

Inability to resupply during action.

Failure to equip troops with protective masks or protective clothing.

(5) *Civil affairs.*

Hostile attitude toward the civil populace, or of the civil populace toward the enemy.

Inadequacies in the control of civil communications, to include movement of civilians.

(6) *Personalities.*

Peculiarities or weaknesses of the enemy commander, major subordinate commanders, or principal staff officers, as disclosed by or deduced from their past performance, education, politics, experience, or other basis.

Section III. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

12. Enumeration

This paragraph lists the enemy capabilities. Enemy capabilities are courses of action which the enemy can adopt and which will influence the accomplishment of the friendly mission, either favorably or unfavorably. A properly stated enemy capability indicates *what* the enemy can do, *when* he can do it, *where* he can do it, and *in what* strength he can do it. For example, "Attack (*what*) now (*when*) along our front (*where*) the five motorized rifle battalions supported by all available nuclear weapons, artillery and air (*strength*)."
Another example, "Conduct harassing operations (*what*) at any time (*when*) in our area (*where*) with about 200 guerrillas equipped only with small arms (*strength*)."
For determination of enemy capabilities see paragraphs 17 through 23, this appendix.

13. Analysis and Discussion

a. The evidence considered in the analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities includes characteristics of the area of operation and positive or negative evidence of enemy activity. A major obstacle across part of the friendly area is evidence that attack elsewhere is more likely. Low ceilings and low visibility are evidence that the enemy may not use all his avail-

able aircraft. Open, flat areas without any appreciable cover are evidence that the enemy may not use guerrilla or infiltration forces.

b. In analyzing and discussing each enemy capability, or appropriate combination, the intelligence officer judges from the *enemy* point of view the advantage or disadvantage in adopting the capability. In making this judgment, the G2 also considers the enemy doctrine and practices and the ultimate results of adoption or rejection of the particular capability. For example, "The enemy employment of the unidentified tank division at TNOMYEH will deprive him of the reserves to counterattack a penetration by either of the two friendly divisions to our south. Commitment of this tank division too early will result in the later defeat of the enemy."

c. If there is no evidence of the enemy possible adoption of a particular capability, and the capability does not represent a major threat to the accomplishment of the mission, the intelligence officer does not judge it. For example, the enemy usually can withdraw beyond our objective. Ordinarily, such withdrawal is not a threat to the accomplishment of the mission. If there is no evidence that the enemy may withdraw, a statement of conclusions is omitted. The intelligence officer merely states "There is no indication of withdrawal."

Section IV. CONCLUSIONS

14. Effects of the Area on Our Courses of Action

The conclusions in these paragraphs, if included, are stated in the manner discussed in paragraph 18, appendix XI.

15. Probable Courses of Action

a. The determination of probable enemy courses of action is fully justified by the previous analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities. In this determination, consideration also is given to how the enemy views his own vulnerabilities as indicated by his doctrine, past experiences, and personality of the enemy commander. Consideration also is given to previous enemy selection of courses of action under similar circumstances. The determination is objective and not a guess at what the enemy will do. It is the conclusion, based on the available evidence, what he is *most likely* to do.

b. In determining the relative probability of adoption of enemy courses of action, the intelligence officer avoids conclusions based on our doctrines and practices. The available evidence considered in the determination includes the *enemy* doctrine and practices as well as positive or negative enemy activity. If the available evidence of enemy *activity* is not definitive enough alone to justify selection of an enemy course of action most probable of adoption, the intelligence officer selects one based on the characteristics of the area of operations, enemy doctrine, enemy practices, and the available evidence. Conclusions reached on this basis, are so indicated to the commander.

c. In the statement of courses of action most likely of adoption by the enemy, several capabilities may be combined for brevity and clarity. All the enemy capabilities combined in one statement must be capable of being implemented at the same time. For example, the most probable enemy course of action may be, "Attack to envelop our north flank reinforced by his corps reserve and using all available nuclear weapons, artillery, and air support and conduct harassing operations in our rear areas with guerrillas and infiltrating forces."

16. Vulnerabilities

a. An enemy vulnerability is any condition or circumstance of the enemy situation or the area of operations which makes the enemy especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat. In this paragraph, only those enemy vulnerabilities which may be exploited are considered. In studying the enemy peculiarities and weaknesses to determine such vulnerabilities, the characteristics of the area of operations, all aspects of the enemy situation, and the enemy's doctrine and practices are considered. Only actual vulnerabilities are presented. An open north flank which the enemy cannot, with available forces, extend or refuse, is a vulnerability. If, however, the enemy has reserves which can readily extend the flank to an impassable obstacle, or counterattack to pin enveloping troops against that obstacle, the open flank is a vulnerability only if the enemy reserves are destroyed. In such a case the open flank is mentioned as a possible vulnerability subject to destruction of the enemy reserves.

b. Each exploitable enemy vulnerability is listed as a brief statement of the effect of the vulnerability rather than a repetition of the peculiarity or weakness. For example, "Shortage of antitank means" is not stated. Instead, the effect of that weakness is given by stating, "Limited capability to opposed armored vehicles." The vulnerability discussed in *a* above, could be stated as "Enemy north flank open to envelopment subject to destruction of enemy reserves at * * *." The order of listing vulnerabilities does not matter.

c. In determining the enemy vulnerabilities to list, the G2 considers the feasibility of their exploitation by his own, higher, and subordinate commanders. However, recommendation to the commander of courses of action to be adopted is the responsibility of the G3. The listing of enemy vulnerabilities does not mean that they can all be exploited at the same time. Frequently, the exploitation of one vulnerability precludes the exploitation of another vulnerability. For example, the enemy may be vulnerable to both a night penetration and a day-time flank envelopment.

Section V. DETERMINATION OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

17. General

a. Commanders base plans and actions upon estimates of enemy capabilities and the probability of their adoption. Enemy capabilities can be estimated objectively because they are based upon knowledge of the area of operations, enemy situation, enemy doctrine, and time and space factors. Indications of enemy intentions may be a consideration; however, intentions can seldom be determined. The enemy commander may change his mind or his higher commanders may change his orders. The enemy may practice cover and deception to indicate actions different from those which he actually intends.

b. In considering enemy capabilities, actions which are grossly disadvantageous to the enemy, or unreasonable, are not included. For example, the enemy may be physically capable of disengaging troops committed outside our zone in order to employ them against us. However, in most circumstances the G2 does not consider this to be a capability because it is unreasonable.

18. The "What" of an Enemy Capability

a. Four general tactical operations are usually possible. The enemy can attack, defend, or withdraw, and can usually reinforce his committed troops. These operations are usually divisible into a variety of specific courses of action. For example, an attack may be a penetration, an envelopment, or a turning movement. A defense may be in one position or in successive positions, and may be either static or mobile.

b. The specific activities which the enemy can physically adopt depend upon the available means and conditions under which those means can be used. Consequently, the *what* of each of the enemy's capabilities is determined by considering the characteristics of the area of operations, the order of battle of the opposing forces, and time and space factors. Study of the characteristics of the area of operations, our situation, and the means available to the enemy, usually indicates that the enemy is physically capable of certain actions, but that others are impracticable. For example, the

enemy can develop only when we have an assailable flank, and can conduct airborne operations only when he has the necessary troops and aircraft.

19. The "When" of an Enemy Capability

a. The time at which the enemy can put into effect any of his capabilities depends upon the dispositions of his forces and equipment. Committed forces can be employed without significant delay, and can attack or defend now. Forces disposed at some distance behind the edge of the battle area cannot be committed immediately; they must first be moved to the place of employment. Complicated weapons systems such as long range missiles, may require time to set up after reaching launching sites before missiles can be fired.

b. An enemy capability involving displacement of forces cannot be put into effect until sometime after the force has started to move. Reserves cannot reinforce an attack or defense until they have been moved to appropriate locations such as attack positions or forward assembly areas. Consequently, time and space factors are computed in determining the *when* of a capability involving the displacement of forces or equipment. These computations are discussed in paragraph 23, this appendix.

c. References to *when* usually are omitted from a statement of the enemy air, nuclear, chemical, and biological capabilities and other capabilities if "at any time" is intended. References to *when* usually are omitted from statements of enemy capabilities pertaining to withdrawal and delay in successive positions as "at any time" is implied. Such actions can be started at any time. In withdrawal capabilities, reference may be made to the time of the start of the withdrawal. For example, "The enemy can withdraw beyond our objective at any time before our attack."

20. The "Where" of an Enemy Capability

a. The *where* of an enemy capability depends upon the weather, terrain, and disposition of his forces. Under existing and predictable conditions of weather, the terrain may provide avenues of approach into our position from the front, flanks, or rear. Conversely, it may

prevent the enemy's use of armored, mechanized, or airborne forces in certain areas. Cross compartments may provide the enemy with suitable defense or delaying positions. The existence of suitable objectives, drop or landing zones, indicates where airborne forces may be employed. The presence of suitable beaches suggests where enemy amphibious forces may land. The locations of adequate assembly areas and attack positions indicate where enemy missile launchers may be located. Accordingly, the intelligence officer determines the *where* of each enemy capability through analysis and integration of the characteristics of the area of operations with the situations of the opposing forces. If the enemy is physically capable of launching an attack, the G2 asks himself in effect, "Where can he do it?" If the enemy defends, he asks, "Where are suitable defensive positions and to what places must reinforcements be moved before they can be committed?" If the enemy delays in successive positions, he asks, "Where are the favorable delaying positions?"

b. Examples.

- (1) If the enemy can attack, and the situation and the area of operations indicate that the attack may strike anywhere along our front, the partially stated enemy capability becomes: "Attack along our front * * *." In other circumstances, enemy capabilities, stated in part, may include: "Attack to envelop our north flank * * *," or "Attack in the direction BEIRUTACRE" or "Land (amphibious or airborne) forces in the vicinity of * * *."
- (2) Partial statements of an enemy defense capability may include: "Defend in his present position * * *," or "Defend the line of the OB River * * *."
- (3) Delay capabilities may include: "Delay in his present and successive positions to the line of the HAN River * * *," or "Delay along the general lines PAULUS-JOANA, PENNYA-WILLTHIR, * * *."
- (4) Partial statements of the enemy's reinforcement capability may include:

"Reinforcement an envelopment of our north flank * * *," or "Reinforce his defense of the line * * *."

21. The "In What Strength" of an Enemy Capability

a. The strength the enemy can use in any particular capability depends primarily upon the composition, dispositions, and strength of his available forces. Order of battle intelligence furnishes necessary data.

b. Forces which the enemy has committed against us can be employed in almost any capability the enemy chooses to adopt. If 6 motorized rifle battalions are committed against a division, the enemy can attack with 6 motorized rifle battalions, supported by all available artillery, air, and nuclear weapons, etc. He also can defend in his present position with the same 6 battalions and the same support. In addition to the forces committed, the enemy also can use the reserves available at any echelon. If the enemy has 6 battalions committed and a regiment in reserve, he usually can reinforce either his attack or his defense with the reserve regiment. A partial statement of this capability could be, "Attack now to envelope our north flank with 6 motorized rifle battalions supported by all available artillery, and nuclear weapons, air, reinforced by 1 motorized rifle regiment at the following times and places * * *."

c. The statement of strength is usually confined to close combat units such as infantry, armor, guerrilla, and mechanized (including reconnaissance) units and their combat support means such as artillery, air, nuclear weapons, and chemical agents. The usual unit of enemy strength is the battalion or a larger unit. Guerrilla strength is expressed in total numbers, if more appropriate. Units smaller than the battalion may be used, if appropriate. The *number* and *details* of artillery, air, and similar units, available to support the enemy's operations, are specified in the "strength" subparagraph of the intelligence estimate and are usually not repeated in the statement of a capability involving support of close combat units. The numbers and types of sorties or weapons such units can deliver are usually stated in detail only in a separate capability distinct from support of close combat units.

d.¹ Reference to "in what strength" usually is omitted in the statement of enemy capabilities for withdrawal and delay in successive positions capabilities as it is implied that such actions involve all the available forces.

22. Capabilities in Support of Combat Forces

a. Some enemy capabilities refer specifically to the support of close combat forces rather than to the capabilities of close combat units. Such capabilities include air, nuclear and chemical and biological warfare, cover and deception, and electronic warfare capabilities.

b. Enemy combat support capabilities, such as use of electronic warfare and cover and deception, are stated when enemy implementation of such activities will significantly affect the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Statements of such capabilities include when the capability can be implemented, the area over which the capability will be effective, and the enemy resources available or the results that can be accomplished. The "where" is omitted if it is meant anywhere throughout the unit area of operations. For example, "Start cover and deception operations at any time to include initiative and manipulative transmissions and use of special units capable of depicting two divisions, either tank or motorized rifle," or "Aggressor can intercept and jam our electromagnetic radiations at any time from any areas where he has line of sight to our transmitters and to the receivers to be jammed."

23. Reinforcement Capabilities

a. The time required for an enemy to move troops from one place to another and then commit them to action is determined on the basis of factors derived from careful analysis of past similar enemy movements. The considerations described below are applicable in training and as a point of departure for the development of experience factors in opera-

tions against an enemy force. See FM 30-102 for Aggressor troop movements.

b. To determine the time when the enemy can employ an uncommitted unit, the travel time from the unit location to a logical point where the unit can be committed is calculated. To the travel time is added the closing time (time length of column). Except when observation of enemy units is continuous, it is assumed that any unit could have started to move immediately after its last reported location. Therefore, to determine the earliest time at which the enemy can reinforce, it is only necessary to add the travel plus closing time to the time last seen. For example, if an enemy reinforcement was last seen at 0800 hours and it can be employed to envelop our north flank 1 hour after starting movement, it is assumed that the attack can be launched as early as 0900 hours (0800 plus 1 hour). In the exceptional case involving piecemeal commitment of enemy reinforcements, travel time only is considered. Forces which are committed piecemeal do not close into an assembly area or attack position.

c. Because observation of reinforcements is rarely continuous, statements of enemy reinforcing capabilities preferably include both the earliest time and the time after starting movement when the reinforcement can be accomplished. For example, "The enemy can reinforce his attack with the 45th Mtz Rifle Regt at 0900 hours, or 1 hour after starting movement." When the time since the last report is greater than the after starting movement time, only the after starting movement time is given. For example, "The enemy can reinforce his attack with the 45th Mtz Rifle Regt now, or 1 hour after starting movement." When the number of reinforcements is large, or the enemy is capable of reinforcing in several areas, reinforcing capabilities are presented in tabular form. For example, "The enemy can reinforce his attack or his defense with all or part of the following units at the places and times indicated below:

Unit	Place	Motor	Foot
45th Mtz Rifle Regt.	RJ 638	Now or 1 hr after starting movement.	091205 Jun or 4 hr 5 min after starting movement.
	RJ 888	090930 Jun or 1 hr 30 min after starting movement.	091605 Jun or 3 hr 5 min after starting movement.
37th Mtz Rifle Regt.	RJ 638	091000 Jun or 2 hr after starting movement.	100740 Jun or 23 hr 40 min after starting movement.
	RJ 888	090920 Jun or 1 hr 20 min after starting movement.	091430 Jun or 6 hr 30 min after starting movement."

d. In selecting a logical point for reinforcement, the effect of such characteristics of the area of operations as avenues of approach, and logical enemy reactions to friendly course of action are considered. For reinforcement of an attack capability, attack positions are selected for battalions and regiments, and forward assembly areas for division and larger units. For units moving to reinforce a defense, defense or counterattack positions are selected. For movements by aircraft, logical landing or drop zones from which the enemy forces can materially affect the accomplishment of the mission are selected.

e. The time required by the enemy to entruck, detruck, issue extra ammunition, make detailed reconnaissance, issue orders, deploy, or move from an attack position to a line of departure, is not considered because all may be completed before starting the operation or simultaneously with the movement.

f. The guidance below is applicable until experience factors against a particular enemy are developed.

- (1) Compute foot marching time for all appropriate reinforcements. Compute motor movement time only for distance greater than 5 miles. If a unit is observed in trucks, compute only the motor movement time.

- (2) Consider a foot march of more than 20 miles as a forced march. Consider a motor movement of more than 175 miles as a forced march for motorized infantry units, and a movement of more than 140 miles as a forced march for armored, tank, and mechanized units.
- (3) At the beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT), if the column is not closing, change the rate of march from night to day. If the column is closing at BMNT, close the column at the night rate of march. At the end of evening nautical twilight (EENT), if the column is not closing, change the rate of march from day to night. If the column is closing at EENT, close the column at the day rate of march.
- (4) To move an enemy infantry battalion, move and close the entire unit. To move a unit of regimental or larger size, move and close two-thirds of the combat elements, that is, 2 battalions of an infantry regiment, 2 regiments of an infantry division. To move a U.S. type armored division, or other unit with a similar flexible organization, move and close two-thirds of the entire division.

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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J. C. LAMBERT,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

EARLE G. WHEELER,
General, United States Army,
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For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320-50.

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